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ABSTRACT 
Foreign Aid, Economic Development and the Indebtedness Problem, 
with Special Reference to the Sudan 
In the task of promoting both economic growth and development 
of the developing countries, both theory and development experience 
suggest that international co-operation in a broad sense has a vital 
role to play. For most developing countries, foreign trade is, and is 
likely. to remain, the most important ingredient of such co-operation, 
although in the absence of a so-called new international economic 
order, its benefits may be smaller than most developing countries 
think to be equitable. But despite the overwhelming importance of 
trade, resource transfers from the more advanced and rich countries 
have a significant and in many cases, a decisive role as well to play 
in augmenting economic development. Resource transfers include 
foreign investment, financial aid and technical assistance. 
The present study principally examines the role of foreign aid - 
including both financial and technical assistance - in economic 
development with particular reference to the Sudan. This focus on aid 
is not intended to under-rate the significance of other forms of 
co-operation between advanced and developing countries in promoting 
the latter's development. This study falls into three main parts which 
together cover most of the principal issues related to foreign aid, and 
examine the situation in the Sudan. 
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Part I is a critical review of the theoretical literature on aid 
and of the controversies that have arisen in the light of the different 
empirical investigations which have been attempted to establish its 
impact upon recipient economies. It also examines the rationale 
behind the provision of aid and the requirements which are to be 
satisfied if it is to be used effectively. 
Part II is an attempt to apply the conceptual framework of the 
previous part to an elucidation of the role of aid in the Sudan's economic 
development. It begins with a brief description of the structure of the 
Sudanese economy and a survey of the trends in available resources. 
In the light of this analysis, a number of key issues are examined: 
in particular the source, composition and end-use of aid funds; the 
significance of Arab capital; the structure of aid management, and the 
role of technical assistance in supplementing domestic skills. Apart 
from these largely qualitative appraisals, the study also attempts to 
apply Weisskopf's behavioural model to evaluate the contribution of 
foreign aid to the Sudanese economy. Part II includes an examination 
of the limitations of such econometric studies. 
Part III examines the so-called debt problem of developing 
countries and its extent. Since foreign aid is not wholly provided in 
grant form, its inflow into developing countries has been accompanied 
by a growing debt. Part III contains a critical appraisal of the 
indebtedness issue of developing countries in the light of recent debates. 
2 
Its prime concern is, however, to identify the causes and to 
demonstrate the immediate as well as the long-term implications of 
debt difficulties. This is followed by a scrutiny of the debt position 
of the Sudan, using for this purpose both published and unpublished 
data. 
Finally, a concluding section summarizes some of the most 
important propositions arrived at in the dissertation. 
.3 
FOREIGN AID, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE IJ DEBTEDNESS PROBLEM, WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE SUDAN 
- by - 
ABUEL GASIM MOHAMED ABUEL NOUR 
A Dissertation presented to the University of St. Andrews (Department 
of Economics) for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland. 
ND 
I 
MVýT 
May 1981. 
L 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that this thesis is based on research carried 
out by me, that the thesis is my own composition, and that it has not 
previously been presented for a higher degree. 
The research was undertaken by me in the University of 
St. Andrews after my admission as a research student under Ordinance 
General No. 12 in October 1977 and as a candidate for the Ph. D. degree 
under this resolution. 
A4 
A. U. M. ABUEL NOUR 
Candidate 
Certificate 
I certify that the aforesaid candidate has fulfilled the 
conditions of the Resolution and Regulations prescribed for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy. 
P. Robson 
Professor of Economics 
Supervisor 
ii 
0 
STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATION 
The Author graduated in the Faculty of Economic and Social 
Studies of the University of Khartoum in April 1973 with B. Sc. (Honours) 
Second Class (Upper Division) in Economics. Then he was employed 
by the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and National Economy up to July 
1974 when he was appointed a Senior Scholar in the Department of 
Economics at the University of Khartoum. 
Thereupon the Author was admitted in October 1975 to read 
for M. A. (Economics) in the University of Manchester on a scholarship 
from the British Council and he graduated in December 1977. In 
October 1977 he was admitted as a research student in the Department 
of Economics at the University of St. Andrews under the Senatus 
Academicus General Ordinance No. (12). During this period. he was 
sponsored by the Sudanese government (University of Khartoum). 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor P. 
Robson for his supervision, constructive suggestions, encouragement 
and concern during the course of this dissertation. My deep appreciation 
extend to Mr. R. S. May for his interest, advice and support. Their 
assistance in easing some of my personal difficulties made my stay in 
St. Andrews a fruitful, an enjoyable and indeed a memorable occasion. 
Dr. B. R. H. S. Rajcoomar kindly clarified a number of issues 
related to the econometric parts of this dissertation and willingly perused 
the final results. I also benefited a great deal from the willingness of 
other Members of the Department of Economics to offer me advice and to 
respond to my queries. I acknowledge the assistance of Mr. C. B. 
Bremener in the Cartography Unit of St. Andrews University in map drawing. 
My thanks extend to an unlimited number of personalities and colleagues 
in the different economic units and research establishments in the Sudan 
for their stimulating ideas and valuable advice on data sources. 
Above all, I am grateful to my parents whose love and overwhelming 
concern have encouraged me during my study period in Britain. I owe a 
great deal to my wife who supported me, made life easier and dedicated 
herself to look after our newly-born daughter while I devoted my time to 
complete this dissertation. I am deeply indebted to the University of 
Khartoum for their concern and financial support. Finally, my thanks 
extend to Mrs. E. Kerr for her precision and perfection in typing the 
final script. 
iv 
TO MY PARENTS FOR ALL THEIR EFFORTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Abbreviations xi 
Introduction 1 
PART I: SOME THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS 
OF FOREIGN AID 4 
Chapter One: The Case for, and the Definition of Foreign 5 
Aid 
1.1 : The Development Gap between the Different 
Countries of the World: A Cause of 5 
Co-operation 
1.2 : The Definition of Foreign Aid, and Some Recent 
Suggestions to raise the Effectiveness of Aid 12 
Programmes by more Multi-lateral Disbursement 
Notes and References 19 
Tables 21 
Chapter Two: The Two-Gap Analysis 22 
2.1 : The Theme of the Two-Gap Approach to Aid 22 
and Development 
2.2 : The Main Criticisms of the Two-Gap Approach 38 
to Aid and Development 
2.3 : Summary and Evaluation 46 
Notes and References 53 
Chapter Three: Absorptive Capacity of Developing 55 
Countries: A Critical Appraisal 
Notes and References 
65 
Chapter Four: The Impact of Foreign Aid on the 
Recipient Countries' Domestic Savings 
66 
4.1 : The Critics of Foreign Aid: Their Statistical 
Findings and Interpretations 
66 
4.2 : Replies to the Critics of Foreign Aid and 
Some Further Interpretations 80 
Notes and References 91 
vi 
Pace 
PART II: A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN 94 
Chapter Five: Some Aspects of the Sudanese Economy 95 
5.1 : Introduction 95 
5.2 : Urban - Rural Distribution of the Population 97 
and its Implications 
5.3 : The Co-existence of Traditional and Modern 
Modes of Production, and the Dominance of 99 
the Agricultural Production 
5.4.1: The Agricultural Sector 102 
5.4.2: Agricultural Development : Which Way? 104 
5.5.1: The Structure of the Industrial Sector 109 
5.5.2: Some Observations on the Present Industrial 114 
Development Strategy 
5.6 : Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures 118 
5.7 : The Successive Development Plans and 
their Projections of the Sources of 121 
Development Finance 
Notes and References 127 
Tables 130 
Chapter Six: Foreign Aid Inflow into the Sudan 151 
6.1 :A Sectoral and A Source Analysis of Foreign 151 
Loans: Commitments 
6.2 :A Sectoral and A Source Analysis of Foreign 158 
Loans: Disbursement 
6.2.1: Some Conceptual Issues 158 
6.2.2: Disbursement of Foreign Assistance 161 
6.3 : Some Related Elements 167 
6.4 : Concluding Remarks 170 
Notes and References 173 
Tables 175 
Vii 
Pace 
Chapter Seven: The Record of Major Arab Development 
Funds in the Sudan and Some. Related Issues 
184 
7.1 :A Background Note 184 
7.2 : Some Bi-lateral Arab Funds and their Lending 
Operations to the Sudan 186 
7.2.1: The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development 186 
7.2.2: The Abu Dhabi-Fund for Arab Economic 
Development 189 
7.2.3: The Saudi Fund for Development 190 
7.3 : The Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development 193 
7.4 : The Basic Programme for Agricultural 
Development in the Sudan 1976-1985 
197 
7.5 : General Remarks, and Evaluation 201 
Notes and References 210 
Tables 212 
Chapter Eight: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Domestic 
Savings: An Application of Weisskopf 225 
Behavioural Model to the Sudan 
8.1 : The Weisskopf Behavioural Model 225 
8.2 : Domestic Savings in the Sudan 228 
8.3 : The Statistical Results and their 
Interpretations 231 
Notes and References 240 
Tables 242 
Chapter Nine: Towards an Effective Management of 245 
Foreign Aid Funds in Recipient Countries 
9.1 : The Dimensions of the Problem 245 
9.2 : The Present Practice in the Sudan and 254 Recommendations for Reform 
Notes and References 260 
Charts 261 
viii 
Chapter Ten: Manpower Resources, Foreign Technical 
Assistance and Emigration from the Sudan 
10.1 : Manpower Requirement for the Long-term 
Development Strategy of the Sudan 
10.2 : Foreign Technical Assistance 
10.3 : The Trend of Manpower Emigration from the 
Sudan and its over-all Impact on the Economy 
Notes and References 
Tables 
PART III: FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS OF THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF THE DEBT POSITION 
OF THE SUDAN 
Chapter Eleven: Developing Countries Indebtedness: 
A Growing Concern 
11.1 : Introductory Background 
11.2 : The Sources and the Magnitude of Foreign 
Resources Inflow into the Developing Countries 
11.3 : The Accumulation of Debt 
11.4 : What to do about Indebtedness 
11.5 : Conclusion 
Notes and References 
Tables 
Chapter Twelve: Foreign Indebtedness and Economic 
Development in the Sudan 
12.1 : The Outstanding Debt: A Source and a 
Sectoral Analysis 
12.2 : Some Indicators of the extent of Sudan's 
Foreign Indebtedness 
12.3 : The Impact of the Growing Size of Foreign 
Indebtedness on the Prospects of Development, 
and Alternative Policy Options 
12.4 : Conclusion . 
Notes and References 
Tables 
Pace 
262 
263 
272 
278 
289 
291 
300 
301 
301 
309 
317 
323 
332 
334 
339 
351 
352 
360 
368 
377 
380 
382 
.ý 
ix 
Pace 
PART IV 392 
Conclusion 393 
Appendices 403 
Bibliography 412 
(i) General 412 
(ii) Foreign Aid and Related Issues 416 
(iii) References and Sources of Materials on 426 
the Sudan 
Maps 
X 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
(i) Periodicals 
AER -American Economic Review 
BOUIES Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics 
and Statistics 
EDCC Economic Development and Cultural Change 
EJ Economic journal 
ILR International Labour Review 
JDP Journal of Development Planning 
JDS journal of Development Studies 
JEL Journal of Economic Literature 
JIE Journal of International Economics 
JPE Journal of Political Economy 
OEP Oxford Economic Papers 
RE&S Review of Economics and Statistics 
(ii) Organizations, Institutions 
AID Agency for International Development (USA) 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
DSRC Development Studies and Research Centre, University 
of Khartoum, Sudan. 
ECGD Export Credit Guarantee Department, HMG, London. 
EEC European Economic Community 
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council, Khartoum Sudan. 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations, Rome. 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
IDA International Development Agency 
IEA Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
ILO International Labour Office, Geneva. 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
NCR National Council of Research, Khartoum, Sudan. 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
xi 
ODI Overseas Development Institute, London. 
ODM Ministry of Overseas Development, Her Majesty's 
Government, London. 
OECD Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Paris. 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization. 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme. 
WHO World Health Organization 
(iii) Other I 
D. M. 
GDP 
K. D. 
m. 
Es. M. 
US $ 
abbreviations and Symbols 
Deutsche Mark 
Gross Domestic Product 
Kuwaiti Dinars 
million 
Million Sudanese Pounds 
American Dollars 
xii 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the many challenges that confront most developing countries 
nowadays, the need to overcome poverty is among the most important. 
The magnitude of poverty in developing countries is evident from their 
typically low incomes and it is reflected in the large and growing 
income gap between the former and the more advanced countries. The 
alleviation of poverty is now widely regarded as an essential ingredient 
of economic development as contrasted with economic growth. The 
latter is certainly a necessary condition for economic development, but 
it is not sufficient; because development entails certain basic changes 
in a society and its economy apart from income growth which is the 
principal criterion of the former. Poverty can co-exist with substantial 
income growth in a developing country. Nevertheless, although policies 
must be judged by reference to their contribution to broad goals of 
socio-economic development, the proximate aim of economic policies 
in developing countries is to eliminate the various impediments that 
stand in the way of an accelerated economic growth some of which, 
self-evidently, will demand social changes. 
In the task of promoting both economic growth and development 
of the developing countries, both theory and development experience 
suggest that international co-operation in a broad sense has a vital 
role to play. For most developing countries, foreign trade is, and is 
likely to remain, the most important ingredient of such co-operation, 
although in the absence of a so-called new international economic order, 
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its benefits may be smaller than most developing countries think to 
be equitable. But despite the overwhelming importance of trade, 
resource transfers from the more advanced and rich countries have a 
significant and in many cases, a decisive role as well to play in 
augmenting economic development. Resource transfers include foreign 
investment, financial aid and technical assistance. It goes without 
saying that an important ingredient in the success of development policy 
is the extent to which the recipient countries themselves pursue the 
appropriate policies to make effective use of both domestic and 
external resources at their disposal. 
The present study principally examines the role of foreign aid - 
including both financial and technical assistance - in economic 
development with particular reference to the Sudan. This focus on 
aid is not intended to under-rate the significance of other forms of 
co-operation between advanced and developing countries in promoting 
the'latter's development. This study falls into three main parts which 
together cover most of the principal issues related to foreign aid, and 
examine the situation in the Sudan. 
Part I is a critical review of the theoretical literature on aid 
and of the controversies that have arisen in the light of the different 
empirical investigations which have been attempted to establish its 
impact upon recipient economies. It also examines the rationale behind 
the provision of aid and the requirements which are to be satisfied if it 
is to be used effectively. 
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Part II is an attempt to apply the conceptual framework of the 
previous part to an elucidation of the role of aid in the Sudan's economic 
development. It begins with a brief description of the structure of the 
Sudanese economy and a survey of the trends in available resources. 
In the light of this analysis, a number of key issues are examined: in 
particular the source, composition and end-use of aid funds; the 
significance of Arab capital; the structure of aid management, and the 
role of technical assistance in supplementing domestic skills. Apart 
from these largely qualitative appraisals, the study also attempts to 
apply Weisskopf's behavioural model to evaluate the contribution of 
foreign aid to the Sudanese economy. Part II includes an examination 
of the limitations of such econometric studies. 
Part III examines the so-called debt problem of developing 
countries and its extent. Since foreign aid is not wholly provided in 
grant form, its inflow into developing countries has been accompanied 
by a growing debt. Part III contains a critical appraisal of the 
indebtedness issue of developing countries in the light of recent debates. 
Its prime concern is, however, to identify the causes and to demonstrate 
the immediate as well as the long-term implications of debt difficulties. 
This is followed by a scrutiny of the debt position of the Sudan, using 
for this purpose both published and unpublished data. 
Finally, a concluding section summarizes some of the most 
important propositions arrived at in the dissertation. 
Please note that footnotes and tables are inserted at the end of each chapter 
to which they are principally relevant and a complete bibliography appears 
at the end of the dissertation. 
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PART I 
SOME THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN AID 
4 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Case for, and the Definition of Foreign Aid 
1.1 The Development Gap between the Different Countries 
of the World: A Cause for Co-operation 
An income gap exists between the developed and developing 
countries and tends to widen over time. 
I Maddison has related this to 
the different characteristics of the developing nations in contrast with 
the advanced countries. He wrote; 
"in rich countries, resources are mobile, organized 
scientific research has institutionalized technical 
progress, knowledge is easily diffused, there is a 
well-articulated institutional and financial structure 
and the fortune of the economy is not tied to a few 
commodities. In poor countries, problems of 
structural adjustment are much greater, skills are 
poor, resources are not so flexible and the economies 
are more unstable. The modern sector is a highly 
specialized enclave. . ."2 
He then argued for the provision of foreign aid as a means of alleviating 
these difficulties and of adding to the growth potential of the developing 
countries. At the same time, however, he emphasized the crucial role 
of domestic economic policies in the developing countries themselves 
in overcoming these difficulties, thereby causing the desirable changes 
which would create dynamism as opposed to stagnation. 
The present structures of most of the developing countries are 
distorted and their development progress is in consequence often subject 
to a variety of economic, technical, political and social constraints 
5 
arising from these distortions. A principal aspect of these distortions 
is termed 'dualism'. Colman and Nixon explained this as: - 
" that ... subsistence production and production 
for the market co-exist, old and new technologies 
are used side-by-side, new social class3 s have 
arisen alongside the traditional strata. " 
- The implications of this for the ability of the developing countries to 
mobilize domestic resources and to accelerate growth are well known. 
One of its main effects is that the output of the subsistence parts of 
the economy is low and much below their potential. The burdens of 
development, therefore, fall primarily on the emergent modern activities 
of the economy. These constraints to economic growth in Third World 
countries resulted in an income gap between the developed countries 
and the former. 
The development literature attaches much significance to the 
reduction of the above income gap. But it is not often explicit whether 
this reference is to relative or to absolute differences between countries 
since the existing income gap takes both forms. Thirlwall reminds us 
that the reduction of the relative income gap would not necessarily 
prevent the absolute gap from widening particularly if the initial size 
of the latter is of a great magnitude. 
4 The relative income gap between 
countries can, in fact, be reduced if the rate of increase of the per capita 
income in the developing countries exceeds that in the advanced 
countries. But this would not make individuals in the developing 
countries comparatively better-off than their counter-parts in the 
advanced countries because the latter increase their command over goods 
6 
and services from initially high levels of income, although the percentage 
increase in their case may be lower than that of individuals in the 
developing countries. In general terms, however, the desirable goal 
should always be to narrow both the absolute and the relative income 
gaps. To achieve that, it is necessary for growth rates in the developing 
countries to proceed more rapidly than those in the advanced countries, 
even though the catching up process will be lengthy. If the growth 
rates in the developing countries merely equalized those in the advanced 
countries, the existing relative and absolute income gap will continue 
to widen. 
The crucial issue, perhaps, is to eliminate poverty in the 
developing countries rather than to focus on the mentioned gaps, and 
this involves accelerated growth. The process of accelerated growth 
certainly involves the removal of a variety of obstacles to growth, an 
expansion of agricultural production by raising the productivity of the 
existing projects and bringing more land under cultivation, an increase 
in the investment share in GDP as well as an initiation of industrialization 
policies which primarily use domestically-produced material inputs and 
also create job opportunities. To ensure accelerated development, as 
Leontief puts it, 
"two general conditions are necessary: first, 
far-reaching internal changes of a social, political 
and institutional character in developing countries 
and second, significant changes in the world 
economic order. Accelerated development... can 
only be achieved through a combination of both 
these conditions. " 
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Although domestic economic policies will be crucial in bringing 
about the former, the attainment of both conditions requires co-operation 
between the advanced and the developing countries and the transfer of 
resources from the former to the latter. This should ultimately benefit 
the advanced countries as well. Such gains should result not only 
from the direct benefits which may accompany aid relationships but 
also from "the general increase in international trade which would follow 
international development. "6 Co-operation between advanced and 
developing countries takes many forms and is diversely motivated. 
Accelerated development would not necessarily be achieved unless 
foreign resource transfers to developing countries are adequate, 
functionally appropriate and are used in an efficient manner. 
The inflow of resources into the developing countries can be in 
the form of private foreign investment, official loans and grants from 
bilateral, regional and multi-lateral donors or direct borrowing from 
financial agencies and foreign banks. Foreign aid takes the form of 
long-term loans, grants and any other unrequited transfers, emergency 
and food supplies as well as technical assistance. The significance 
of foreign resources channelled through each of the earlier mentioned 
sources is different. For instance, private foreign investment 
necessarily requires the transmission of profits, dividends and 
remittance abroad and foreign loans require annual debt servicing over 
their maturity periods but grants are unrequited transfers. The ability 
of a developing country to acquire more loans from private sources 
depends on its capacity to service its foreign debt. But this is not 
8 
entirely true in the case of aid. In fact, developing countries 
designated asIbest performers may not receive more aid than others 
because political and military reasons also have a direct impact on the 
size and final destination of aid. 
The Pearson Report (1969)8 proposed a development strategy for 
the Third World during the 1970's on the basis of the type of 
co-operation between the rich and the poor countries described earlier. 
This report was, in fact, intended to present a long-term projection of 
foreign resource requirement by the developing countries which was 
believed to be necessary if these countries were to be able to raise 
their growth rates from the annual average of 5 percent during the 1960's 
to a target growth rate of 6 percent by the end of the 1970's. Among 
the main stimuli of that accelerated growth process was a , target 
transfer of one percent of the advanced countries' GDP to the Third 
World countries. But a necessary condition for the achievement of 
such target growth rates was that 70 percent of this transfer should be 
provided on highly concessional terms, the remaining part coming as 
private foreign investment through the usual market operations. The 
Pearson Report suggestedthe softening of foreign loan terms primarily 
to minimize the possibility of debt crises and to put more resources at 
the disposal of the developing countries. It also envisaged a direct 
link between the inflow of foreign aid funds and the movement of private 
foreign capital. 
Various difficulties are involved in such a global projection for 
developing countries which eventually reduce its practical usefulness, 
9 
for instance, the varying rates of growth among the developing 
countries themselves, the diversity of development constraints and the 
way in which foreign aid funds are distributed among these countries. 
Despite these difficulties, the recommendations of the Pearson Report 
formed the broad basis of the United Nations projection for the Second 
Development Decade during the 1970's. 
9 
It was suggested that 
certain conditions were to be met if the developing countries could be 
expected to achieve the envisaged target growth rates. In addition to 
foreign resource transfers, the critical importance of certain domestic 
economic policies in the developing countries themselves was also 
stressed. These include the implementation of economic policies to 
ensure a faster growth of industrial output than that of agriculture (this, 
however, does not mean that the development of the agricultural sector 
is less important in stimulating the economy but only reflects the low 
contribution of industry to GDP); the generation of more domestic savings 
and transforming them into effective investment as well as acquiring a 
sufficient degree of flexibility to expand exports in relation to the 
required level of imports. The ultimately desired sustained rates of 
growth can only be achieved if the appropriate economic policies to 
effect such changes in the structure of the developing economies are 
pursued. * These elements are generally acknowledged to form the basis 
of successful development programmes. 
The Second United Nations International Development Strategy 
for the 1970's emphasized the significant role of an appropriate 
management of domestic economic affairs in the developing countries to 
10 
was to 
vitalize their economies. If this/coincide with sufficient amounts of 
foreign resource transfers, it could be feasible for the majority of 
developing countries to achieve high rates of growth and eventually to 
reach a self-sustained growth path. But it was recognized that the 
existing channels of resource transfers into the developing countries 
may not be capable of transferring the necessary resources to achieve 
the prescribed targets. In addition to the required increase in the 
volume of foreign aid, there was consequently a stress on switching 
significant amounts of these funds from bilateral to multilateral sources 
to ensure continuous support for the development programmes. The 
rationale for, and the difficulties involved in such a switch of foreign 
aid structure will be examined in the next section. Also, there was a 
desire by the United Nations to see that donors should generally soften 
their loans so that borrowing by the developing countries would not lead 
to unmanageable levels of indebtedness and that the proportionate size 
of tied loans should in any case be reduced. 
To ensure an effective use of-foreign aid funds, donors may wish 
the recipient countries to undertake certain policies which could affect 
the prospects of development in the latter. For example, the Pearson 
Report suggests that, 
" aid givers cannot be indifferent to whether population 
problems receive the attention they require and both 
bilateral and multilateral agencies should press for 
adequate analysis of these problems and their 
bearing on development programmes. " 10 
These problems are generally acknowledged to have adverse effects on 
the outcome of the development programmes. 
11 
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1.2. The Definition of Foreign Aid, and Recent Suggestions 
to Raise the Effectiveness of Aid Programmes by More 
Multi-lateral Disbursement 
The current use of the term 'foreign aid' carries many shades of 
meaning. Ambiguity surrounds its definition. This arises mainly 
because of the over-lapping motives and objectives behind the provision 
of foreign aid to the developing countries. Another element that 
contributes to the lack of a common agreement on a more precise, 
operational definition of foreign aid is the difference in the forms by 
which an act of resource transfer into a developing country can take 
place. Some acts of foreign aid may not indeed be easily quantified, 
such as the aid element embodied in preferential trade agreements. This 
suggests that formal aid calculations may not indicate the effective 
amount of foreign assistance a certain country is receiving. Variations 
in different estimates of the magnitude of aid from one source to another 
can be explained mainly by the adoption of varying definitions and scope 
of coverage. An explicit and clear-cut definition of foreign aid would 
assist in setting a distinction between what can be classified as aid in 
contrast to other resources inflow into a certain country. 
Our main concern throughout the present study is with 'economic 
aid' or 'assistance, that is, with the amounts of resources that are 
transferred on concessional terms for promoting socio-economic 
development in a developing country. The former is sharply distinguished 
from the amounts of foreign aid funds that are provided for non-economic 
purposes, notably, military aid. However, not all economic aid such 
as balance of payments and budget support is necessarily for developmental 
12 
purposes in the strict sense of the term although it might be a vital 
element to the over-all success of a development programme. Economic 
assistance, therefore, 
"consists of explicit transfers of real resources to 
less developed countries on concessional terms. 
Unless the resource transfer involves, to some degree, 
more favourable terms than those available commercially, 
there is no gift element involved. " 
Accordingly, private foreign capital inflow into the developing countries 
and aid are not synonymous. "Aid, properly speaking, refers to those 
parts of capital inflow which normal market incentives do not provide. 1& 
13 
In order that an act of external resource transfer into a certain 
country should qualify as aid, it should have two specific 
characteristics., 
14 (i) It has to be a resource flow which would not 
otherwise take place without the intervention of special machinery and 
procedures, that is, bilateral or multilateral agreements. It is 
distinct from a flow of goods and services that takes place by the means 
of market operations such as private transfers which are motivated by 
profits. (ii) The conditions and terms of such a transfer should be 
more favourable than those which normally apply to commercial 
transactions or borrowing. A concessionary element is therefore an 
integral part of any act of resource transfer which can be classified as 
aid. In such cases, the developing countries acquire foreign resources 
although the present investment opportunities they offer may not 
encourage the inflow of foreign capital through the market mechanism. 
The distinction made above is important in view of the multiplicity 
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of sources and types of foreign capital inflow into the developing 
countries. These inflows include private foreign investment and 
borrowing from international financial lending institutions and agencies 
on terms dictated by the state of the market, which cannot be regarded as 
foreign aid. (However, borrowing from international institutions may 
sometimes embody a certain degree of concession in consideration of the 
economic situation in a particular country). Estimates of the magnitude 
of foreign aid also exclude short-term suppliers' credits and medium-term 
loans which are in fact "selling devices for tied exports of equipment 
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goods. " 
Foreign aid then consists primarily of long-term loans repayable 
in foreign currencies, interest-free loans and grants. The 'harder' the 
loan's terms become, the more it approximates to commercial transactions. 
The line between them is drawn by calculating the grant element of the 
given loan. The main characteristics of a long-term aid loan are 
identified in relation to the existing terms of borrowing from international 
markets. They include: lower interest rates, longer grace and 
maturity periods. These conditions are necessary to allow recipient 
economies to absorb the borrowed funds and eventually to increase their 
debt servicing capacities. Obviously, they increase the grant elements 
of foreign loans. (The grant element of a loan is that percentage of the 
total amount of the loan--- calculated at a discount rate over its life-span - 
which does not require repayment). 
Some loans may include provisions for repayments in domestic, 
unconvertible currencies rather than in foreign exchange. These funds 
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may be spent by the donor in the country or otherwise re-lent to cover 
parts of the local currency component of certain projects. In the latter 
case, it may ease the impact of a liquidity crisis on the particular 
project if that happens to be the situation. Repayments may also be in 
goods. Such aid practices soften the terms of loans by raising their 
grant elements. 
As was mentioned before, economic aid may not necessarily make 
a direct and immediate contribution to economic development. A few 
examples will illustrate this type of assistance. A food aid programme 
to meet an emergency need in a developing country due to critical 
shortages caused by factors such as war or persistent drought does not 
count as development aid. Another example is foreign technical 
assistance which is certainly more beneficial in the long rather than the 
short term. Technical assistance is an essential part of foreign aid 
programmes which makes it necessary to estimate its size, although this 
may in some cases prove difficult. 
Foreign loans may be 'conditional' or 'tied. ' A loan which is 
tied by source may involve an extra cost to the recipient country than 
that which is apparent in its terms if other competing suppliers exist 
and could supply similar goods at relatively low prices. A country which 
seeks foreign loans on any terms to finance its development programme 
may end with an inappropriate type of technology and also might incur 
excessive costs. The recipient country can reduce the extra cost of 
a tied loan if it can exploit substitution opportunities that exist in the 
donor's market and indeed in other countries' markets, unless the terms 
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of the particular loan also specify the technology. An aid loan may 
also be project-tied in the sense that funds are provided for specific 
items of expenditure on a certain project. This may distort the over-all 
development priorities of the recipient country because the specified 
project may not be of immediate concern and may rank low among the 
various projects. However, 
"source-tying of aid will generally impose costs, 
inclusive of monopolistic pricing by suppliers, even 
when ideal procurement policies are followed. 
Moreover, these costs are likely to be accentuated 
when the donor countries also specify the end-use, 
by project or otherwise, of source-tied aid. " 
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Foreign aid, therefore, comes from private and official sources 
in the developed and the rich countries in cash or kind. Official aid 
refers only to those foreign resource transfers that are put at the disposal 
of governments in developing countries by other governments, multi- 
lateral or regional institutions. 
as an official flow of resources. 
Almost all multi-lateral aid is regarded 
This includes loans and grants from 
the different international agencies such as the IMF, IBRD, IDA and the 
UN specialized agencies such as WHO and UNESCO. It also includes 
aid from the regional financial agencies such as the Inter American, the 
Asian, the African and the Arab Development Banks, the Islamic Bank and 
the OPEC Fund ... .A donor country may establish 
its own aid agency 
such as AID in the case of the United States of America. In particular 
circumstances, a group of donors may join together in an aid consortium 
to assist a certain country or region. An example of such arrangements 
was the 'Colombo Plan' when a group of donors joined their lending efforts 
16 
to provide, and to ensure the continuous flow of aid into the Indian 
sub-continent countries. At the present time, aid consortiums normally 
assist those countries which face critical debt servicing difficulties. 
The costs imposed on the. recipient countries by the limitations 
of bilateral aid has led economists to argue for shifting more resources 
to the international financial agencies so that the largest part of 
. assistance to the developing countries could be provided on a multi- 
lateral rather than on a bilateral basis. It is widely believed that such 
a source-shift of aid could reduce direct donor-to-recipient pressures 
and might promote the continuity of funds. inflow into the developing 
countries. Table 1.1 shows that during 1970-76 there was in fact a 
tendency for the percentage share of multi-lateral aid in the total official 
inflow of resources into the developing countries to increase. 
Although the arguments for the source-shift may be persuasive 
in as much as it is widely believed that it would lead to an effective use 
of aid funds and an equitable distribution of these funds among developing 
countries, such a switch faces difficulties: - (i) Donors may not be 
willing to channel the whole or most of their aid to developing countries 
through multi-lateral agencies because of the benefits that accrue to them 
from a direct aid relationship such as trade links with particular sources 
of supply or demand. (ii) Public opinion in donor countries may prove 
hard to convince with regard to the significance of the described aid 
redirection. (iii) Donors may feel that they could lose direct control 
over the direction of their aid funds in the sense that they might be 
willing to favour those developing countries with whom they have close 
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economic and political ties. For example, the British government may 
be willing to extend more aid to members of the British Commonwealth 
than to non-members. Bilateral aid could also be used as a means of 
expressing dissatisfaction with particular policies pursued by a 
recipient country which are believed to be against the donor's own 
interests. (iv) Foreign aid is only one aspect of international 
co-operation between countries and so donors may find it vital to reach 
agreement on certain issues such as 'the energy problem' before 
considering such source-switch of aid. (v) The institutional structure 
of the multi-lateral agencies in its present capacity may not be capable 
of administering significantly larger amounts of funds than the existing 
levels. This is evident from the various proposals for establishing 
new multi-lateral agencies to set the scene for a new international 
economic order. Any considerable source-shift of aid may necessarily 
have to be preceded by the establishment of new international aid agencies. 
To sum up, foreign aid is an integral part of foreign capital inflow 
into the developing countries. It takes many forms and extends to 
various developmental activities. Motives behind aid provision are 
diverse. Its role and contribution to the growth potential of the 
developing countries is controversial. 
17 There is however a case for 
more effective aid programmes which is accentuated by the rate of increase 
in the size of indebtedness of the developing countries and its possible 
impact on their development progress as well as the extent of primary 
poverty in certain countries. The former issue will be considered in 
Part III. Finally, even if the rationale behind the advocacy of a source- 
shift of aid is persuasive, there are certain issues which have to be 
considered before the new arrangement could be put into effect. 
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TABLE 1.1. 
The Percentage Distribution of Official Aid Between Bilateral and 
Multilateral Sources for 87 Non-oil Exporting Developing 
Countries: 1970-76 
Years Bilateral Multilateral Total 
1970 74.5 25.5 100.0 
1971 73.0 27.0 100.0 
1972 71.2 28.8 100.0 
1973 69.9 30.1 100.0 
1974 68.2 31.8 100.0 
1975 71.1 28.9 100.0 
1976 67.3 32.7 100.0 
Source: World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables: External 
Public Debt of Developing Countries, Vol. I, 
Doc. No. EC-167/78, pp. 76,92. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Two-Gap Analysis 
2.1. The Theme of the Two-Gap Approach to Aid and Development 
The inflow of resources into developing countries has assumed a 
central position in modern development theories. There is however a 
growing concern about its productivity and allocation. The focus on the 
crucially important role assigned to external resources is generally 
believed to be the outcome of the 'desire' of the majority of developing 
countries to achieve what amounts to a 'big push. '1 In other words, 
there is a growing desire to transform the present relatively poor and 
stagnant economies into ones whose normal conditions are self-generated 
growth paths. The two-gap approach is an attempt to explain the 
existing and the potential limits to economic growth, the extent to which 
these limits can be eliminated by foreign aid and the necessary conditions 
that must be satisfied if such countries are to reach the development stage 
where they would no longer need foreign aid in its present concessionary 
forms. Put differently, the two-gap approach attempts to provide a 
description of some existing situations of structural disequilibrium and to 
recommend the use of foreign resources to eliminate the-obstacles that 
normally hinder development. It draws from the post-war experience 
of those developing countries which could achieve and maintain self- 
sustained growth by an effective use of foreign resources. 
The two-gap analysis suggests that the growth path of a typical 
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developing country will be constrained either by shortages of domestic 
savings to finance the investment requirements to achieve a target growth 
rate or by a shortfall of export earnings to finance imports needed to 
support the mentioned target. In the former case, growth would be 
investment-limited. In the latter case, the economy would be caught 
by foreign-exchange deficiencies and growth would be trade-limited. 
Apart from these two constraints, such an economy is likely - at least 
in its earlier stages of development - to face difficulties arising from 
its limited capacity to absorb an annually increasing size of investment 
activities. Since the availability of skills (technical and administrative) 
is an important element in determining the level of capital absorption in 
the economy, the growth path may be termed 'skill-limited. ' 
While the various studies on the role of foreign resources into 
developing countries have treated all capital inflow in the same manner, 
irrespective of its purpose and' origin, the conclusions drawn usually 
refer to foreign aid only. The issue is two-fold: first, there is 
overwhelming desire to determine the exact role that foreign aid can 
play in augmenting economic development in order that a time-limit can 
be set where it would no longer be necessary for a given country to 
acquire it for developmental purposes. The decisive issue in this 
connection is that dependence on foreign aid should decline in importance 
over time as a result of an escalation of a self-financed development 
process until the economy reaches a stage where concessional aid funds 
are no longer an essential element for the continuous maintenance of the 
target growth rate. The second issue may be said to be a desire by 
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development economists and policy-makers to develop an economic 
criterion to support and to justify the extension of foreign aid to 
developing countries, and also to offer an economic rationale to 
wealtheir nations on the appropriate size of their foreign aid programmes, 
funds allocation and methods of control. However, this should not be 
taken to indicate that foreign aid is always motivated by economic 
factors because historical relations, political ties or other factors may, 
by far, outweigh the economic motives. 
In a pioneering article, Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) 
2 
studied the 
inter-dependence process between foreign capital inflow and economic 
growth in a number of developing countries in an attempt to determine 
the long-term foreign resources requirement of the latter. The external 
resource requirement is determined by the difference between the maximum 
attainable domestic savings and the investment size needed to achieve 
and support a given target growth rate. Foreign aid is not usually meant 
to contribute in raising the standard of living in the recipient countries in 
a direct manner, but - supposedly - to permit them to make a transition 
from situations of economic stagnation to a state of dynamism and a 
self-generated growth path. This could be fulfilled by closing the 
initial gaps and also those which would emerge during the growth process. 
The over-all aim of development aid is not to 
equalize incomes in different countries, but to 
provide every country with an opportunity to 
achieve steady growth. Aid should continue 
not until a certain income level is reached in 
underdeveloped countries, but only until those 
countries can mobilize a level of capital 
formation sufficient for self-sustaining 
3 
growth. ' 
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Therefore, foreign capital inflow in general and foreign aid in particular 
should be aimed at supplementing domestic savings during a certain 
development stage. An annually increasing rate of domestic savings 
is, therefore, an important ingredient to ensure a growing level of 
domestic contribution to investment over time. 
A marginal rate which is much higher than the 
average rate of savings is the main lever of a 
development programme and should be the principal 
condition of aid to underdeveloped countries. " 4 
This consideration forms the basis of a performance criterion which is 
supposed to reflect the ability of the recipient countries to pursue sound 
economic policies and to use foreign funds effectively. 
Rosenstein-Rodan's analysis focused on two issues with regard 
to developing economies: their limited absorptive capacity and the 
possibility of a domestic saving constraint. There is no explicit 
discussion of a possibility of a foreign exchange constraint although it 
seems that most developing countries are likely to face such a limit on 
growth in their attempts to implement large industrialization and 
modernization programmes. The lack of discussion of a trade-limit 
may indicate that Rosenstein-Rodan was considering those developing 
economies which were either closed or had unlimited export possibilities 
to pay for imports at the given terms of trade; or which had access to 
unlimited foreign resources inflow. 
5 Also, he may have implied that 
the growth process in the developing countries is almost always limited 
by shortages of domestic savings. Such an interpretation can be thought 
of in terms of the two-gap analysis, that is, the foreign aid requirement 
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should be determined in relation to the size of the dominant gap and 
that it should close all of them simultaneously. However, Rosenstein- 
Rodan was largely drawing from the experience of countries in South-East 
Europe where conditions were different from the present situation in the 
Third World and he did not explicitly refer to these considerations. 
His analysis requires modifications before it can be applicable to the 
present situation in developing countries. This leads us to a consideration 
of the two gap analysis. 
The literature on the two-gap analysis is voluminous. The 
following discussion will mainly draw from the early contributions of 
McKinnon6 and of Chenery and Strout? for the purpose of outlining the 
basic theme of the two-gap approach and the general assumptions that 
underlie it. Other contributions will be referred to during the critical 
appraisal and the evaluation that will follow. 
To begin with, McKinnon (1964) developed a Harrod-Domar type 
model in an attempt to explain the different gaps that are likely to face 
a developing country at different development levels. His analysis 
mainly focused on the time-sequence of the gaps' appearance and the 
contribution of foreign capital transfer to overcome them. The given 
economy would not be capable of achieving its target growth rate if its 
capacity to increase exports has already reached the maximum obtainable 
limits. In that case, a bottleneck (foreign exchange) constraintwould 
emerge and this would lead to under-utilization of domestic resources. 
The growth rate will not be dictated by the size of domestic savings which 
is greater than the maximum export capacity. Foreign capital transfers 
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should ease the demand pressures on foreign exchange and hence raise 
the attainable growth rate. This is a typical situation of a developing 
economy that relies on the importation of capital goods only. In 
diagram 1, the growth rate is 'as' where 'a' is the aggregate output- 
capital ratio and is composed of the sum of units of capacity requirement 
of domestic and foreign capital: 's' is the aggregate marginal propensity 
to save of the economy. 'ep' is the maximum foreign exchange revenue 
that is available for capital goods importation, where 'e' is the marginal 
propensity to export and 'P ' is the output-foreign capital requirement. 
In its initial stages, the economy is hindered from achieving its growth 
rate because ep. as, that is, a bottleneck constraint is in existence. 
Foreign capital transfers should remove this constraint by making it 
possible to import more capital goods than before. At the point 'P', 
foreign exchange should no longer impose a limit on the growth rate and 
Growth Rate 
(9) 
B 
as 
eP 
Diagram 1: Effects of Foreign Transfers on the Growth Rate. 
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Foreign Transfers (f) =F 
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the economy should then enter into a saving constraint zone. 
McKinnon is of the opinion that the productivity of foreign capital 
transfers is higher when a foreign exchange constraint is binding than 
that in the case of a saving constraint. This suggestion is clearly 
evident in diagram 1 where the slope of the foreign exchange constraint 
is steeper than that of the saving constraint. The contention is based 
on the assumption that expenditures on foreign capital goods would form 
a small fraction of the total domestic capital formation. In other words, 
the impact of foreign capital transfers would be large under the bottleneck 
constraint if is large, that is, the foreign capital goods requirement 
is relatively small. For these reasons, if ep> as, that is, a bottleneck 
constraint does not hold when f=o, then, it may never hold (see the 
dotted line BC). Instead, a saving constraint would be binding for any 
given foreign capital transfer in this situation. 
Unlike the above case, if the economy would necessarily have to 
import raw materials, spare-parts and consumer goods in addition to 
capital goods, then the growth rate is likely to be zero in the initial 
stages even though there are foreign transfers. This is because any 
appreciable rise in income would tend to generate current imports in 
excess of the attainable level of exports. A minimum level of foreign 
transfers (that is, greater than 'fl' in diagram 2) would be required so 
that foreign exchange availability could be sufficient to permit the economy 
to operate at full capacity and also to allow the process of capital 
accumulation to take place. In diagram 2, the zone from 0 to fl represents 
a situation where a given economy is assumed to be in need of structural 
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changes. Unless they take place, 'f' may affect its level of income but 
not necessarily its growth rate. Countries receiving aid in the region 
leftwards of fl would spend these funds primarily to keep their economies 
from the state of economic collapse, and almost all foreign 'funds would 
be spent on current expenditures with no significant capital accumulation 
expected to take place. 
In the same article, McKinnon presented what he described as 
'a more realistic model' in which domestic efforts to raise the existing 
level of capital formation are evident, that is, there are increasing 
average propensities to save and export. The rigidities of his previous 
models in assuming fixed propensity to save are lifted. The first case 
is that of an economy with an increasing marginal propensity to save. 
This is a necessary condition to attain a self-sustained growth rate. 
Growth Rate 
(g) 
U fl 
gm is the growth rate with a bottleneck constraint. 
gs is the growth rate with a saving constraint. 
Diagram 2: The situation in an Economy where Exports are less than 
Current Material Needs. 
2 Foreign Transfer (f) =Y 
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The economy will start development with the support of foreign transfers 
sufficient to fill the savings gap. Then the time-span of such transfers 
will depend on the speed by which the economy can move towards the 
achievement of a self-supported growth path. In diagram 3, Ft = It - St 
where Ft fills the existing gap between the available domestic savings 
and the investment size required to achieve a given target growth rate. 
At time tI, F should terminate and the excess of S over I could be used 
to service past debts. An initially high and increasingly growing rate 
of domestic savings should result in an early termination of F (at t2). 
The amount, -and time-path of foreign transfers and the growth rate of the 
economy are, therefore, determined by the size of the marginal propensity 
to save. 
I, S, F 
F 
0 
Diagram 3: The Time-Path of Foreign Transfers with a rising Propensity 
to Save and no effective Export limitations. 
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The second model refers to a situation where there is a binding 
foreign exchange constraint. McKinnon held the opinion that "a bottleneck 
constraint will not be effective at the start of a development programme in 
the sense that the economy can provide domestic savings but not earn the 
8 
foreign exchange necessary to purchase foreign capital goods. " This 
can only take place in an economy which starts its development process 
with both zero savings and zero export possibility because the whole of 
the initial level of investment (both domestic and foreign capital goods) 
would have to be financed by foreign aid. However, when a domestic 
savings constraint is not dominant but still the growth rate cannot be 
achieved because of foreign exchange shortages then foreign transfers 
should ease the latter constraint. As in the previous case, the time-path 
of foreign transfers would largely depend on the initial size, and the rate 
of increase of the marginal propensity to export. It could be relatively 
shorter than in a case of a domestic savings constraint, because if export 
earnings progressively increase, then foreign exchange could soon be 
generated to offset the initial high levels of foreign capital requirement 
necessary to support a desired growth rate that is higher than before. 
Finally, McKinnon briefly discussed the case of an economy taking 
into account an independent skill-limit on growth. This limit can be 
incorporated in the previous models by raising the capital-output ratio. 
However, it is likely to dominate at the later stages of development. But 
in a fairly primitive economy, the adverse effects of the skill-limit can 
be felt at an early stage of development (in the lower range of BC in 
diagram 4). If adequate consideration is given to raising the technical 
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Diagram 4: Sequential Appearance of Growth Constraints. 
and organizational capacities of the labour force at this early stage, then 
this limit may not at all dominate again to the contrary of what is shown 
in diagram 4. 
The later presentation of the two-gap model by Chenery and Strout 
and subsequently by Chenery and associates in a number of articles might 
not seem to differ in substance from that by McKinnon. The former have 
discussed an elaborated resource planning model in which the three 
constraints mentioned earlier and their time sequence are separately 
examined. 
According to Chenery and Strout, a typical developing economy is 
usually bound to pass through three sequential constraints distinguished 
by the one that dominates at a particular stage. It is a three-phase 
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Constraint 
thesis which attempts to determine the amount of foreign aid that can 
be effectively used by a developing country at any particular time. 
9 
Utilizing a Harrod-Domar one-sector model which assumes that a 
specified amount of investment would be needed to increase output, 
Chenery and Strout showed that in the early stages of its development 
process, a developing economy would be constrained by insufficient 
investment opportunities due to the limited nature of its absorption. 
This would be reflected by shortages of complementary-input supplies 
and also' by critical shortages of the required human resources. The 
latter is the skill-limit "reflecting the skill formation required of 
managers, skilled labour and civil servants in order to increase 
productive investment. " 
10 
The analysis starts with a description of phase I which is 
characterized by a constant increase in investment and an accelerating 
growth rate of income. The gap is between the maximum absorptive 
capacity of the economy and the available domestic savings. Resources 
would be wasted if the economy projects its foreign aid requirements on 
the assumption that a domestic savings gap is dominant at this stage. 
The appropriate economic approach would be an emphasis on the provision 
of basic infra-structure for a potentially modern economy which includes 
the exploration of the future prospects of the economy, secular training 
and mass education. 
Therefore, the role of foreign aid in phase I is mainly to provide 
different forms of technical assistance. The absorptive capacity of a 
developing economy should increase as the development activities expand 
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and spread their leverage impacts. But this should not imply that 
developing countries are not to be concerned about an initial short- 
term increase in their absorptive capacities. These countries would, 
in fact, need fairly heavy capital investment in a relatively short period 
so as to be capable to break away from economic stagnation and to 
ensure that future developmental efforts would not be frustrated by any 
retarding elements. 
The economy should by-pass phase I when it can absorb a level 
of investment sufficient to achieve a given target growth rate, and that 
should reflect, among other things, that the amount of foreign aid funds 
which any economy can acquire is generally limited. The economy 
would, then, move to phase II where the availability of domestic 
savings is the limiting factor to growth. However, it would still be in 
a domestic resources-constrained type of growth. In other words, both 
phases (I and II) constitute the domestic resource-gap because they 
comprise a constraint that arises from the deficiency of domestic 
resources rather than that which would arise as a consequence of the 
'openness' of the economy. 
Once the economy moves into phase II, its growth rate will be 
subject to constraints of a different nature. Although it is now 
capable of absorbing adequate amounts of investment to support a target 
growth rate, it faces a domestic saving constraint. This phase 
corresponds to the relationship developed by Rosenstein-Rodan. 
Domestic saving is a function of the total national income. It 
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is determined not only by the before tax propensity to save but also by 
the government's ability to raise total savings by effective changes in 
the existing tax-structure and other policies designed to ensure a 
higher level of domestic savings than before. The specification of 
phase II is based on the assumption that the given economy has already 
developed an efficient system for raising the level of domestic public 
savings and for mobilization of private savings. The over-all size of 
investment and its annual rate of increase will be dictated by the 
choice of a target growth rate. Unless the marginal rate of savings 
gradually exceeds the marginal rate of investment, the need for foreign 
capital inflow will not decline over time and the economy cannot 
overcome this gap. 
Success in overcoming phase II is decisive in the attempts to 
set the economy into the desired goal of a self-sustained growth path. 
It indicates the economy's capacity to achieve and to maintain a target 
growth rate and this, in itself, means an efficient mobilization and an 
effective use of domestic resources. However, although it might be 
possible to achieve a target growth rate, this does not necessarily lead 
to a situation of a continuous self-sustained growth rate. 
Once the given economy achieves a rising level of domestic 
savings and its dependence on foreign aid gradually declines in 
importance, this indicates that it is approaching the final phase in its 
drive towards self-supporting growth path. Phase III reflects the 
structural rigidities that are widely held to surround developing 
economies and the problems they face in relation to foreign trade. There 
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is certainly an annually increasing demand for imported capital goods, 
raw-materials and spare-parts to support the development programme. 
There is also a growing demand for consumer goods. A substantial 
proportion of the latter would have to be imported, *- at least in the 
initial stages of this phase. This import requirement results from 
"the relatively inelastic demand for a large proportion 
of the manufactured goods currently imported - 
particularly intermediate goods and investment goods - 
arising from the lack of domestic supply and their 
necessity in production. " 11 
A minimum level of imports would be required to maintain the target 
growth rate of the economy. Any level of imports belowa certain 
minimum limit would result in excess capacity in the productive units 
and misallocation of resources. The marginal import ratio would 
therefore represent a structural limitation in the immediate future. 
It could be reduced in the long-run by the establishment of import- 
saving industries which use domestic raw-materials. 
On the other hand, the economy's ability to increase its exports 
drastically is practically limited due to the composition of its exports 
which are mainly primary products. The inelastic supply conditions 
of these products and the changing composition of world demand for 
certain products, such as man-made fibres as a substitute for cotton 
would make it difficult to increase export proceeds substantially. 
Apart from these factors, world market arrangements often dictate the 
amounts to be exported and their prices and over that, trade barriers 
exist between developed and developing countries. Also, the decline 
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of the over-all demand in the developed economies themselves because 
of, say, a recession would add to these factors. However, for "a foreign 
exchange constraint to be dominant, the size of exports should reach 
the maximum attainable level and the amounts of imports have to be 
sustained at the minimum possible level sufficient to maintain the growth 
rate. In the absence of foreign aid, the growth rate would then be 
dictated by the behaviour of the foreign sector. The difference between 
exports and imports would determine the required size of external 
resources that is necessary to sustain a target growth rate. Otherwise, 
savings would either fall below their potential or else less productive 
investment would take place. 
Although there is no necessary sequence for the appearance of 
phase III, it is less likely for a trade limit to appear during phase I 
since the rising level of foreign capital inflow may not make it even 
necessary for exports to increase as fast as imports. But once a target 
growth rate is attained, exports should rise more rapidly than imports as 
the economy enters phase II and remains there as far as domestic savings 
is the only limit to growth. If not, the economic indicators would point 
to the end of phase II and mark the beginning of phase III. This clearly 
indicates that the three described phases could follow in any order if, 
according to Chenery and Strout, the structural parameters are allowed to 
change randomly. But with fixed. parameters, phase I is definite and 
should be followed by phase II or III. Moreover, if the trade limit holds 
in phase I, then it would be characterized by two sub-phases: IB to 
indicate the dominance of the trade limit (although, according to Chenery 
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and Strout, this is not of great empirical significance) 
12 
and the 
dominance of the domestic resources limit would be called IA. 
Finally, the projection of the total size of foreign capital for 
the whole process of transformation to a state of self-supported growth 
stream is determined by adding up the amount required to fill each 
individual gap during the three phases. It is based on the estimated 
values of four parameters; saving, investment, imports and exports and 
an assumption on the aggregate capital-output ratio. 
2.2. The Main Criticisms of the Two-Gap Approach to Aid 
and Development 
The two-gap analysis has been viewed both as a major 
contribution to the development of a methodology to investigate the 
factors that presumably prevent the developing economies from achieving 
self-sustained growth and as an analytical tool for the projection of 
foreign resource requirements of these countries at different development 
stages. It broadly assumes that the only limiting factor to economic 
development is capital: both physical and human. If capital could be 
made available, then the economy should eventually move to a self- 
supported stage of development. The analysis further rests on implicit 
assumptions of a stable socio-political structure that favours economic 
development. These assumptions may not be valid in typical developing 
countries. Development in fact, takes place as a result of the 
interaction of economic, social, institutional and political factors. 
Signalling only one factor as the cause of backwardness (implying that 
all these essential ingredients to development are already in existence) 
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may not be appropriate for many developing countries. 
The two-gap analysis assumes the existence of certain constraints 
on the structural relationships between the different economic variables, 
such as the inability to raise the level of domestic savings sufficiently, 
and more importantly, to transform an appreciable part of that into foreign 
exchange through international trade. Bruton13 was first to question the 
validity' of such models in reference to the present situation in developing 
countries. He pinpointed two main issues: the existence of two 
distinct gaps during a given short interval of time and their origins. 
To illustrate his criticisms, let us suppose that we have an 
. economy which necessarily imports all 
(and only) its capital goods 
requirement, the whole of its exports are consumer goods and there are 
no apparent changes in inventories of consumer goods or foreign exchange 
reserves. The possible explanation of the two-gap situation would then 
basically depend on the relevant assumptions about the elasticity of the 
foreign demand curve. Diagram 5 illustrates this situation where the 
horizontal line 'cf' represents a perfectly elastic foreign demand curve 
for the exports of a given developing country. 'ss' and 'dd' are the 
supply and the domestic demand curves for the exportable consumer goods. 
The economy produces OB which is partly used to satisfy domestic 
consumption (OA) and partly exported (AB). If domestic savings are to 
be increased by refraining from consuming the exportable commodities, 
then the domestic demand curve should shift leftwards to d1 dl adding an 
amount of DA to the exports at the given price level. Therefore, the 
reduction of the level of domestic consumption has in fact resulted in the 
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Diagram 5: A Perfectly Elastic Foreign Demand Curve for Exports. 
expansion of exports. In such a situation, there can be no trade gap 
that is distinct from a savings gap. 
In contrast to that, diagram 6 illustrates a situation where the 
foreign demand curve for the exports of the given developing country is 
perfectly inelastic. The curve 'tt' represent's the total demand curve 
obtained by horizontally summing 'dd' (tlddomestic demand curve) and 
'ff' (the completely inelastic foreign demand curve). To raise the level 
of domestic savings by shifting dd to d1 d1 would eventually force the 
price level downwards from OP1 to OP2 because foreign demand would 
in this case not be affected. The impact of falling prices would 
therefore induce an increase in domestic demand or otherwise unemployment 
would occur. There is, of course, no possibility of transforming a part 
of the forced savings into foreign exchange. However, if domestic 
demand falls and prices follow, then the resultant increase in domestic 
savings could be transformed into capital formation but at higher costs 
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than before. A given rate of capital formation would normally require 
more savings than when price was at P1 (see the cited Article). When 
the rate of capital formation approaches its maximum obtainable level, 
then the achievement of a target growth rate that requires a higher rate 
of capital formation than this maximum would be constrained by a trade 
gap. Such a gap cannot be closed by further increases in the rate of 
domestic savings. This situation resembles that of a typical 
developing country whose exports are mainly traditional products. 
Devaluation would not help to increase foreign exchange earnings but 
to the contrary may in certain circumstances reduce it. 
Price (P) I df 
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Diagram 6: A Perfectly Inelastic Foreign Demand Curve for Exports. 
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Diagram 7 explains some of the further problems that may have 
to be taken into account on the supply side. The foreign demand 
curve PIf1 is perfectly elastic at the price OP1. However, domestic 
suppliers would be unwilling to export at that price and can only survive 
under heavy protection. Even if the level of domestic savings was 
forced to rise by curtailing consumption, causing the domestic demand 
curve to shift from dd to d1d1, the volume of exports would not be 
increased and the economy could find itself moving back to the initial 
situation (dd), unless appropriate policies such as devaluation were 
pursued. In terms of domestic currency, devaluation would push the 
foreign demand curve to P2f2 and the new price level would stand at 
OP2. Hence, part of the forced domestic savings could be transformed 
into foreign exchange. However, Bruton suggests that devaluation will 
not be sufficient to increase foreign exchange earning for a country with 
a very large traditional sector unless it is accompanied by a duty on 
traditional exports (or dual exchange rates). In terms of diagram 7, the 
given country would then be able to export AB and consume OA. In such 
a situation, the possibility of two distinct gaps entirely disappears. 
Bruton then concludes that 
"without devaluation and the export duty there can 
indeed be two gaps, but they exist not for structural 
reasons, but because of the inability or unwillingness 
to pursue a policy that would eliminate the distinction 
between the gaps. " 14 
Bruton maintained his attack on the structural explanation of the 
two gaps on moderate neo-classical grounds: - (i) The presence of a 
capital goods sector - however small that may be - would enable the 
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Diagram 7: A Perfectly Elastic Foreign Demand Curve for the Exports 
of a Heavily Protected Supplier's Market. 
economy to transform part of its domestic savings into foreign exchange 
without going through international trade. He referred to that sector 
in a broader sense of the term to include all those activities which 
have the effect of increasing the productive capacity of the economy. 
If after all the economy could not achieve its target growth rate, then 
it is certainly limited by a low level of domestic savings, that is, 
there is only one gap. (ii) There is scope for adaptability and 
flexibility of all productive inputs; a possibility that is generally 
disregarded by the proponents of the two-gap analysis. (iii) The 
essence of the structural explanation of development constraints implies 
the irrelevance of short-term policy measures. In other words, the 
gaps have not been the result of inappropriate economic policies in the 
past when long-term investment priorities were not fully observed, that 
S 
F2 
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is, the lack of investment in capacity-raising activities. Ideally, 
"the allocation criterion must be gap-prevention rather than least 
disadvantaged or some other cost-based argument. "15 Foreign aid 
funds could be effectively used to dictate the appropriate allocation of 
resources. Economic policies built around the assumption of the 
inevitability-of a trade gap as a legitimate outcome of the development 
process generally undermine the necessity to reverse certain existing 
policy measures in order to enhance the development efforts. 
Writers such as Joshi16 have discussed the two-gap analysis 
on almost similar lines to that of Bruton. According to Joshi, the 
domestic savings and the trade gap are mutually exclusive. In the 
context of a two commodity-producing economy (consumer goods which 
are exportables and investment goods which are importables), the saving 
constraint only dominates when the squeeze of consumer goods in 
favour of investment goods reaches its maximum possible level, that 
is, when domestic consumption reaches a minimum level. The trade-gap 
then dominates at a stage when it becomes impossible to transform 
domestic savings into foreign exchange through international trade. 
There are certain specific criticisms that question some of the 
assumptions on which the two-gap approach projections are derived. 
For example, the model of Chenery and Strout maintained an assumption 
of rigid capital-output and import-output ratios throughout the 
transitional period to a self-sustained growth path. The analysis 
utilized an aggregate capital-output ratio for the whole economy. Since 
that is an average of the sectoral ratios which are determined in 
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accordance with the changing compsotion of investment and output in 
each sector, then, an aggregate ratio would carry the disadvantage of 
being limited in use. 
17 Since the latter is expected to change as a 
result of the increasing size of investment over time, it would certainly 
differ from one phase to another and for different sectors during a given 
phase. Thirlwall related his arguments for the existence of two 
distinct gaps to the rigidities of the assumptions of the two-gap models 
claiming that "if the capital -output and import-output ratios are 
flexible there can only be one gap, not two, " 
18 
that is, savings. 
The whole approach may be criticized on the ground that it tackles the 
development issues at an aggregate rather than at a sectoral level. 
Finally, the two-gap analysis does not explicitly incorporate 
the question of debt repayments. In other words, it does not refer to 
the possibility of a bottleneck arising because a given country has 
been over-indebted. That approach would, therefore, be taken to 
assume either-that all foreign aid is in the form of unrequited transfers 
or that substantial proportion. of it is concessional so that foreign 
indebtedness is not expected to cause difficulties. Even though if it 
might have been taken for granted that foreign transfers to developing 
countries could be available in sufficient quantities and concessional 
terms in the past for the benefit of development, this is doubtful at the 
present time. Perhaps, the proponents of the two-gap model were 
entirely thinking of external resource transfers that should not incur 
current obligations. "Some of the potential bottlenecks - skills, saving 
or foreign exchange - can be temporarily relaxed by adding external 
resources for which current payment is not required. " 
19 
But, their 
long-term models also do not incorporate the repayment issue. 
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The possibility of a debt difficulty and its implications on the 
development progress of a developing economy will be examined in 
Part III with particular emphasis on the Sudan. 
2.3. Summary and Evaluation 
The remarkable post-war development experience of certain 
countries has inspired economists to draw general conclusions and to 
derive models in an attempt to assist developing countries to foresee 
their development prospects on similar lines. The ultimate goal has 
always been to ensure that the developing economies can achieve and 
maintain a self-sustained growth path. The level of co-operation 
between the advanced and developing countries is the cornerstone for 
any development breakthrough that is envisaged to take place in the 
latter. Broadly speaking, this co-operation manifests itself in the 
volume and terms of trade between the two categories of countries, 
and the amounts of foreign assistance which the developing countries 
acquire from their developed counterparts. The developed and the rich 
countries of the world are seen as assisting the developing countries by 
facilitating the transfer of resources and know-how on concessional 
terms up to the point where the latter can support an accelerated growth 
rate from their öwn resources. 
These fundamental arguments form the main grounds for the 
two-gap approach to development. The derived models incorporate the 
striking development experiences of Certain countries during the past 
few decades; take into account the relevant characteristics of the 
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developing countries and anticipate a level of co-operation between 
the developed and the developing countries to ensure a continuous flow 
of resources into the latter and to further trade. These development 
models emphasize the critical role of capital in augmenting development. 
They describe and analyse the different development phases which a 
developing economy normally follows in its drive towards a self- 
sustained growth path. These development phases are characterized 
by two main constraints; namely, domestic savings and foreign 
exchange. Apart from these constraints, a developing economy is also 
likely to face a skill-limit. The dominance of a saving constraint 
means that both public and private savings are insufficient to support 
a level of investment that is compatible with a given target growth rate. 
In general terms, this reflects the over-all state of the economy's 
resource-endowment and its dualism between traditional and modern 
activities. However, the acceleration in the growth of the modern 
sector will certainly increase the demand for current public spending 
and this should have implications on the level of future current budget 
surpluses. 
At this phase of economic development, the size of foreign aid 
funds requirement necessary to enable the implementation of the 
appropriate investment programme would be determined by the size of 
the saving gap. But, in the absence of foreign aid, the target growth 
rate cannot be achieved and the obtainable growth rate will be dictated 
by the most binding constraint of the two which in this case is the 
level of domestic savings. Foreign funds would supplement domestic 
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savings and enable the economy to increase its potential capacity to 
generate an increasing level of savings. Therefore, the impact of 
foreign funds would be to accelerate the rate of mobilization of domestic 
resources into effective investment. The role of foreign funds in 
supplementing domestic savings would eventually diminish and the 
economy would enter a new phase characterized by shortages of foreign 
exchange. 
The appearance of a distinct foreign exchange constraint on 
growth has been one of main controversial issues in relation to the 
two-gap analysis. The latter reflects the fact that international trade 
may not lead to full employment of resources in the developing countries 
mainly because of factor immobility and the fact that certain imports 
are required to achieve full utilization of domestic resources but their 
values exceed the obtainable export proceeds. However, the situation 
may be more difficult with respect to those developing countries whose 
main export items are primary products. The dominance of a foreign 
exchange constraint means that domestic resources are under-utilized 
in the sense that part of domestic savings is not effectively used)which 
aroused a great deal of concern among economists. This issue will be 
discussed later in this section. 
The basis of the two-gap analysis specification of a foreign 
exchange limit on growth is the proposition that the given economy has 
not yet acquired a sufficient degree of structural flexibility which would 
enable the transformation of a part of the domestic savings (which are 
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in excess of that required for investment) into foreign exchange by export 
promotion and/or import substitution. Therefore, the gap between the 
available foreign exchange and that which would be required to import 
the necessary capital and other manufactured goods as well as material 
inputs would have to be filled by foreign funds if such an economy is to 
achieve its target growth rate. Otherwise, the economy would perform 
at a lower rate of growth than that could be obtainable and the latter would 
reflect the shortage of foreign exchange rather than be dictated by the 
domestic savings. But once the economy acquires the necessary degree 
of flexibility to transform sufficient proportions of domestic savings into 
foreign exchange, the role of foreign aid - which is assumed to be 
gradually declining during this period at a rate which depends on the 
speed of such process - should be substantially reduced. 
The main question to ask is about the bases on which we can 
accept the propositions of the two-gap analysis with regard to the 
appearance of an independent trade gap that is distinct from a saving gap. 
The critics argue that such presentation of a distinct trade gap is of 
limited practical use because it implies that the developing countries 
have been pursuing the appropriate economic policies with regard to the 
external sectors of their economies. For example, Bruton is of the 
opinion that the determination of an independent trade gap would necessarily 
have to be considered after taking into account the elasticities of world 
demand for the particular country's exports and he suggests that economic 
policies such as devaluation and import-saving industrialization play a 
significant role in eliminating the possibility of its appearance. 
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Accordingly, the appearance of an independent trade gap during any 
period of time is often the result of inappropriate economic policies 
in the past and should not be always related to structural factors. 
This is the view taken earlier by Rosenstein-Rodan when he emphasizes 
that foreign aid would act to supplement domestic savings without 
explicitly referring to the possibility of a foreign exchange constraint 
dominance implying that the former is the usual limit to growth in the 
developing countries. 
In general terms, the two-gap analysis treats all the developing 
countries in a similar manner implying that each individual, country 
should necessarily pass through the described phases in one order or 
another before it reaches a state of self-sustained growth. This may 
not always be the case. A developing country may not necessarily 
face a distinct foreign exchange gap if it has consistently been pursuing 
appropriate economic policies by continuously ensuring that an adequate 
level of domestic savings is being transformed into foreign exchange 
through trade channels and efficient uses of domestic resources. To 
a large extent, this will depend on the elasticities of the supply of, and 
the demand for its exports. If the given country is a price-taker and 
its exports face a growing competition from other producers then it may 
be difficult to increase the volume and/or raise the price level of its 
exports unless the world market situation moves in its favour. This 
applies to countries which export primary products and manufactured 
goods alike. Even if the prospect for world demand improves, a given 
country may still be constrained by the inelasticity of supply of its 
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exportables and hence may not be in a position to benefit from that 
situation by increasing its foreign exchange proceeds. However, if 
we consider the situation of the different groups of developing countries, 
things may look different. It is conceivable that there are some 
developing countries which can actually increase their foreign exchange 
proceeds by benefiting from' the existing world market situation such as 
those developing countries which produce vital commodities like oil, or 
else can exercise monoplistic practices in the world market. The 
possibility of a dominant trade-limit may also be remote for those 
countries which can expand their sales over other developing countries 
by improving quality, delivery ... etc. In contrast, other developing 
countries - particularly those least developed - may not acquire such 
capacities to raise their foreign exchange earnings and eventually find 
themselves caught up during their development process by a trade-limit. 
Therefore, we need to consider the practical uses of the two-gap 
analysis for each individual developing country in relation to its own 
economic situation and the present performance and future prospects of 
its export sector. 
Even though the two-gap analysis is subject to a wide range 
of criticism, the critics appreciate its significant contribution to 
development literature in focusing on the limits to economic growth 
arising from the deficiency in domestic savings. The latter is the 
result of the poor state of the developing economies which are caught 
up in a vicious circle of poverty, because of the generally low per 
capita income, low levels of capital stock, low rates of capital 
51 
accumulation ... etc. Therefore, although the two-gap analysis 
might, in one way or another, be defective, the case to close the 
domestic savings gap still remains. This means that the case for 
foreign aid to fill this gap and to help in eliminating absolute poverty 
remains valid. The role of foreign aid should not in any case be 
weakened if it becomes evident that the possibility of a distinct foreign 
exchange limit is unlikely to take place. 
In conclusion, the theme of the two-gap analysis is to describe 
the existing constraints that limit the capacity of developing economies 
to use their resources in an effective manner. It proposes that a 
continuous flow of foreign aid into these economies determined on the 
size of the most limiting factor should supplement their domestic 
resources and help to move them from their state of backwardness 
towards an accelerated and a self-sustained growth path. The critics 
maintained that such a phase-approach to development implies that each 
phase is inevitable and hence prolongs the time-horizon of foreign aid. 
Their main emphasis has always been on the effectiveness of domestic 
economic policies to eliminate the possibility of a trade-limit which, 
the critics argue, has been mistakenly explained by structural factors. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Absorptive Capacity of Developing 
Economies :A Critical Appraisal 
The need for an effective use of resources in developing 
countries has been emphasized in the growing body of literature on 
development economics. It is widely acknowledged that the limit 
imposed on the developing economies by the present extent of their 
absorptive capacities is among the main elements that lead to an 
ineffective use of resources and hence to an unsatisfactory implement- 
ation of development programmes. The focus on the absorptive capacity 
constraint has sharpened as a result of the increasing inflow of resources 
from the advanced countries into the developing economies and a growing 
concern about is productivity and allocation. Therefore, it could be 
desirable that much of the investible resources in the initial stages of 
the development process should be directed towards broadening the 
base of the 'infant' economy. This involves the elimination of the 
different obstacles - both technical and institutional - that frustrate 
the subsequent developmental efforts. 
However, despite the significance attached to the limits imposed 
on development by the capacity of the developing economies to absorb 
a large investment in an effective manner, the concept itself has not 
been given a well-defined operational meaning. This makes it difficult 
to measure the absorptive capacity of a given economy and thereby to 
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determine the appropriate size of investment which it can effectively 
undertake at any particular stage of development. The multiplicity 
of factors. that affect (and are affected by) this concept are among the 
main reasons that resulted in the ambiguity that surrounds its definition. 
In addition, absorptive capacity differs between countries and among 
the different activities of the same economy so that a comparison in 
both cases may not be quite useful. However, there are aggregate 
indicators which might usefully indicate the extent of the absorptive 
capacity of an economy. 
The capacity of an economy to absorb more capital investment 
than the present levels could be estimated by examining the pattern of 
aggregate indicators such as the general level of education in the 
country and the proportion of technical education; the present state of 
the economy and its performance over the past years; the experience 
of private entrepreneurs both domestic and foreign and the way they 
foresee the future prospects of the economy. It is evident that policy- 
makers would also'need to acquire adequate qualitative knowledge about 
the extent of the economy's absorptive capacity and the appropriate 
methods to reduce its short-term adverse effects. 
There have been various attempts to identify the broad 
boundaries of the absorptive capacity of the developing economies. 
One of the earliest is that of Rosenstein-Rodan. He contends that a 
country's absorptive capacity is limited at low levels of development 
and is likely to increase as a result of the development process itself. 
He asserts that it "relates to the ability to use capital productively. "1 
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That is, its extent is reflected through the net rate of return on capital 
investment. This is an aggregate concept which should apply to the 
total investment programme rather than to be considered for each 
individual project. It may however differ from one activity to another 
depending on the availability of the complementary material and non- 
material inputs. But as the aggregate level, it generally refers to 
the non-existence of a combination of basic development pre-requisites. 
The United Nation (1960) presented a broader version of absorptive 
capacity by explicitly relating it to the available physical and human 
resources in a given country. It depends 
"on natural resources, taxes, the labour supply, 
the level of labour, technical and managerial 
skills, entrepreneurial capacity, the efficiency 
of public administration, the extent of 'technology 
mindness' of the population, and so on. Such 
capacity sets a limit to the amount of efficient 
investment physically possible, and although it can 
itself be increased through further investment, it 
does effectively. limit the rate of development possible, 2 particularly in the short-run. " 
A particularly interesting point in this interpretation of absorptive 
capacity is the emphasis on the negative impact of incompetent 
bureaucratic practices in handling matters related to the development 
programme, as for instance, the application of the Acts that are designed 
to provide concession for private investors and to encourage foreign 
participation. 
In contrast, Adler (1965) attempts to determine the absorptive 
capacity of developing economies exclusively in terms of the relative 
rate of return on capital. He states that it should be viewed 
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"as the amount of investment, or that rate of gross 
domestic investment expressed as a proportion of 
Gross National Product, that can be made at an 
acceptable rate of return, with the supply of 
co-operant factors considered as given. " 3 
This version is open to different interpretations between domestic and 
foreign entrepreneurs and among the former themselves as to what can 
be viewed as 'an acceptable rate of return on investment. ' In short, 
the ability to mobilize and transform higher levels of domestic 
resources than before into effective investment could be singled as 
one of the main indicators of the absorptive capacity of a developing 
economy. 
However, Adler's version of the type of limits imposed on the 
developing economies because of. their absorptive capacities is 
ultimately closer to that suggested by Chenery and Strout when they 
described phase. I in the proposed three-phase thesis of the two-gap 
analysis. 
4 
The substance of these arguments is that absorptive 
capacity for additional investment would be limited due to the lack of 
sufficient complementary inputs. The binding constraint is broadly 
referred to as the 'skill-limit' which primarily reflects not only 
shortages of skilled labourers, managerial staff and entrepreurship, but 
also the inability of the economy to supply the required complementary 
inputs for the new development ventures. The latter could be illustrated 
in two ways: the absence of complementary inputs necessary for a 
successful completion of a given project and the failure to simultaneously 
develop a chain of interrelated projects. In the first case, a 
manufacturing industry may happen to be cut-off from its prime source of 
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material-inputs due to the lack of adequate transport facilities and 
this could be particularly aggravated during rainy seasons. The 
outcome would be low capital turnover because of existence of idle 
capacity leading to lower returns on capital investment. The second 
case relates to a situation of complementary industries or agro-allied 
processing establishments. 
The above constraints tend to influence the decisions of 
private entrepreneurs in undertaking large capital investment in a 
particular country because the ielätive rate of return on capital could 
be higher in other countries.. However, different attitudes towards the 
viability of investment might exist among domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs. On the one hand, local businessmen may come to 
conclusions that the net return on capital are well below what they 
generally regard as the 'minimum reasonable level' and hence they 
refrain from further investment under the prevailing circumstances. 
In contrast, foreign investors might foresee better future prospects as 
well as good present investment opportunities in that country for a 
number of reasons: - (i) The net returns on capital may be higher than 
those obtainable in their mother countries or in the other countries 
where their business activities extend. (ii) Foreign investors may 
value the future prospects of investment more than the short-term 
returns on capital as obtainable from the existing investment 
opportunities and also are likely to have more capital backing to run 
through a period of low returns. (iii) Foreign businessmen may be 
selective with regard to the available investment opportunities and so 
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could be assured of an adequate return on their undertakings. (iv) They 
may be able to overcome the short-term problems arising from the 
shortages of co-operant inputs by importation in contrast to domestic 
businessmen who may be subject to strict exchange control systems. 
All the above factors may leave domestic investors at a 
disadvantageous position compared with their foreign counterparts, mainly 
arising from the inability of the economy to provide some basic 
pre-requisites necessary for a successful investment. This is applicable 
to all forms of development investment, and is particularly evident in the 
early stages of the development process in a typical developing country 
where mostly a large and an indivisible investment is vitally required. 
The limited capacity of private investors to undertake such ventures., due 
to their socio-economic nature or the lack of investible funds leads us 
to argue in favour of a sizeable government involvement in investments 
that are mainly characterized by long gestation periods, have relatively 
low direct rates of return and are often producing services and intermediate 
inputs. The initial emphasis should be on the improvement of transport 
and communication links between the material-input sources, industrial 
locations and consumption markets as well as between the agricultural 
production areas, the domestic and international markets ... etc. 
Another example is the installation of hydro-electric power in all parts 
of the country particularly in areas where the development prospects are 
relatively better and where the power-operated technology can replace 
the old methods of production. These investments are essential to 
vitalize the economy. The government could acquire capital from foreign 
sources in the form of aid and borrowing. But that does not guarantee 
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success if the basic information on the structure and performance of 
the economy are either lacking or inadequate. The latter could be a 
prime barrier to the use of the available investment opportunities. 
The demerits of the 'information gap' would be felt at both the 
aggregate and the sectoral levels. At aggregate levels, the present 
performance and future prospects of the economy are indicated by an 
analysis of cross-section and time-series data on variables such as 
the annual growth rate of GDP, per capita income, the behaviour of the 
saving function, the size of investment in relation to GDP, the gap 
between exports and imports, the changing composition of manpower 
... etc. More importantly is the relevance of the past and present 
economic policies and their impact on each individual economic variable 
and the economy as a whole; in particular how they influenced the 
allocation of resources among the different activities. The latter is 
crucial in view of the competing claims on, and the need to make 
effective uses of the limited resources. On the other hand, the 
emphasis at sectoral levels should be on the growth rates of the 
different sectors and their relatives contributions to GDP. This 
information enables policy-makers to analyse the structure of these 
t 
sectors and to set priorities among and within them to apply the 
appropriate measures which would result in changing the future 
structure of the economy as may be deemed desirable. The latter should 
demonstrate the inter-links between the different components of the 
development programme and reduce the probability of resource waste. 
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The availability of the information described above makes it 
possible to conduct feasibility studies to decide on the appropriate 
allocation of the development funds and eventually to fulfil the long- 
term projections which in this case are based on thorough knowledge 
about the economy. In other words, the provision of sound statistical 
data on the various aspects of the economy will certainly reduce the 
degrees of uncertainty that is associated with most developing countries 
particularly those newly independent ones because of a mixture of 
socio-economic and political problems. 
5 All the mentioned elements 
would act- simultaneously to increase the absorptive capacity of the 
developing economy. In addition, the establishment of sound financial 
institutions all over the country to mobilize domestic resources for 
development financing and the elimination of the various institutional 
constraints to development whether in the form of bureaucratic procedures 
or organizational controls both contribute to raise the level of the 
absorptive capacity of a developing country. 
The estimates of the capacity of a developing economy to absorb 
a given size of capital investment is an important element in determining 
the size of foreign resources which could be effectively used. The 
significance of this arises from the fact that only part of the required 
external resources can be acquired in grant form. Therefore the 
recipient country needs to meet debt service obligations in the short- 
and the long-run depending on the terms of borrowing. 
6 
Unless these 
resources are productively used, the recipient country could face debt 
difficulties with far-reaching implications on its development process 
itself. 
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The above analysis brings to the fore the practical benefits 
of co-ordination between different economic activities to reduce the 
flaws caused by the limitations of the absorptive capacity. These 
obstacles could be overcome by foreign assistance in the short-run. 
However, the economy's absorptive capacity would increase in the 
long-run partly as a result of consistent efforts to raise the human 
skills, to improve the statistical system and to provide basic infra- 
structure and partly as a result of the development process itself due 
to the leverage effects of accelerated development. However, it may 
prove difficult to broaden the scope of a developing economy through 
scattered developmental efforts, where the over-all outcome may be 
misallocation of resources and far less impact on the economy compared 
to what could be obtained mainly because of the limited leverage effects 
of such unco-ordinated efforts. The development momentum should not, 
in any case, over-shadow these important issues. The achievement of 
a 'big push' may not be possible in an economy with a severely limited 
absorptive capacity. 
To sum up, the notion of limited absorptive capacity of developing 
countries reflects a multitude of simultaneous constraints on development. 
It is one of the main elements that tend to slow progress and frustrate 
the development strategies. By emphasizing the role of physical 
capital in economic development, we should not take for granted that 
all the other necessary conditions to achieve that objective are given. 
The absence of the latter conditions would eventually lead to an 
ineffective utilization of the available resources. To reduce the negative 
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impact of a limited absorptive capacity on the development process, 
the developing countries need to launch relatively 'huge' investment 
programmes in the early stage of their development drive. This may 
not be feasible in the absence of foreign aid particularly that in the 
form of technical assistance. Although the former may take a long 
time to be effective, its immediate merits in removing some institutional 
constraints should not be underestimated. 
Chapters 9 and 10 will adopt this conceptual framework to the 
Sudanese economy focusing on the constraints that arise from the 
skill-limit and from the institutional establishments which cater for 
the development programme and in particular aid-sponsored projects. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Recipient Countries' 
Domestic Savings 
4.1. The Critics of Foreign Aid: Their Statistical Findings 
and Interpretations 
Arguments that favour the extension of foreign aid to developing 
countries usually rest on the proposition that the process of economic 
development in these countries is likely to be constrained by shortages 
of domestic savings over the required level of investment or export 
proceeds over import needs. Foreign aid is seen as a means that could 
fill whichever of these gaps that may emerge during the development 
process. This represents the main theme of the two-gap approach to 
development which focuses on determining the limits to economic growth 
and suggests that these limits could be eased and eventually eliminated 
by an effective use of foreign aid as deemed sufficient depending on 
the size of the dominant gap. 
It is argued by many economists that the size of foreign aid 
inflow would have the following sequence: initially, its size is required 
to be relatively large because of the often huge investment undertakings 
that are an essential pre-requisite for development, such as investment 
in basic infra-structure and in raising social capital per head. However, 
the size of required foreign aid would further increase as the economy's 
absorptive capacity increases. There would come a time when the 
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foreign aid requirement reaches a peak. Thereafter, the economy would 
be in a position to finance an increasing proportion of its capital 
investment requirement from domestic resources. Subsequently, the 
importance of foreign aid should gradually diminish until the economy 
reaches a point where concessionary development aid are no longer 
necessary. At this stage, foreign aid for developmental purposes 
would cease, but the economy can acquire foreign finance - if that 
proved to be necessary - through the usual commercial channels. 
According to the above analysis, the crucial factor to the whole 
process of transforming the developing economies from the state of 
stagnation, subsistence and slow growth into ones that are dynamic 
and possess the potential of achieving and maintaining a satisfactory 
growth rate, is the success of policies designed to mobilize domestic 
savings for development finance. The two-gap analysis itself assumes 
that foreign aid funds would be efficiently used in accordance with the 
recipient country's own priorities. Foreign aid would support the 
recipient country in overcoming the initial difficulties of resource 
deficiencies at a time when its economy is still in a transitional period, 
thus making possible the achievement of the required level of savings 
to support a target growth rate in a shorter period than would otherwise 
be the case without it. On this view, foreign aid is expected to 
supplement rather than substitute domestic savings. The extent of this 
supplementation is the subject matter of this section. 
The crucially important role assigned to foreign aid in augmenting 
domestic savings has aroused considerable concern among economists 
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who sought to establish quantitative evidence on the impact of foreign 
capital inflow on domestic savings in the developing countries. If 
such inquiries were able to establish positive relationships between 
the two variables, then it could be maintained that foreign aid (as one 
main component of foreign capital inflow into developing countries) is 
in fact effective and contributory to economic development. But if 
the statistics were to reveal negative correlation between both variables, 
then it could perhaps be argued that foreign aid is unproductive, 
adversely affects domestic savings and is a burden on the recipient 
countries' resources because it leads to some extent to debt accumulation 
and also delays some essential changes in the structure of these 
economies. 
A start with the empirical analysis of this issue was made by 
Rahman (1968)1 who used data provided by Chenery and Strout2 for 31 
developing countries on foreign capital inflow and domestic savings 
to estimate the following equation: - 
St 
=a+ 
Ht 
Yt Yt 
where St, Yt and Ht represent domestic savings, Gross National Product 
and foreign capital inflow respectively. 
St 
and 
Ht 
stand for the 
Yt Tt- 
saving-income and the foreign capital-income ratios consecutively. 
The above equation is derived from a general postulate that 
investment in developing countries is a function of total income which 
includes foreign capital inflow. The result of the regression analysis 
was: 
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St 
= 0.1427 - 0.2473 
Ht 
Yt Yt 
According to this equation,. a unit increase in foreign capital inflow is 
associated with about . 25 unit decline in domestic savings. Rahman, 
then, argued that this result could possibly be attributed to three 
factors: - (i) Because of the short-run shortages of investment 
opportunities as a direct result of the limited absorptive capacity of the 
developing economies, part of the foreign transfers would go into 
consumption. However, if it happened to be known to both the donor 
and the recipient countries that the possibilities' of undertaking larger 
investment than before would be constrained by the present absorptive 
capacity, then (according to the author) foreign aid would be deliberately 
provided to ease the pressures on consumption rather than to augment 
investment. (ii) The dominance of ex-ante trade over ex-ante saving 
gap might result from the adoption of import-intensities whose choice 
might be influenced by the availability of foreign aid funds. It is 
suggested that the availability of foreign funds may deter the use of 
local resources for construction; instead imported materials are chosen 
if foreign exchange is not scarce. 
3 (iii) The final possible factor is 
a behaviouristic or a psychological consideration relating to the 
attitudes of governments in poor and/or 'politically difficult' countries. 
Governments may in such circumstances, it is suggested, relax their 
efforts to mobilize domestic resources when more foreign aid is 
available than otherwise. 
The latter interpretation was elaborately discussed by Griffin 
(1970) and formed the basis of his analysis on the relationship between 
foreign capital inflow and domestic savings. Griffin opened his 
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analysis by arguing that although there is good reason to assume some 
degree of inflexibility in the production systems of developing 
countries, the two-gap analysis has assumed an excessive degree. 
"One can accept the proposition that most 
underdeveloped countries do not have flexible 
economies ... , But the degree of inflexibility 
assumed in the two-gap analysis is surely 
excessive. " 
This type of structural inflexibility is the main reason behind the 
appearance of a foreign exchange constraint. If it is accepted that 
there is some degree of flexibility in any economy, then the appearance 
of a trade gap larger than a saving gap would be the result of 
unwillingness rather than inability of developing countries to introduce 
policies which would increase foreign exchange revenues. This could 
be achieved by producing some capital goods, promoting exports and 
Initiating foreign exchange-saving import-substitution industries. The 
foreign exchange problem would, then, be caused by unwillingness to 
reduce consumption in order to expand exports or reduce imports. 
Griffin then concludes on these grounds that ultimately there can only 
be one constraint on investment, namely, domestic savings, and he 
went on to claim that: - 
"Assuming the government wants to achieve its 
growth objective at the lowest possible cost in 
terms of reduced current consumption, it will 
substitute foreign capital for domestic savings to 
the fullest possible extent. "5 
But since considerable parts of aid are project-tied, how can 
a recipient country switch these funds from investment to consumption 
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p 
or behave in the manner described? On this issue, Singer (1965) 
wrote, 
"provided that the country which receives aid has 
some additional money of its own .... and provided 
that this additional money is not entirely absorbed 
in the project or projects selected by the aid donor 
and to which aid is tied, the project actually financed 
by aid may be quite different from the one to which 
aid is ostensibly tied. to 
This means that although aid may be tied to a specific project which is 
economically sound and meets the particular donor's conditions, it 
may however be switched by the recipient country to finance a 'low 
priority' marginal project. This could take place only because the 
aid-financed projects rank high and would in any case have been 
undertaken in the absence of foreign aid by the use of domestic 
resources. This - according to Griffin - is a case of 'fungibility of 
aid funds' and could lead to the support of the marginal consumption 
expenditure rather than the marginal investment projects as was earlier 
cited by Singer. 
The analysis may be illustrated diagrammatically. In diagram 
8, (derived from Griffin) Ct and Ct +1 represent the choice of a 
government or a community between present and future consumption in 
terms of indifference curves and a budget line. The slope of the 
indifference curve at any point reflects the government's or the 
community's time preference. The slope and position of the budget 
line bl bl are both determined by the amount of available resources and 
the rate of return on investment. In the initial stage, the equilibrium 
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is at E. If EG amount of foreign aid is made available, then the 
budget line would shift to b2 b2. Since consumption is not an inferior 
good, resources provided through foreign aid are expected to be 
allocated between consumption and investment in such a manner that 
"the opportunity cost of current consumption is exactly equal to the 
satisfaction obtained from consuming one additional item. " 
7 
It is 
unlikely that consumption will remain constant and henceforth the new 
equilibrium will not be at El (as was assumed in the two-gap analysis), 
but instead it would be at a point such as H, making Ct and Ct +1 
higher than their initial values. Therefore, a foreign capital inflow 
of EG leads to EF rise in current consumption which, in turn, is a fall 
in domestic savings. At this juncture, Gulati (1976) pointed that 
Griffin had, in fact, regarded any increase in consumption as a 
Ct+1 
b2 
bl 
Diagram 8: The Effects of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings. 
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Ob1 ---" b2 ct 
subtraction from domestic savings. He rejected this contention, 
arguing that "so long as- the increase in consumption is not more than 
a hundred percent of aid received, total savings will still be higher. "8 
In terms of diagram 8, 
F- 
is the proportion of foreign capital consumed 
and 
EG is that proportion which supplements investment and would 
lead to an increase in future consumption of FH. 
The over-all effect of foreign aid programmes on the growth 
rate of the recipient countries was considered with regard to the capital- 
output ratio. Griffin argued that foreign aid reduces the growth rate 
of recipient economies by causing an increase in the capital-output 
ratio because of the apparent practice of some donors of insisting on 
financing large projects of a prestige nature, concentrating funds on 
heavy infra-structure and on the increase of social over-head capital. 
This usually leads to a distortion of the investment pattern and to a 
rise in the overall capital-output ratio because of the increase in the 
relative size of the capital-intensive sector of the economy. But, 
apart from the possibility that foreign aid funds might be directed 
towards the financing of some prestige projects that are totally 
unproductive, and that the choice of techniques may be distorted, 
there seems to be nothing wrong in financing infra-structural projects 
and increasing the social over-head capital if the implications for 
future government current expenditures are borne in mind. Of course, 
judgement on these matters would mainly depend on the given 
community's welfare function. 
9 
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Griffin then concluded that foreign capital might reduce the 
potential growth rate of the economy depending on whether or not it 
would lower domestic savings and/or increase capital-output ratio. 
The extent of the adverse effects on these two variables may necessitate 
larger amounts of aid than before if a target growth rate is to be 
maintained. To support these arguments quantitatively, he regressed 
the percentage ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP (-YS) on the 
percentage ratio of foreign savings to GDP ,) 
for 32 developing 
countries using United Nations data for the years 1962-64. He 
obtained the following relationship: - 
Y= 11.2 - 0.73 
Y R2 = 0.54 
This shows that foreign capital inflow and domestic savings are inversely 
related. Similar results were obtained when the same equation was 
estimated for Columbia (1950 - 63), that is, 
Y= 21.5 - 0.84 
Y R2 = 0.43 
, 
These statistical findings left Griffin in no doubt about the 
adverse effects of foreign aid on the recipient economies for reasons 
which will be discussed later. In the meantime, diagram 9 represents 
this statistical findings on the inverse relationship between foreign aid 
and domestic savings. f1 f1 is the investment frontier indicating the 
various combinations of domestic and foreign savings that could be used 
to achieve a given target rate of growth. S0 So is the domestic saving 
function drawn in a way suggesting that domestic savings and foreign 
capital inflow are inversely associated. 
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Savings 
(s) 
fl 
f2 
Bo 
B1 
Aid (A) 
Diagram 9: The Inverse Relationship Between Domestic Savings 
and Foreign Aid Inflow 
If the initial level of savings is B0 and the level of foreign aid is at 
Ao, then an increase of A0 Al would reduce the former by Bo B1 and 
would shift f1 f1 to f2 f2. In such circumstances, if the initial level 
of foreign aid was at A1, it would be necessary to reduce its size by 
A1 A0 so as to remove the negative resource gap. A reduction in the 
general level of foreign capital inflow, therefore, might lead to an 
increase in the domestic savings ratio. In addition, for reasons to be 
discussed later, it could also result in a decline in the incremental 
capital-output ratio. The cost of increased self-reliance would, then, 
be some reduction in the level of consumption rather than a slower rate 
of growth of the economy. 
10 
However, in a paper published in 1970 by Griffin and Enos 
(one month earlier than that of Griffin), they presented similar statistical 
results but they concluded with a considerably less extreme view 
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do AI 12 ll 
admitting that: 
'the pattern of development is complex and the 
effect upon it of foreign assistance is still 
undetermined ... . In general foreign aid has 
neither accelerated growth nor helped to foster 
democratic political regimes. ... the limited 
evidence available suggests that aid programmes, 
as currently administered and insofar as they are 
concerned with economic development, frequently 
are counter-productive. " 11 
Griffin made no reference to these important considerations in his 
subsequent article examined earlier. 
The above mentioned work of Rahman, Griffin and Griffin and 
Enos-was later criticized by Weissokopf12 on two grounds: - (i) their 
failure to exclude those countries with net capital outflow because in 
such cases the causality would run from the domestic savings to the 
capital flow and not the other way round; (ii) their failure to 
differentiate between ex-ante and ex-post domestic savings, because 
foreign capital inflow would only contribute to the former. The 
identification of a behavioural savings function will depend on the 
dominance of this constraint for a given country during the time period 
under consideration. 
13 He then derived a model that is based on the 
ex-ante (potential) behaviour of the domestic savings function rather 
than the ex-post (realized) accounting relationship. The estimation of 
his equation included only those developing countries where a domestic 
savings constraint was binding at the time. The behavioural function 
is of the following type: - 
S*=a+ by + cF + dE +u 
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where, S* is ex-ante savings defined as the gross domestic savings 
that would be potentially available for investment although not necessarily 
always realised. Y, F and E represent, in turn, GDP, net foreign 
capital inflow and exports of goods and services. 'a' is a constant 
and the parameters 'b', 'c' and 'd' stand for the marginal propensities to 
save out of Y, F and E. u is the stochastic term. 
The estimation of the above function by methods of regression 
analysis using data for 17 developing countries for a period of at least 
seven years for each country (extending from the 1950's to 1966) produced 
the following relationship: 
S=a+0.1837Y - 0.227F + 0.176E 
(t = 65.9) (t = -5.3) (t = 4.6) 
"According to this equation, the impact of F on S is highly significant 
and approximately 23 percent of net foreign capital inflow substitutes 
for domestic savings. " 
14 
avings. "14 Weisskopf then argued that such inverse 
impact on domestic savings is only the result of the dominance of the 
domestic savings gap. It is likely to be positive when an economy 
faces an active foreign exchange constraint because foreign capital 
inflow would help to relieve the independent limitation on investment 
imposed by shortages of some specifically required imports. 
However, Weisskopf seems to argue that similar (negative) 
coefficients would usually characterize the relationship between domestic 
savings and foreign capital inflow because of the more frequent dominance 
of the savings rather than the trade constraint. This implies that there 
is no general rule to shape the relationship between domestic savings 
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and foreign capital inflow, but instead such a relationship would be 
affected by the binding constraint at any particular time. In general, 
although Weisskopf's model has revealed similar results as those 
reviewed earlier, it has the merit of incorporating the contribution of 
the export sector to domestic savings, that is, the extra impact on the 
propensity to save that is attributable to the export sector. 
In addition to the specific criticism of foreign aid programmes 
from the standpoints just considered, other arguments have been put 
forward proposing the suspension of aid programmes on rather different 
grounds. For example, Professor Bauer has consistently attacked aid 
programmes on the basis that they keep alive oppressive political 
regimes without benefiting the majority of the people in the recipient 
countries. He regards foreign aid as one of the main obstacles to 
development and argues that those who argue for the provision of aid 
usually misunderstand the concept of development itself. He contends 
that 
"the advocacy and operation of aid suggest clearly 
and often explicitly that material advance depends 
largely on external grants, rather than on the emergence 
of appropriate human qualities, attitudes, values and 
also the removal of institutional constraints. " 15 
The impact of foreign aid would, then, be to expand the role of 
governments in the economy (although this may also take place in the 
absence of aid) and to lead to the establishment of superficial planning 
machineries to impress donors and it is "often linked to balance of 
payment deficits of the recipients, especially when these deficits are 
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considered as the result of laudable official efforts to speed up 
16 Generally speaking, such views are primarily based on progress. 
casual, unsystematic observations on the performance of developing 
countries (perhaps only a few countries. ). Also, they, to a large 
extent, fail to distinguish between different forms of aid and to 
appreciate the need for co-operation between the advanced and 
developing countries to overcome the problems of development in the 
latter leading to mutual benefits to both sides. 
Most of the critics of foreign aid tend to substantiate their 
arguments by interpretations drawn from certain characteristics of 
developing countries. Much emphasis is placed on the recipient 
countries' alleged official attitudes towards domestic savings in the 
presence of foreign aid, such as that a recipient government may reduce 
taxation, make less effort to collect it or fail to adjust taxes in line 
with inflation rates. Also, the present expenditure pattern may be 
altered in favour of more consumption by increasing the size of public 
services, raising wages and salaries and introducing social security 
benefits. In addition to these plausible interpretations, Griffin 
17 
also 
referred to the effects of capital imports on local entrepreneurs in the 
recipient countries. If foreign capital is in aid form and the government 
uses part of it to provide incentives to indigenous businessmen in the 
form of soft credits and other facilities, the outcome may prove to be 
a reduced desire to save or to mobilize domestic savings for business 
expansion. Private foreign investment may also be competitive with 
local investors to an extent that the latter may find themselves at a 
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disadvantageous position because of their inadequate capital, low 
skills and less experience in management and marketing relative to 
their foreign competitors. Also in that connection, capital imports 
may stimulate the consumption of importables and of exportables. 
The consumption of importables may increase because the availability 
of imported goods become possible in the presence of extra foreign 
exchange. The impact on the exportables may come from the adoption 
or pursuance of inappropriate exchange rates that reduce the efforts 
devoted to export promotion and as a result, the domestic consumption 
of potential export goods is likely to increase. However, if the 
motives behind extending a part of foreign aid to developing countries 
are not 'purely economic', then recipients will certainly spend these 
funds on activities that are not directly related to economic development. 
18 
These general criticisms of foreign aid programmes are mainly 
based on "the laxity in government efforts in less developed countries 
to introduce necessary institutional changes for greater accumulation 
and saving. "19 The result of the availability of an extra foreign 
exchange may be that 
"countries shuffle their domestic priorities in 
favour of the types of local cost expenditures that 
are complementary to foreign exchange-intensive 
public investment programmes. " 20 
4.2. Replies to the Critics of Foreign Aid and Some Further 
Interpretations 
The above statistical findings on the relationship between foreign 
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capital inflow and domestic savings in the developing countries and 
their interpretations have been subjected to a wide range of criticism 
on various grounds. The following analytical review will focus on 
the main content of these criticisms regarding the issues which were 
raised in the previous section and will present the counter-arguments. 
The main criticism falls on the manner in which the negative 
relationship between foreign capital inflow and domestic savings is 
obtained and the assumptions that lie behind that. For example, 
Eshag21 has critically examined Griffin's basic assumption that 
changes in consumption would not affect the level of production and 
so there is zero elasticity of resources supply in developing countries 
which implies that resources are fully utilized. But, if a given amount 
of foreign aid is spent on importing equipment, an effective use of 
some idle resources would, usually, become possible. In fact 
Eshag's criticism is based on the contention that there is under- 
utilization of resources in developing countries and that idle resource- 
use may be responsive to the availability of imported equipment financed 
by foreign aid. He presents a model utilizing the multiplier to show 
the impact of a given amount of foreign aid on domestic savings when 
the former has been spent on importing equipment; something that 
would not take place in the absence of aid. If &I = Ia + Id where LI 
is the change in investment, Ia represents foreign aid funds that have 
been spent to import equipment and Id represents the idle domestic 
resources that were subsequently put into use. The incremental 
increase in income (& Y) will be: 
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AY = 
Id+g 
s +t+m 
where 'g' stands for the rise in public expenditure. 's', 't' and 'm' 
represent marginal propensities to save, tax and import respectively. 
To leave the level of foreign exchange position of the recipient country 
unchanged, the total amount of foreign aid (A) will be equal to the total 
increase in the level of imports (AM). NM will be equal to Ia + M. by 
as a result of the multiple impact on Y. Private domestic savings will 
increase by s. 'Y and public savings by t. pY - g. Therefore, the 
total increase in aggregate savings (NS) will be equal to: 
s. AY + t. AY -g 
=&Y (s + t) -g 
which means that savings will not be reduced unless we have a situation 
where g> (s + t) and "there is clearly no a priori reason to expect that 
this will invariably be the case. "22 
The main criticism of Griffin and others came from Papanek23 
who pointed out that the inference of causation between foreign aid and 
domestic savings as a result of the observed negative correlation 
between total foreign capital inflow and the latter does not seem 
appropriate and largely suffers from the problem of aggregation. Any 
model concerned with the long-term impact of foreign capital inflow on 
the growth rate of a given economy should necessarily establish the 
impact of each component of foreign capital separately. On these 
bases, he disaggregated foreign capital inflow into aid (A), private 
foreign investment (PFI) and others flows (R). He obtained the 
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following regression equation using cross-section data for 85 
developing countries in the 1950's and 1960's: 
g=1.5 + 0.2055 + 0.39A + 0.17PFI + 0.19R 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
R2 = 0.37 
One of the remarkable features of the above relationship is the 
direct impact of foreign aid on the growth rate as compared to that of 
domestic savings and private foreign investment. This could be 
partly explained by the dual-gap role performed by foreign aid. 
However, domestic savings and foreign capital inflow do not usually 
explain all the growth rate of the economy. There are other factors 
such as natural and human resources, capital stock and the overall 
management of the economy which should also have appreciable impacts 
on the growth rate. In another study, Papanek obtained a negative 
correlation coefficient between foreign aid and domestic savings, but 
since this was not significant between the latter and the other components 
of capital inflow, he doubted the notion that domestic savings would 
negatively respond to the size of total foreign inflow. He relied on 
this point to cast doubt on the usefulness of the analyses "... which 
combine all foreign resource flows and then draw conclusions for aid ... 11.24 
The conclusions which can justifiably be drawn from the different 
statistical findings should clearly reflect, among other things, the state 
of the given economy at the particular time. In cases where foreign 
capital inflow is associated with low savings, this should not imply 
causality between both variables. Also, savings in the developing 
83 
countries may be a function of some exogenous factors that might 
lead to high levels of capital inflow, low saving levels and low growth 
rates or vice versa. These factors reduce the level of domestic 
savings and may raise the size of foreign aid programmes if the strict 
criterion of extending more aid to the needy and crisis-ridden countries 
was observed. Wars, political disturbances and riots, bad climatic 
conditions, catastrophes and deterioration in the country's terms of 
trade may be associated with a high level of foreign resources inflow 
because they reduce the level of domestic savings. Some importance 
may be attached to historical, political and cultural factors with 
regard to the behavioural pattern of savings. To substantiate these 
arguments, Papanek25 found that for 11 low-saver developing countries 
in the 1950's and 1960's (those saving 9 percent of their GDP or less), 
the average gross saving ratio was 5.1 percent of GDP and the average 
net foreign aid was 5.6 percent of GDP. By contrast, and during the 
same period; 15 high-saver developing countries (those saving 18 
percent of their GDP or more) had an average gross saving ratio of 24 
percent of GDP associated with 0.4 percent of GDP in net foreign aid 
receipts. This clearly indicates that high levels of foreign aid were 
in fact associated with relatively low levels of domestic savings and 
vice versa. Hence, any statistical evidence that seeks to determine 
the shape of the relationship between domestic savings and foreign 
capital inflow would only be suggestive rather than conclusive because 
the developing economies are bound to be influenced by various non- 
economic factors that cannot be counted for quantitatively in the 
aggregate models. 
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Some criticism was also directed to the methodologies which 
were used to derive the values of different variables. Both Papanek 
and Newlyn 
26 held the view that the negative statistical relationship 
between domestic savings and foreign capital inflow could be the 
result of an accounting convention and not of a behavioural relationship. 
The accounting convention means that all the additions to consumption 
from foreign resources will be shown as a reduction in domestic 
savings. National savings (Sn) is usually defined in the following 
manner: - 
Sn sY+ CT -C=I- (Fý + Fi) 
where; CT represents net current foreign transfers. Fc and Fi are 
the proportions of F, that are used for consumption and investment, 
respectively. F is defined as the current deficit on the balance of 
payment. 
In such a manner, Sn would be reduced by any increase in C 
that is financed by foreign aid. In other words, if Fc increases, then 
a fall in the level of Sn is inevitable. The reason for the accompanying 
fall in Sn is attributed to the accounting procedures that define savings 
as disposable income minus consumption. On the whole, 
"this representation of consumption expenditure 
out of extra revenue sources as dissaving is 
entirely justified in accounting terms, but it does 
not reflect clearly the behaviour which is being 
examined in an examination of the effect ofd capital 
inflow on the use of domestic resources. " 
9 
The behavioural equation must take into account the total resources and 
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the dependent variable should be total savings defined as total 
resources minus consumption. Total savings (St) will include the 
components saved out of income and foreign finance. 
St =a+ b(Y) + c(CT) + dF 
The appropriate identity would then, be: 
'Y+ CT +F=C+I 
and the national resources being used for investment (Ri) would be: 
Ri =Y+ CT - (C - F) =1- Fi 
According to Newlyn (1977), the use of a saving variable obtained 
from accounting procedures is not appropriate for a behavioural analysis 
of resource-use in an economy that receives foreign resources, and 
would give misleading results. In that case, the negative values 
of the coefficients of F (between 0 and -1) which result from the 
regression of Sn on F and at the same time show a reduction in the 
total national savings would "mean there is no change in behaviour 
with regard to the amounts of national resources being used for 
investment (Ri), but simply reflect the extent to which foreign resources 
are being used for consumption (Fe). Only if the negative value 
exceeds unity is there any reduction in the amount of national resources 
being used for investment ... "28 
There is, therefore, a need to distinguish between the different 
types of foreign capital in accordance with source and end-use. A 
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developing country may receive aid for consumption purposes such as 
food and emergency-relief programmes or military assistance. Also, 
foreign aid may be acquired to support public expenditures by providing 
more resources for education, health and social institutions such as 
British 'Budget Support Aid' programme. In such cases, consumption 
would be desirable or in itself is regarded as a productive activity. 
If all these and similar consumption items were regarded as dis-saving, 
then to obtain a negative type of relationship between domestic 
savings and capital imports should not be a sufficient condition to 
reject the latter. 
In some instances, misunderstanding would arise because of 
identifying the deficit on the current account with long-term capital 
inflow in such a manner which implies that all this deficit is necessarily 
to be financed by foreign capital. Deficits are usually financed from 
many sources which include reserves, short-term capital movement 
and long-term capital. If capital inflows are to be identified with the 
current account deficits, then it would of course be shown that an 
increased capital inflow causes domestic savings to decline. This 
implies that an increase in the current account deficit causes domestic 
savings to decline; something that does not seem to be an appropriate 
proposition. 
29 
In further criticisms, the increase in the capital-output ratio . 
suggested by Griffin as a result of foreign capital inflow and the 
subsequent unfavourable impact on the growth rate of the economy was 
flatly rejected by Thirlwall on the basis that the two-gap analysis only 
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refers to the over-all ratio in the economy and not to specific public 
projects ratios. 
30 
Foreign capital can decrease the capital-output 
ratio even though it has been used to finance capital-intensive 
projects if they have considerable external effects. However, the 
impact of foreign-financed activities on the aggregate capital-output 
ratio depends on the amount of foreign investment in relation to the 
total size of the investment programme. 
Furthermore, the impact on domestic savings may depend on the 
factors that influence such an act of thrift. 
31 If saving is a function 
of government efforts to raise public savings then the availability of 
foreign capital may result in changes in government's attitudes in that 
connection and so one domestic saving would decline. In the case 
of private savings, the competition between foreign and domestic 
entrepreneurs may enable the former to invest in the most profitable 
activities leaving the latter to contract and so private domestic savings 
may decline as a result. However, this is unlikely because investment 
opportunities can generally be regarded as inexhaustible especially in 
the developing countries where there may be abundant unutilized 
32 
resources. 
In contrast, foreign capital inflow may, in fact, raise the level 
of domestic savings if the given economy faces a foreign exchange 
constraint. In that case, investment should increase as a direct 
result of the importation of essential capital goods that complement 
domestic factors of production and which only become possible due to 
the availability of foreign capital. This was discussed during the 
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analyses of the foreign exchange constraint of the two-gap approach. 
Also, savings may rise if they depend on the growth rate of income of 
a particular group known to have higher marginal propensity to save 
than others. 
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Foreign capital inflow will increase domestic savings 
if it raises the income level of this particular group. Of course, this 
may not be always true in the case of foreign aid if it was purposefully 
extended for social and rural development and not for the relatively 
developed sectors of the economy. A third factor in this connection 
may be the commitment by the recipient countries' governments to 
finance the whole or part of the domestic currency counterpart of the 
foreign-exchange-financed projects by aid funds, where the former 
may, in fact, intensify their efforts to mobilize domestic resources 
and with the initial investment taking place, the multiplier effect might 
act to raise future domestic savings. 
In conclusion, the statistical findings that showed negative 
relationship between domestic savings and foreign capital must be 
viewed with some reserve. We cannot justifiably conclude that these 
findings necessarily infer a causal relationship between both variables. 
But the analysis is suggestive and it raises important issues in relation 
to the contribution of foreign aid to the developing economies. 
Inefficiency-uses of aid funds may exist in recipient countries and the 
concerned governments should certainly reconsider the whole question 
of these funds' channels in order to eliminate resource waste. There is 
a need to consider the particular situation of individual recipient 
countries separately and the different factors that influence their growth 
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courses. The issue will then be to search for the most effective 
means to stimulate the economy by accelerating its growth rate and 
to raise the standard of living of the whole population by an equitable 
distribution of income. To ensure a sustained rate of growth, the 
country should be capable of providing alternative methods or sources 
of development financing if one or more of these proved ineffective or 
have a retarding impact on the development process. These 
considerations are forwarded by Stewart when he suggests that the 
"interesting questions here are the conditions in 
the economies and policies of the recipient countries 
and in the type and quality of foreign aid given, that 
make for successful use of aid as34compared with 
those associated with 'failure"'. 
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PART II 
A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Some Aspects of the Sudanese Economy 
S. 1. Introduction 
The Sudanese economy - like many other developing economies - 
is characterized by the co-existence of both traditional and modern 
means of production. This is particularly noticeable in the case of 
agriculture which assumes a leading part in the income-support of the 
population, but it is also found in other sectors. However, by no 
means all production in the traditional sector is necessarily of a 
subsistence character. Gum Arabic which . 4s produced 
by traditional 
methods of production is an exportable commodity. Other examples 
include milk and fruits which are marketable commodities produced in 
the traditional sector. Moreover, certain subsistence crops are 
produced within the modern agricultural sector. For example, tenants 
in the Gezira Scheme - which produces the main cash crop in the 
country - are allowed to grow some staple food crops for their own 
consumption and fodder crops to feed their livestock outside the official 
rotation system. The distinction between modern and traditional 
sectors is mainly based on differences in the adopted methods of 
productionI and the degree of monetization. 
Economic activities other than agriculture are by no means 
homogeneous either. The manufacturing sector is also composed of 
modern and traditional production practices. A similar dichotomy 
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prevails in the other components of the National Income such as 
transport, communication and energy. In some parts of the country, 
the latter is produced from domestic sources such as dung, 
2 
woods 
and leaves of trees. 
The Sudanese economy may be designated as mixed. The 
state participates in the commercial economy by its direct involvement 
in agricultural and industrial activities. The state is also heavily 
involved directly in the provision of basic infra-structures in transport, 
communications and other necessary services. Apart from this, the 
state also influences the allocation of resources in the private sector 
indirectly by directives and by various concessions and intervenes to 
influence the location of industry with the object of encouraging industrial 
location outside Khartoum or major urban centres. 
3 
There are sharp differences between urban and rural areas in 
job-opportunities, wages, social services and other basic requirements 
which cause problems in many spheres. One of the most important of 
these is the magnitude of rural-urban migration and its repercussions on 
both of these areas. This trend has led to the creation of an urban 
informal sector whose size is influenced by the capacity of the formal 
industrial sector to provide job opportunities. 
The following selective analysis is not intended to present an 
account of all aspects of the Sudanese economy, but only to examine 
certain issues that have direct relevance to the developmental path and 
future prospects of the country. The discussion is more particularly 
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focussed on those aspects which throw light on the issues involved 
in development finance. 
5.2. Urban-Rural Distribution of the Population and 
Its Implications 
Statistics on the Sudan divide the population between urban 
and semi-urban on one hand and rural population on the other hand. 
Such statistics must be treated with caution because of the arbitrary 
nature of such divisions. Figures in table 5.1. shows that the bulk 
of the population live in rural areas and that the size of urban and 
semi-urban population tends to increase as a result of population 
growth and at the expense of rural areas through migration. This led 
to rapid growth of the size of major cities such as Khartoum. The 
marginal decline in the size of rural population can be attributed to 
many factors: First, the growing demand for seasonal labourers in the 
production areas of large methanized agricultural schemes such as 
El Gezira and El Gadarif. Second, the mobility for better-paid jobs 
in the modern industrial sector. Third, the desire to get certain 
services such as education and health which are relatively better found 
in urban areas. 
A large proportion of population in rural areas depends on 
traditional farming practices for living. Social services in health, 
education and recreational facilities are poor. There is a relatively 
high illiteracy rate among this group of people. However, if we 
compare the over-all situation of the Sudan with other developing 
countries, it appears that the level of literacy in the Sudan is lower than 
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in most other developing countries as table 5.3. indicates. Standard 
figures reveal that literacy rates had increased among the African 
population in a relatively short period, but Africa still remains the 
worst continent in this connection. Table 5.2. indicates that the 
average rates of literacy for 1965-70 were 26 and 53 percent for Africa 
and Asia respectively while that for Latin America was 76 percent. 
This compares with a world literacy rate average for the same period 
of 66 percent. It was reported in the same source that the average 
rate for Africa was 19 percent in 1960. Policy in the Sudan emphasizes 
the importance of illiteracy eradication for the benefit of socio-economic 
development in general and rural development in particular. Accordingly, 
the 6-year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) set a target to reduce its levels to, 
say, 30 percent by the year 1990 from the present level of 80 percent. 
Measures taken to achieve this objective include the opening of primary 
schools in almost every part of the country, the provision of more funds 
for the existing illiteracy eradication programme and the use of mass 
communications media. 
The significance of rural-urban distribution of the population 
r 
and the magnitude of illiteracy is the direct impact both have on framing 
the development strategy of the country. Since a large proportion of 
the population is relatively poor and the per capita income is low, 
there is need for capital investment to reduce rural-urban disparities, 
to ensure an adequate level of regional balance and to pursue 
comprehensive studies to uncover the untapped natural resources in 
different parts of the country. 
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5.3. The Co-existence of Traditional and Modern Modes 
of Production, and the Dominance of the Agricultural 
Prr iintinn 
The National Income of the Sudan is principally generated by 
two sectors; namely, agriculture and services, which together account 
for more than two-thirds of GDP. This is illustrated in table 5.4. for 
the period from 1969/70 to 1977/78; where the contribution of the 
agricultural sector was seen to be almost 40 percent of GDP at market 
prices and that of the services sector was about 35 percent. The 
4 industrial sector's contribution was less than 10 percent of GDP 
throughout the above-mentioned period. The dominance of the 
agricultural sector was even more evident when we examined the 
composition of exports and the type of industrial development, which 
was almost entirely agriculture-based. The construction sector's 
contribution was 4 percent on average during this period. Though small, 
it has a vital role in enabling the country to generate the physical 
equipment required to carry out its development strategy. 
Table 5.5. indicates that the modem part of the agricultural 
sector was producing just over 55 percent of that sector's contribution 
to GDP. This came mainly from the state-owned Gezira Scheme and 
other mechanized projects in east and west of the country. However, 
it must be borne in mind that data on the size of the traditonal sector 
are only 'official guess-estimates' because of the difficulties that'are 
incurred in collecting reliable information on a sector that is largely 
unmonetized. These difficulties probably lead to under-estimation of 
the contribution of the traditional activities to the National Income. 
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But despite their limitations, such estimates indicate the patterns 
and the trends of output in the traditional sector. 
In the industrial sector, by contrast, a higher proportion of 
output originates from modern activities, as is revealed in table 5.6. 
The modern industrial sub-sector's contribution to GDP has regularly 
been at a level well above 70 percent of the total share of that sector. 
Moreover, the relative contribution of the traditional sector has shown 
a tendency to decline over the past years. This can be attributed to 
various factors; such as, the spread of knowledge about the modern 
techniques of production coupled with accessible loan facilities from 
the different financial institutions and in particular the Industrial Bank 
of Sudan (which was established in 1961 and started its lending 
operations in 1962). The prime function of the Industrial Bank of Sudan 
is the provision of loans to private industrialists for financing new 
, industrial establishments and for modernization and improvement of 
existing ones. 
4 The ability of the Bank to undertake this function has 
been helped considerably by foreign assistance, for instance, it 
acquired a loan to the amount of £S. 4m. from IDA in 1973 and also two 
loans - from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (1.5m. K. D. ) 
and West Germany (5m. D. M. ) - during 1975.5 
The 1960's saw the establishment of a number of state-owned 
industries whose material inputs originated from agricultural and related 
activities; such as textiles, sugar, dairy products and meat canning. 
The state was involved in industrial investment mainly because of the 
relatively larger scale of the projects; their prime dependence on raw- 
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materials originating from agriculture where in certain cases, such as 
sugar, correspondent plantation was required; and perhaps the 
'reluctance' of private businessmen to invest in industry compared to 
that in commercial activities and agriculture. Another reason for the 
state's involvement in industrial development was perhaps the capacity 
of the former to provide the required capital through foreign loans and 
borrowing in contrast to indigenous entrepreneurs. 
Modern agricultural production is undertaken both by the state 
and the private sector. Table 5.7. shows that more than half of crop 
production in the Sudan in, say, 1974/75 was attributed to the private 
sector. The state's contribution comes from the mechanized schemes 
in the Gezira, the Managil Extension and in the White Nile. The size 
of the state-owned agricultural production can be expected to grow in 
relation to total output in the light of the growing state involvement in 
large scale mechanized agricultural development projects. However, 
the state regularly assists private farmers as well. Particularly 
important in this context was the establishment of the Agricultural Bank 
in 1959 in order to assist private cultivators and agricultural 
co-operatives to promote and to improve their agricultural production and 
other related activities. It supports private farmers by extending loans 
for land preparation, irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, harvesting, 
storage, transport and marketing. 
6 
The Agricultural Bank activities are 
normally confined to medium and short term lending due to the limited 
capital resources at its possession. Its initial authorized capital was 
£S. 5 m. but by the end of 1976 it stood at £S. 15 m. and during the same 
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year it was for the first time granted a West German loan of 5 m. D. M. 
7 
used to support its credit facilities. 
The dominance of the agricultural sector in the Sudanese economy 
. 
is reflected in the composition of the country's exports which consist 
mainly of cotton, cotton-seeds, sesame, gum Arabic, groundnuts and 
hides and skins. Table 5.8. shows the main items that made up the 
exports of the Sudan during the period from 1970 to 1977. On average, 
cotton alone represented more than half of the total visible export 
proceeds. Cotton also contributed to exports through its by-products 
such as oil-cake and meal. All other export items however are either 
produced in the agricultural sector or originate from agriculture-related 
activities. The bulk of exports is in the form of primary unprocessed 
products. A process of export diversification seems to be desirable 
so as to avoid instability and vulnerability of export proceeds which 
results from heavy dependent upon a limited range of primary products. 
Such a process, with the ultimate aim of reducing the relatively high 
dependence on cotton, is gradually taking place in the Sudan. This 
is evident from the rising percentage contribution of items such as 
groundnuts although this crop itself is subject to annual output 
fluctuations that generally characterize agricultural production. The 
same analysis applies to export items included under 'others' which are 
increasing their relative share in total export proceeds due to recent 
access to export, to Arab countries products such as meat and vegetables. 
5.4.1. The Agricultural Sector 
The importance of agriculture in the economic life of the Sudan 
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is demonstrated in many ways. Above all, it offers employment to 
almost 80 percent of the economically active population in the country. 
Table 5.9. compares the employment opportunities which the agricultural 
sector provides in the Sudan with similar figures for the World and the 
African Continent. It is evident that while the ratio of economically- 
active population engaged in agriculture is higher in Africa (about 70 
percent) than in the World (about 50 percent), that for the Sudan is one 
of the highest. The table also shows a general tendency for the 
proportion of economically-active population engaged in agriculture to 
decline over time. 
The development prospects of agriculture in the Sudan are 
generally supposed to lie mainly in the expansion of mechanized farming 
in both rain-fed and irrigated land. The Sudan is well-endowed with 
fertile land as can be seen from table 5.10. Arable land is just over 
3 percent of the total land area of the country. 38.5 percent of the 
Sudan is covered with forests and woodlands; while 10.1 percent is 
regarded as permanent pasture. The size of potentially rich but yet 
to be tapped land is large in relation to total land area. 'Other land' 
which is put to uses not mentioned in the categorization such as roads ... 
also includes deserts and constitutes nearly half of the land area of the 
country. As the table indicates, the irrigated areas constituted 15.5 
and 20.1 percent of arable land in 1961-65 and 1975 respectively. The 
rate of land utilization is, therefore, on the increase as the last row of 
the table indicates. 
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Public plans for agricultural development in the Sudan are 
generally based on bringing large acreages of unutilized land under 
cultivation by means of modern irrigation systems where that is 
appropriate such as El Rahad and Kenana projects. At the same time, 
the government intends to assist private farming modernization by the 
introduction of new methods of production and by bringing together small 
lots of land under agricultural co-operatives. 
8. These measures remain 
an essential ingredient for the success of the agricultural development 
programme. 
5.4.2. Agricultural Development: Which Way? 
In view of the potential of the Sudan in agriculture and related 
activities, its future progress will largely depend on the degree of success 
on this front. This view has gained wide acceptance within and outside 
the country. 
9 The three Development Plans which the Sudan had since 
Independence all emphasized the intention to make agriculture the 
leading sector of the economy. Development of certain other supporting 
activities, such as, infra-structure and education is expected to help to 
achieve a 'green revolution' in agriculture on whose success the major 
part of industrial development is seen as depending. 
The first Development Plan (1961/62-1970/71) itself emphasized 
the role of agricultural development. In it, a heavy emphasis was 
placed upon the establishment of large scale irrigation and mechanized 
agricultural projects. The strategy emphasized the need for state-managed 
projects similar to the pioneering Gezira Scheme but also provided for 
land for private cultivation at nominal rents. The state was to provide 
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private farmers with extensive credit facilities and technical help 
through the Mechanized Farming Corporation. This broad approach 
was adopted in order to facilitate foreign participation at all levels. 
Action in that direction during the first Plan period resulted in the 
completion of certain large mechanized projects such as the Magagil 
extension of the Gezira Scheme and sugar production in El Girba where 
irrigation became possible due to the building of a dam on River Atbara. 
The emphasis on large-scale mechanized projects was maintained 
during both following Development Plans. This strategy was regarded 
by the state as the most appropriate means of achieving rapid economic 
growth. It involved a horizontal expansion by bringing more land 
under mechanized farming either by irrigation system or by rain-feeding 
in areas where climatic conditions were favourable. In terms of regions, 
central and eastern parts were particularly suitable for irrigated farming 
because of the many river tributaries that flow across these regions. 
In contrast, the south and southern parts of western Sudan were seen as 
areas where rain-fed dry farming was feasible. In addition to the 
expansion of cultivated land, vertical integration was sought in the 
existing schemes on the banks of the Nile particularly in the north where 
state-owned pumping schemes are operating. The pumping schemes of 
the northern Sudan had been operating at relatively low productivities 
because of the transport problem which manifested itself in fuel 
shortages, inadequate supplies of fertilizers, an insufficiency or 
complete lack of insecticide inputs and above all, the efficiency was 
probably partly lowered by the bureaucratic administration of these 
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schemes. However, productivity should rise if these constraints 
are removed, marketing facilities are improved and better seeds are 
provided. 
The agricultural development strategy broadly aims at 
diversification of output primarily to break the long-standing dependence 
on a limited range of products for exports. This could be better 
achieved by introducing new cash crops such as sugar, wheat and 
fruits. Animal husbandry did not receive appropriate attention in the 
past. Its output could be significantly increased by improving the 
breed, adequate feed and improvement of marketing facilities by 
shortening the channels of distribution from the home areas to urban 
consumption centres and foreign markets. 
The discussion so far has referred to the modern parts of the 
agricultural sector on which, given present known resources, the 
future prosperity of the country certainly hinges. Nevertheless, it 
should not be forgotten that the traditional part of the agricultural 
sector generates more than 45 percent of the total agricultural sector's 
contribution to GDP and even modest improvement in its productivity, 
because of its relatively large size, could generate substantial 
potential savings. Any attempt to influence the productivity of the 
traditional sector its outcome necessarily would have a direct impact 
on rural ways of life. Policies designed to modernize and improve the 
traditional methods of production must be formulated as an integral 
part of a comprehensive rural development strategy for the country. 
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Despite the potential saving, agricultural production in the traditional 
sector has received little government support in comparison with the 
modern sector. 
10 According to an ILO mission" however, the 
traditional sector, which is mainly composed of rain-fed farming and 
live-stock-raising, is capable of producing much higher returns for 
modest outlays and its expansion is more promising in terms of equity. 
In addition, the development of the traditional sector would involve 
smaller foreign exchange outlays than would be required for developing 
mechanized farming because the latter is relatively more capital- 
intensive than the former and requires the importation of the appropriate 
technology. Above all, the development of traditional agriculture can 
have, unlike mechanized agriculture, an important contribution towards 
redressing regional inequalities. A policy of opening the doors for 
labourers from rural areas to become permanent tenants in newly- 
developed modern projects might fall short of achieving the objective 
of creating employment opportunities becaus. e of the proportionately 
limited numbers that could be absorbed by such projects. At the same 
time, the leverage effects of large mechanized projects may fall below 
anticipation and hence no greater impact on rurar population may take 
place. For these reasons, the traditional sector should not be 
disregarded in favour of mechanized farming. 
The ILO mission presented a development strategy for the 
western part of the Sudan as an indication of the importance of striking 
the appropriate balance between the development of the traditional 
sector and the establishment of a modern mechanized base. 
12 
Resources 
in the west and south are not sufficiently utilized because of the 
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traditional ways of life that necessitate nomadic movement in search 
for pasture and water. In some areas over-grazing might take place 
leading to a decline in the quality of herds and things could get worse 
if this was coupled with over-stocking. Nomadic ways of life certainly 
create difficulties for the government in its attempts to provide social 
and other services on a permanent basis. 
The present 6-year Plan projection for economic development 
(1977/78-1982/83) is based on a substantial increase in the size of 
irrigated land and the establishment of corresponding agro-allied 
industries in the relatively better resource-endowed areas of the country. 
The ultimate goal of achieving self-sufficiency in food-stuffs and then 
creating export surpluses could only be achieved during the time-span 
of the Plan if the strategy is successfully implemented and viable 
projects are completed in the envisaged periods. The target is to 
increase the growth rate of the economy to 7.5 percent per annum and 
at the same time achieve other national goals like the creation of job 
opportunities, the improvement of the standard of living of the population 
and an over-all emphasis on rural development as an integral part of the 
success of developmental efforts. 
13 The level of feasible investment 
that would be undertaken in each region is to depend on its resource- 
endowments. However, it is recognized that policies to reduce regional 
disparities and to achieve some degree of specialization among the 
various parts of the country are of great importance. This could be 
partly achieved by the provision of basic infra-structure on a country- 
wide basis particularly transport and communication facilities and 
hydro-electric power. 
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In a country with relatively low levels of savings and hence an 
inability - at the present time - to mobilize sufficient domestic resources 
for financing large-scale capital-intensive irrigated agricultural projects 
like those envisaged in the present 6-year Plan and embodied in the 
'Basic Programme for Agricultural Development', foreign capital and 
foreign technical assistance must play a decisive role in the final outcome. 
The Sudanese authorities have decided to encourage foreign participation 
in financing and implementing all sectors of the development programme, 
including agriculture, industry,, transport, services and regional 
development. Foreign participation may not, however, take place unless 
economically sound projects can be generated. This is particularly 
important for attracting private foreign capital. 
5.5.1. The Structure of the Industrial Sector 
The importance of industrial development stems from its hoped-for 
effects on the balance of payments through import saving and export 
promotion, as well as opportunities it is likely to offer. Until very 
recently, the industrial sector in the Sudan has been very small in relation 
to other sectors of the economy. Mainly it was composed of soap, 
perfumeries, textiles, edible oils and other food-processing factories, 
all of which were private undertakings. Its contribution to the National 
Income was negligible until the 1960's when the first Development Plan 
was enacted. The Plan's industrial strategy was designed to establish 
a broad. base for industrial development with the effective assistance of 
foreign capital and especially foreign aid and at the same time to 
encourage the private sector to increase its investments in industries. 
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In accordance with the Plan, various food-processing and textile 
industries were established under the ownership of the state. The 
distribution of these industries among the various regions of the country 
was largely dictated by the availability of material inputs but to a 
limited extent reflected the need to alleviate the great regional imbalances 
that exist in the Sudan. After a decade of public industrial development, 
many difficulties became apparent, and by the 1970's it was clear that 
each newly established factory was facing at least one major bottleneck 
that had hindered it from producing at reasonably acceptable levels. 
One factory - namely, Aroma cardboard factory in Kasala Province, 
eastern Sudan - was forced to close down after proving to be a total 
failure; incurring heavy financial losses and running at very low 
capacity. 
14 There were certain difficulties common to all state 
industries which were established during the 1960's, but this factory 
also faced additional problems of its own. 
Some of the most common problems that underlay these industrial 
difficulties have been put as follows: - 
"it is quite striking to note that no known scientific 
criteria for the selection pf those projects were 
followed, and appraisal studies to determine their 
socio-economic, technical and commercial feasibility 
were either improperly done or were totally absent. 
At the same time, no attempts were made at the 
co-ordinated planning of the different processes of 
this new experience, or at least to assertain the 
availability of plan for the adequate flows of raw- 
material supplies and other inputs. " 15 
Also, these factories had suffered from deficiencies in many other areas 
that were of significant importance to their success, for instance, 
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technical and managerial skills. Managerial training was either 
inadequate or lacking and job evaluation was often neglected which 
resulted in assigning senior technical and management posts to people . 
on criteria other than competence. 
With respect to economic criteria, things were not any better. 
The location of the factories was chosen with the ultimate intention of 
utilizing locally-available material-inputs in agriculture and related 
activities in the different parts of the country. The establishment of 
Babanousa milk factory in western Sudan was an indication of this 
pattern. This factory was established for processing the milk that was 
produced in that area by nomads. But by their nature, nomads normally 
move from one. area to another in search for pasture and water. They 
do not stay permanently around Babanousa where the factory was built. 
For such an industry to succeed, it would need to adjust to the pattern 
of its material-input supplies. Nothing was done in this direction and 
the milk factory had been operating at an even lower capacity than the 
cardboard factory as can be seen from table 5.11. Seven of the eight 
enumerated factories were operating at far less than half of their 
installed capacities. Only El Girba sugar factory appears to have 
utilized its installed capacity to a reasonable degree (over 80 percent). 
The other sugar factory at El Guneid, was running at a loss that totalled 
about 60 percent of the invested capital during the eight years of its 
operation (that is, 1962 to 1969/70). 
16 
With the only exception of the 
Babanousa milk factory and El Girba sugar factory, all the factories 
were also running at varying degrees of losses since their inception and 
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up to 1969.17 Therefore, by the beginning of the 1970's, after a decade 
of industrial experience, the industrial picture presented by the public 
sector was gloomy. 
Rasheed18 has discussed the various difficulties that surrounded 
Aroma cardboard factory and inevitably led to its permanent closure. 
He argued that cotton stalks were proved to be the wrong type of raw 
materials. He also asserted that even if cotton stalks were appropriate, 
then the factory would have better been established in the Gezira area 
where it could be assured of adequate input supplies. The factory also 
faced difficulties when the Gash Board (a corporate body independent 
from the cardboard factory) decided to shift from growing cotton to 
castor, thus depriving it from raw material supplies. Of course, this 
could have been a favourable development if the technical and the other 
difficulties were removed. Above all, the quality of cardboard which 
this factory produced was quite bad and no real demand for this product 
was, in fact, evident. The cardboard factory was a case of extreme 
failure, but it left behind lessons to be learnt in the country's attempts 
to achieve an adequate and a satisfactory level of industrial' progress. 
For the other factories which - despite their low levels of 
production - were maintained, attempts were then made to raise their 
productivity either by re-organization or by introduction of new lines of 
production that could use other material inputs that were available in 
the specific area. An example was the Babanousa milk factory which 
introduced new lines of production to process 'Karkadi' and gum Arabic. 
Another example of improved utilization was El Guneid sugar factory 
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which benefited from the rise in the international price of sugar. But 
before that, the unit cost of production in this factory was well above 
the selling price. 
However, the economic situation of the state-owned factories 
was much better in 1973/74 than it was in 1969. Table S. 11 also 
shows an encouraging improvement in capacity utilization although 
certain factories were still operating at capacities far below that which 
was originally installed. These included Wau fruit and vegetables 
canning factory in the southern part of the country which significantly 
lacked sufficient material inputs. However, despite the improvements 
that might have taken place, there were noticeable annual fluctuations 
in capacity utilization which were probably largely attributable to 
fluctuations in the supply of the agricultural inputs. 
The relative success of the sugar industry had led policy- 
makers to forward plans for more sugar production and processing. 
Two of the planned new sugar plantation schemes and factories were 
situated in the southern part of the country. However, the largest and 
most celebrated sugar scheme is located at the Kenana. It is based on 
a large scale mechanized agricultural project and is jointly financed by 
the British company, Lonrho, various Arab Development Funds and the 
Sudanese government. By the end of the present 6-year Plan in 1982/83, 
the Sudan is expected to be at least self-sufficient in sugar, if not a 
marginal exporter. Domestic production of sugar constituted less than 
half of domestic consumption during the period 1973/74-1976/77 and 
was subject to annual fluctuations due to the previously mentioned 
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difficulties that faced the sugar industry although the new factory at 
north-west of Sennar had come into operation in 1976/77 with total 
output of more than 26,000 tons. 
19 
Finally, one vital piece of information on the distribution of 
industrial activities between public and private ownership is presented 
in table S. 12. The 1970/71 Industrial Survey showed that 59 percent 
of the amounts of capital that had been invested in the industrial sector 
was from public funds, whereas only 56 out of 209 industrial 
establishments were under state control. This reflected the relatively 
large size of the state industries compared with private undertakings. 
The Industrial Survey also provided information on the types of the 
state's industries. The public sector invested four-fifths of total 
capital investment in food-processing industries, nine-tenths of that 
invested in quarrying industries, two-thirds of paper, paper products 
and printing industries' total investment and two-fifths of the total 
investment in textiles. 
20 However, the private and the public sectors 
provided roughly equal job opportunities. 
5.5.2. Some Observations on the Present Industrial 
Development Strategy 
In spite of considerable efforts by the state during the 1960's 
to establish än effective industrial basis for future development, the 
outcome was generally less than satisfactory. State industrialization 
policy which commenced with the first development plan had many flaws. 
These resulted in the total closure of one factory and others operating 
at such low capacities that they had possibly reached a point where they 
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could be regarded as not economically viable. This was very 
disquieting at a time when the country was seeking further industrial 
development in quite similar patterns. The drawbacks of the state 
industries were, generally, the result of insufficient or lack of 
feasibility studies that had led to an inappropriate allocation of certain 
factories, shortages of managerial personnel and skilled manpower, 
inadequacy of material inputs that were subject to annual fluctuations 
and seasonalities and finally, an insufficient or complete lack of 
complementary industries that were deemed necessary for their success, 
for instance, packing materials. 
In addition to its direct involvement in the industrial development, 
the state recognized the importance of private sector's participation. 
This was clearly evident from the various Acts that were designed to 
encourage domestic and foreign private investment in the development 
activities of the country by offering favourable treatments. These Acts 
were designed in an attempt to encourage private participation and to 
influence the location of development projects particularly of industries 
because of the adverse effects of an industrial concentration in the major 
urban centres such as Khartoum. 
The Promotion and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act 
(1972) provided concessions in custom duties for imported machineries 
and spare-parts and also offered the new industrial establishments an 
exemption from business profits tax and other local duties for periods 
of time depending on the size of the particular establishment. 
21 
This 
Act did not discriminate between domestic and foreign private capital 
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and provided government guarantees against nationalization, in which 
contingency full compensation would be paid. Foreign firms were to be 
allowed to transfer their original capital in addition to any realized 
profits during their terms of operation. The spirit of all the successive 
Acts (1956,1967) was the restoration of confidence among the business 
communities about the prospects of investment in the Sudan. 
The 1972 Act was also repealed in 1974 and replaced by "The 
Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act, 1974". 
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The new Act maintained the previous concessions and exemptions and 
provided for the establishment of 'the Advisory Committee for Industrial 
Development' whose membership includes representatives from the 
different economic activities and to be chaired by the Minister of 
Industry and Mining. The Committee's role was to scrutinize the 
applications for concessional treatment under the provisions of the 
mentioned Act. 
The Industrial sector cannot be adequately, if at all, examined 
in isolation from the over-all state of the economy and the availability 
of the complementary inputs and the necessary developmental pre- 
requisites. The inefficiency and the limited capacity of the transport 
system added to the difficulties that faced the industrial sector in 
general and the state-owned industries in particular. The problem of 
transport may effectively continue to hinder future industrial development. 
An important characteristic of the state-owned industries is that 
many depend on material inputs that originate from the traditional part 
of the agricultural sector such as Karima and Wau canning and Babanousa 
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milk factories. These factories were established on the basis that 
the estimated domestic supply of the given materials exceeds effective 
demand. In addition, the production patterns in these areas were 
expected to adjust to the growing material requirement of industry but 
no policies were introduced to ensure that this should be the case. 
Once a given crop found a guaranteed market, this was expected to 
provide incentives for farmers to increase their production. But the 
traditional part of the agricultural sector is stagnating and has low 
productivity relative to the modern sector. Production also experienced 
unforeseeable annual fluctuations caused by climatic conditions ... etc. 
The seasonality of production means that sufficient material input 
supplies may not be available evenly during the whole year unless a 
storage system is developed to maintain regular supplies. 
Another question is 'whether the choice of the size of the 
factories was actually related to the availability of material inputs'. 
A large factory that will remain idle for long periods because of the 
shortage of material input supplies will certainly incur an operating 
cost which is considerably large in relation to its final output proceeds. 
This will be the case even though the working force is largely seasonal, 
because managers and skilled labourers will have to be employed on a 
permanent basis if the given establishment intends to raise the skills 
of its working force partly by the process of 'learning by doing' and 
secular training. 
The above remarks on the progress of the industrial sector lead 
to questions such as the choice of the appropriate technology and the 
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economic size of the different establishments. The public sector in 
the Sudan has generally been associated with relatively large industrial 
establishments perhaps on grounds that despite their importance and 
leverage effects, private investors proved reluctant to enter these areas 
most probably because of the relatively large initial capital that is 
necessary and the lack of past experience in such fields. In addition 
to this, certain industries (such as sugar) are associated with large 
agricultural development projects that are undertaken by the state 
perhaps because of the capacity of the state to involve international 
donors and foreign investors in their financing. However, since the 
production of primary raw-materials is dispersed over a wide area of 
land, factories of smaller sizes may prove more appropriate than larger 
ones because this will, at least, save the costs of transporting bulky 
raw materials from distant areas. In that situation, a number of small 
factories in various parts of the specific area can be established and 
will result in an even more leverage effects on a wider section of the 
rural population. 
5.6. Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures 
This section is intended to present a brief note on the revenue 
and expenditure of the public sector and their functional classification. 
Table 5.13. shows that the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
budget were subject to annual fluctuations with 1974/75 recording the 
highest annual increase on both sides for the period 1969/70-1976/77. 
The average annual growth rate of both revenue and expenditure during 
the specified period was 15.1 and 14.1 percent respectively, indicating 
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that increases in public revenues were almost matched by a 
corresponding increase in public expenditures. The last column of 
the table shows the balance between revenue and expenditure. This 
surplus constitutes the 'public savings' that would be devoted to 
development financing. Allthese years, the budget showed an annual 
surplus which itself was rising during the last three years averaging at 
about £S. 30 million. However, the average for the whole period 
amounted to £S. 18.5 million. The ordinary budget surplus amounted 
to 7.9 and 8.6 percent of the average revenue and expenditure and 
amounted to 1.5 percent of the average GDP for this eight-year period. 
On the revenue side, there had been heavy reliance on taxation 
as table 5.14 indicates. A salient feature of this period is the decline 
in the share of non-tax sources in the total revenue. Non-tax sources 
revenue comes mainly from the government monopoly of sugar, 
government and semi-government corporations and other commercial 
activities. Tax-revenue amounted to an average of 67.1 percent of total 
government revenue during 1969/70-1976/77. Comparing the Sudan with 
countries in Africa during 1973, we notice that it is among the countries 
with the highest tax-revenue ratios as can be seen from table 5.15.23 
Table 5.16. shows that the annual receipts from taxation was 
growing at an average annual rate of 18.8 percent and averaged £S. 25.9 
million in current values. On the other hand, non-tax sources' 
contribution to total revenue was increasing at an annual average rate of 
10.7 percent and was £S. 8.3 million in current values (average for 
1970/71-1976/77). Non-tax revenue was decreasing at the beginning 
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of this period because of the fluctuation in the Gezira Board's 
contribution from cotton proceeds and also because other corporations 
were incurring financial losses and were in fact drawing on central 
government subsidies. However, the relative increase in the 
proportionate share of non-tax revenue during the last few years can 
only be attributed to the then improvements in the financial positions of 
these corporations, and to the broadening of non-tax revenue sources' 
base due to the completion of some development projects in agriculture 
and industry. However, taxation remained the major contributor to 
government current revenue. 
Taxation revenue mainly comes from indirect taxes which include 
import, export, consumption and excise duties, royalties and exchange 
taxes. Import duty was the highest revenue-yielding tax followed by 
excise duties on domestically produced consumer goods; chief among 
these were sugar, edible-oil, sweets, wheat flour and textiles. Direct 
taxes include business profits, personal income, capital gains and 
stamp duties. Business profit tax was the highest revenue-yielding 
among this group. 
24 
The existence of largely subsistence traditional 
sector added to the factors that made the size of direct taxes revenue 
smaller in comparison with indirect taxes and the total current government 
revenue. Also, the difficulties incurred in a genuine assessment of 
private businesses (because of inadequate record keeping and the acts 
of evasion and avoidence that may exist) reduced the amounts of revenue 
which could be. obtained from business profit tax. 
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Table 5.17. reveals that more than four-fifths of tax revenue 
were in the form of indirect taxation and that constituted more than half 
of total government revenue. Direct taxes constituted about 16 percent 
of tax revenue and just over 10 percent of total government revenue 
(see table 5.18). The dependence on taxes as the main source of 
government revenue and in particular the reliance on indirect taxes is 
not peculiar in the case of the Sudan but is characteristic of the majority 
of developing countries. 
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On the expenditure side, table 5.19. reveals that loans' service 
repayments for domestic and foreign sources amounted to an average of 
10 percent, an item whose share was relatively low at the beginning of 
this period (see appendix 3) but grew rapidly as the period progressed. 
Expenditure on social services, which was composed of education, health 
and housing, appeared to be relatively low for a country with large rural 
population, high illiteracy rates and generally low standards of health 
care. But local government funds were partly spent on economic and 
social services and this meant that their overall relative share was 
actually larger than that in the table (which only reflects the direct 
central government expenditure on these activities). The largest single 
item of government expenditures was defence and security amounting to 
about one-quarter of the total central government allocation. 
5.7. The Successive Development Plans and their Projections 
of the Sources of Development Finance 
After Independence in 1956,26 the Sudan resorted to foreign aid as 
a means to fill the gaps arising from the deficiency of domestic savings 
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and of the available foreign exchange. However, it was not until the 
drafting of the first development plan (1961/62-1970/71) that a definite 
role was assigned to foreign capital and in particular to international 
aid. 
27 
This Plan came into existence at a time when 'the economy was 
in a growing need of basic investment in agriculture, industry, transport 
... etc. as a necessary foundation for further development. 
The projection of the possible contribution of domestic resources 
in that Plan was over-estimated which led the planners to envisage a 
modest role for external resources (particularly foreign aid) compared 
with other developing countries at roughly similar stages of development. 
28 
About a quarter of the total gross fixed investment was to come from 
foreign resources and more than three-quarters of this amount was planned 
to be in the form of loans and grants on the public account. The first 
plan period witnessed - for the first time in the history of the country - 
the emergence of state-owned modern agro-based industries in vegetable 
processing (Karima and Wau), meat canning (Kosti), onion dehydration 
(Kasala), milk factory (Babanousa), cardboard factory (Aroma), hides and 
skins tannery (Khartoum) and two sugar factories in Khashm El Girba and 
El Guneid. Also, there were significant amounts of capital investment 
in transport, by extending the railway line further to the west and the 
south of the country, building new bridges (one to link Khartoum North 
and Omdurman 'Shambat bridge') and linking Khartoum and Wadi Medani 
with a highway. 
With the overthrow of the military regime in 1964, the 10-year 
Plan - having completed half of its life-time - was interrupted by the 
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then frequently changing governments and the escalation of the unrest 
in the South. However, out of the total capital investment of £S. 138.1 
million during the second half of the Plan (1965/66-1969/70), foreign 
loans accounted for £S. 72.2 million or 52.3 percent of the total 
investment. 35.6 percent was borrowed from the banking system by 
means of deficit financing and the remaining 12.1 percent was the 
contribution of domestic savings. 
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The second development plan (the 5-year Plan 1970/71-1974/75) 
was based on an enlarged public sector ownership, implemented in 
part by the nationalization and the confiscation of some private business 
that took place in 1970. The Plan envisaged to finance 47.5 percent 
of the total capital investment from foreign loans (table 5.20). It 
emphasized that the role of foreign capital should 'considerably' decline 
end of 
in importance by/the Plan period. So, the percentage share of foreign 
capital was to be 51.9 percent at the beginning of Plan implementation 
but to decline to 43.2 percent by the end of the Plan period in 1974/75. 
The actual performance of the economy during this Plan revealed that 
only 32.1 percent of the total investment was funded from foreign sources 
and the remaining 67.9 percent was financed by deficit financing. 
30 
Resort to deficit financing was completely ruled out in the initial 
projection because of its apparent adverse effects on the economy. 
Nevertheless, during the Plan implementation, it became essential to 
resort to deficit financing. Two factors, in my view, were behind this 
policy reversal: - (i) the limited ability of the public sector to mobilize 
more domestic savings for development financing, and (ii) the fall in the 
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size of foreign capital inflow below what was originally anticipated. 
The second plan (5-year Plan 1970/71-1974/75) was eventually 
extended to cover two more years until the present 6-year Plan (1977/78- 
1982/83) was adopted to provide phase I of an eighteen-year comprehensive 
pro4ramme for social and economic development. Like its predecessor, 
the current plan assigned a significant role to foreign resources. Out 
of a total public sector investment of ES. 1570 million; an amount of 
ES. 835 million was planned to come from foreign sources. This 
constitutes 52 percent of the planned public sector investment during the 
whole Plan period. For the private sector, it was also planned that 
50 percent of its investment during the same period would come from 
foreign sources. 
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There seems to be a great need for sizeable foreign exchange 
revenues if economic and social development is to be maintained. The 
performance of the export sector is, of course, crucial to a foreign 
exchange demanding development strategy. Table S. 21. shows that 
the percentage share of total receipts from the export of goods and 
services in GDP remained in the range of 10.5 to 15.9 percent during 
the period 1966-77 and was subject to noticeable annual fluctuations. 
The main factor behind such fluctuations was the contribution of cotton 
to tangible exports which fell from 61.1 percent in 1971 to 35.5 and 
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46.0 percent in 1974 and 1975 respectively. With the apparent 
deterioration in terms of trade that were reflected in low foreign exchange 
proceeds, the Sudan sought an increasing amount of foreign capital to be 
able to meet the rising costs of imports and obtain the capital goods that 
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were necessary for the development programme. As a result, a sharp 
increase in foreign aid inflow was reported during 1974. The percentage 
of gross receipts of foreign capital to GDP rose sharply to 9.1 percent 
during that year in contrast to only 2.5 percent in 1973 (table 5.22). 
This sizeable increase in the receipt of foreign capital was partly 
associated with the balance of payments deficit and the liquidity 
crises. Substantial amounts of this capital was in the form of cash 
loans from various bi-lateral donors, OPEC oil facilities and the IMF. 
Table 5.22. shows that the ratio of gross receipts of foreign 
. capital 
to GDP remained modest with an average of 3.3 percent for the 
period 1966-77 in relation to the development potential of the Sudan. 
Certain non-economic factors may have acted simultaneously to influence 
the level of foreign capital inflow into the Sudan. The country faced 
the problem of the Southern region before independence and by the mid- 
1960 it dominated the Sudanese politics until an agreement was finally 
reached in 1972.33 During that period, aid provision for development 
projects in the South could only be made on a limited basis. Also aid 
from the major bi-lateral donors was frequently interrupted. For 
example, the US aid programme to the Sudan was halted in 1967 following 
the Six Days War in the Middle East. A further reason for the reduced 
proportions of foreign aid funds for developmental purposes might be the 
foreign exchange crisis of the 1972-77 period. This inevitably led the 
Sudan to seek more cash loans from bi-lateral donors and to resort to 
IMF loans in an attempt to maintain internal and external balances in the 
economy. The above period also witnessed an increasing reliance on 
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oil facilities' funds set up by OPEC member countries to assist the 
developing economies whose economies are seriously affected by the 
consecutive rises in oil prices. i 
The fall of foreign aid inflow below the projected amounts had 
two major impacts on the development budget: - (i) The resort Zo 
deficit financing contrary to the initial projections during the Five Year 
Plan (1970/71-1974/75). (ii) The failure to meet the development 
budget targets: This is illustrated by table 5.23 which shows that the 
overall average fulfilment of the development budget was only 68.5 
percent of the initial estimates; but this was also partly caused by 
delays in project implementation due to technical and other reasons. 
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Notes and References: 
1. Sayigh, Y. A. (1978); The Economies of the Arab World: Development 
Since 1945, Vol. 1, Croom Helm, London, Ch. 9, p. 339. 
2. Dung is excrement of animals normally used as fuel for cooking; 
as plaster for traditional houses, and in building materials 
particularly brick manufacturing. An estimate of dung production 
was incorporated in National Income statistics for the first time 
in 1972/73 drawing on the experience of other countries. See, 
National Income: Accounts and Supporting Tables, 1972/73- 
1974/75, Department of Statistics, Khartoum, p. 4. 
3. The Sudanese government issued three Acts to encourage private 
investment in different activities. -* 
W The organization and Encouragement of Investment in Economic 
Services Act, 1973. 
(ii) The Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment 
Act, 1974. 
(iii) Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act, 1976. 
4. Industrial Bank of Sudan Guide, undated, Khartoum (in Arabic). 
5. Industrial Bank of Sudan, Annual Report, 1973, Khartoum, p. 10. 
6. Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, Khartoum. 
7. Economic Prospectus on the Sudan (1977); Banque ArabeEt 
Internationale D'Investissement (BA 11), p. 31. 
8. The 5-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, (1970/71-1974/75), Vol. I, 
Ministry of Planning, Khartoum, paragraph 49, p. 35. 
ý 
9. Kiss, J. (1977); Will the Sudan be an agricultural Power? Studies 
on Developing Countries No. 94, Institute for World Economics of 
the Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapest,, p. S. Also in this 
connection see, Berkoff, D. J. W. and Adams, M. E. (1979); Which 
way Sudan Agriculture? EDCC, Vol. 27, No. 1,, pp. 195-8. 
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10. Adams, M. E. and Howell, J. (1979); Developing the Traditional 
Sector in the Sudan, EDCC, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 506. 
ILO (1976); Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive 
Stragegy for the Sudan, Geneva, pp. 33-5. The mission also 
acknowledged that "Unutilized irrigation water needs to be 
exploited, large areas of rain-fed land where the soil is too 
heavy to work by hand are waiting to be brought into use under 
mechanized farming schemes. " p. 33. 
12. Ibid. , Technical Paper No. 4, pp. 275-82, "An Agricultural 
Strategy for Western Sudan. 
13. The 6-year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1977/78- 
1982/83), Vol. I, Pp. 47-72, "Main Features of the Development 
Strategy" (Arabic Version). 
14. Rasheed, S. (1977); The Experience of Public Industrialization 
in the Sudan, Printed in El Hassan, A. M. (ed. ) (1977); Essays 
on the Economy and the Society of the Sudan, Vol. 1, NCR/ESRC, 
Khartoum, table 2, p. 89. 
15. Ibid. , p. 88. 
16. Ibid., p. 89. 
17. Ibid. , table I, p. 86. 
18. Ibid., pp. 88-9. 
19. Economic Survey, 1977/78, Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy, Khartoum, p. 39, (in Arabic). 
20. The Industrial Survey, 1970/71, Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 
P. 25 0 (in Arabic). 
21. Ibid. , pp. 22-8. 
22. This Act is reproduced in Economic Prospectus on the Sudan (1977); 
op. cit., pp. 73-7. 
23. In this connection see, Suliman, A. A. (1975); Issues in the 
Economic Development of the Sudan, Khartoum University Press, 
Khartoum, pp. 23-35. 
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24. Economic Survey, 1975/76, Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy, Khartoum, p. 40. 
25. Suliman, A. A. (1975); op. cit. , p. 26. 
26. The Sudan was ruled by a 'Condominium Administration' including 
both Britain and Egypt. 
27. The 10-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of the 
Republic of the Sudan (1961/62-1970/71). This Plan was 
criticized as being a collection of numerous projects that were 
not co-ordinated and for which financing was not assured. 
28. Robson, P. and Lury, D. A. (eds. ) (1969); The Economies of 
Africa, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, table 3, p. 3 1. 
This table shows that the foreign resources requirement of different 
African countries' development plans as a percentage of the total 
planned capital investment in each case was 52% for Tanzania 
(1964-69); 51% for Kenya (1965/66-1969/70); 41% for Nigeria 
(1962-68); 33% for Ghana (1963/64-1969/70) and 27% for the 
Sudan (1961/62-1970/71). However, the Sudan represents the 
longest plan period among this group of countries. 
29. The 5-year Plan (1970/71-1974/75); op. cit. , p. 108. 
30. The 6-year Plan (1977/78-1982/83), Vol. I, op. cit., p. 16. 
31. Ibid., p. 79. 
32. The Economic Survey, 1975/76, op. cit., pp. 97-8. 
33. Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973); Peace and Unity in 
the Sudan: An African Achievement, Khartoum University Press, 
Khartoum. 
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TABLE 5.1. 
The Distribution of Population Between Urban and Rural Areas, 
(Percentages) 
Years 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 Average 
Urban & 
Semi-Urban 18.0 18.4 19.0 19.7 18.8 
Rural 82.0 81.6 81.0 80.3 81.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
I Source: National Income: Accounts and Supporting Tables, 
Department of Statistics, Khartoum. 
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TABLE 5.2. - 
An International Comparison of Adult Literacy Rates* 
(1965-70 average) 
Continent Latin Oceanic Europe North World 
or Region 
Africa Asia America Islands & USSR America Average 
Literacy 26 53 76 90 96 99 66 
Rate I II I I I I 
Source: World Bank (1973); Trends in Developing Countries, 
table 3.6. 
* Percent of adult population (15 years and over). 
TABLE 5.3. 
Adult Literacy Rate in the Sudan compared with some African Countries 
(1975) 
Country Ethiopia Zaire Sudan Morocco Liberia Zambia Kenya 
Literacy 10 is 20 28 30 39 40 Ra te 
Soutce: World Bank/IBRD, World Development Report, 1980, 
Oxford University Press , table 1, p. 110. 
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TABLE 5.5. 
The Distribution of Agricultural Output* between the Modern and 
the Traditional Modes of Production, 1971/72 - 1974/75 (ES. m. at 
Current Market Values) 
Fiscal Years modern" Value % 
Traditional 
Value % 
Total 
Value % 
1971/72 81.8 55.5 65.6 45.5 147.3 100.0 
1972/73 83.7 55.5 67.2 45.5 150.9 100.0 
1973/74 136.4 55.7 108.5 44.3 244.9 100.0 
1974/75 146. 
_7 
1 55.7 1 116.7 44.3 1 263.4 1 100.0 
Source: National Income: Accounts and Supporting Tables, 
1971/72 and 1972/73 - 1974/75, Department of 
Statistics, Khartoum. 
* Only includes 'agriculture proper', that is, crop production. 
** The distribution of agricultural output between modern and 
traditional methods of production is based on official 
estimates. 
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TABLE 5.6. 
Distribution of Industrial Output between Modern and Traditional 
Sectors, 1971/72 - 1974/75 (ES. m. at Current Market Values) 
Fiscal Years Modern Value % 
Traditional 
Value % 
Total 
Value' % 
1971/72 60.1 78.5 16.5 21.5 76.6 100.0 
1972/73 57.1 71.9 22.3 28.1 79.4 100.0 
1973/74 84.3 78.6 22.9 21.4 107.2 100.0 
1974/75 113.6 1 82.1 24.7 1 17.9 1 138.3 1 100.0 
Source: As for table 5.5 
TABLE 5.7. 
Distribution of Agricultural Output between Public and Private 
Ownership, 1971/72 - 1974/75 (Percentages) 
Fiscal Years Public Private Total 
1971/72 42.9 57.1 100.0 
1972/73 42.9 57.1 100.0 
1973/74 42.9 57.1 100.0 
1974/75 43.1 56.9 100.0 
Source: As for table 5.5. 
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TABLE 5.8. 
Major Export Items as Percentages of Total Value of Export Proceeds 
for the Period 1970 to 1977 
Items 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1 
1977 
1 
Average 
Cotton 61.3 61.1 58.6 55.4 35.5 46.0 50.7 57.2 53.2 
Ground 5.3 8.1 7.8 8.5 14.9 22.6 20.2 12.5 12.5 
nuts 
Sesame 6.3 7.0 7.4 7.0 13.5 7.8 9.0 7.9 8.2 
Gum Arabic 8.8 7.0 7.3 4.9 11.7 5.0 5.8 5.9 7.1 
Oil-Cakes . 1 5.4 3.9 3 .5 5.2 1.8 2.7 2.6 3.4 3.6 and Meals 
12.9 12.9 15.4 19.0 22.6 15.9 11.7 13.1 15.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan 18th. Annual Report 1977, p. 22. 
Include livestock, meat, sorghum, edible-oil, etc. 
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TABLE 5.9. 
Percentages of Econom ica Ily -Active Population Engaged in the 
Agricultural Sector for Selected Years: A Comparison between the 
Sudan, Africa and the World 
Years 1965 1970 1975 1976 
World 54.2 51.0 47.9 47.3 
Africa' 74.1 71.5 68.6 67.9 
Sudan 83.9 82.0 79.5 79.0 
Source: FAO Production Year-Book 1976, Rome, pp. 61 - 3. 
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TABLE 5.10. 
Land Use in the Sudan as a Percentage of its Total land Area. 
(1) 
Description 1961-65 1966 1970 1975 
Arable Land & Permanent Crop: 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.2 
Of Which (2) (i) Arable Land 99.6 99.5 99.5 99.4 
(ii) Permanent Crop 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Permanent Pasture 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Forests and Woodlands 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 
Other Land 
(3) 48.8 48.5 48.7 48.2 
Total Land Area 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Irrigated Land as % of Arable 
Land(4) 
15.5 16.9 19.7 20.1 
I 
Rate of Utilization of 
- 0.06 0.16 1.34 Unused Land I I I I 
Source: FAO Production Year Book 1976, p. 47. 
Explanatory Notes: 
(1) Land constitutes 94.8% of total area of the Sudan. 
(2) Figures are approximated to the nearest one decimal point. 
(3) 'Other land' includes unused but potentially productive land. 
(4) Irrigated land refers to areas purposively provided with water. 
Calculations are based on the figures in Appendix 1. 
The last two columns are the Author's calculations. 
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TABLE 5.11. 
Capacity Utilization in Some Public Industrial Establishments 
1968/69,1971/72 - 1973/74 (Percentages) 
Name of Estab. lishment 1968/69 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 
El Guneid Sugar Factory 31.0 47 70 75 
El Girba Sugar Factory 84.0 105 118 126 
Kasala Onion Dehydration 36.4 17 19 54 Factory 
Aroma Cardboard Factory 7.0 closed down 
Karima Canning Factory 14.4 9 10 13 
Karima Dates Factory 33.3 37 89 27 
Wau Canning Factory 11.0 5 10 10 
Babanousa Factory 
W Milk 0.7 6 14 is 
(ii) Karkadi - 27 71 33 
(i i i) -ý Gum Arabic 1- 1 1 
107 59 104 
I 
Source: 1968/69 from Rasheed, S. (1977); The Experience of Public 
Industrialization in the Sudan, Printed in El Hassan, A. M. 
(ed. ) (1977); Essays on the Economy and the Society of the 
Sudan, Vol. 1, NCR/ESRC, Khartoum, table 2, p. 87. 
1971/72 1973/74 from ILO (1976); Growth, Employment 
and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 
p. 286. 
Some factories operate at more than their installed capacities 
by increasing work shifts. 
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TABLE 5.12. 
Distribution of Manufacturing Industries between Public and 
Private Ownership* (ES. m. ) 
The Particulars Public Private Total 
Amount of Investment 60.603 42.101 102.704 
% 59.0 41.0 100.0 
Total Wages 6.503 6.444 -12.947 
% 50.2 49.8 100.0 
No. of Employees 21870 20953 42833 
% 51.1 48.9 100.0 
Value Added 14.565 12.886 27.451 
% 53.1 46.9 100.0 
Total Production (at 
Factor Cost) 42.231 39.661 81.892 
% 51.6 48.4 100.0 
No. of Establishments 56 153 209 
% 36.8 73.2 100.0 
Source: The Industrial Survey 1970/71, Department of Statistics, 
Khartoum, (inArabic), p. 248. 
Ownership is based on holding 5 1% or more in the 
establishment. 
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TABLE 5.14 
The Ratios of Tax to Non-Tax Revenue in the Total Public Revenues 
for 1969/70 - 1976/77 at Current Values (ES. m. ) 
Fiscal 
Years 
Tax 
Revenue 
% of Total 
Revenue 
Non-Tax 
Revenue 
% of Total 
Revenue 
Total 
Revenue 
_ 
1969/70 82.5 55.2 66.9 44.8 149.4 100.0 
1970/71 102.0 62.0 62.5 38.0 164.5 100.0 
1971/72 110.1 67.3 53.6 32.7 163.7 100.0 
1972/73 118.8 67.2 57.5 32.. 6 176.3 100.0 
1973/74 142.8 68.2 66.7 31.8 209.5 100.0 
1974/75 216.5 75.2 71.3 24.8 287.8 100.0 
1975/76 245.6 74.0 86.4 26.0 332.0 100.0 
1976/77 263.5 67.8 12 4.9 32.0 388.4 100.0 
Average 67.1 32.9 
Source: As for table 5.13. 
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TABLE 5.15 
Tax Revenue as a Percentage of General Government 
Total Revenue of Some African Countries for 1973 
Country % 
Sudan 85.9 
Sierra Leone 85.9 
Somalia 85.9 
Botswana 84.3 
Lesotho 84.1 
Zambia 79.5 
Nigeria 78.7 
Kenya 74.5 
Africa 79.5 
Source: World Bank, World Tables 1976, 
John Hopkins University Press, 
pp. 432-437. 
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TABLE 5.17 
Ratios of Direct and Indirect Tax Revenue to Total Tax Revenues 
(Percentages) 
Fiscal Years Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Total 
1969/70 84.0 16.0 100.0 
1970/71 84.0 16.0 100.0 
1971/72 83.0 17.0 100.0 
1972/73 82.0 18.0 100.0 
1973/74 83.0 17.0 100.0 
1974/75 85*. 0 15.0 100.0 
1975/76 86.0 14.0 100.0 
1976/77 83.0 17.0 100.0 
Average 83.75 16.25 100.0 
Source: As for table 5.16. 
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TABLE S. 18 
Percentage Contribution of Direct and Indirect Taxes to Total 
Government Revenue, 1969/ e 70 - 1976/ ? 77 
Fiscal Years Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Total Percentage* 
1969/70 46.5 8.8 55.3 
1970/71 52.1 9.9 62.0 
1971/72 55.5 11.7 67.2 
1972/73 55.2 12. -l 67.3 
1973/74 56.9 11.3 68.2 
1974/75 63.8 11.5 75.3 
1975/76 63.6 10.3 73.9 
1976/77 56.6 11.3 67.9 
Average 56.3 10.9 67.1 
Source: Various Issues of Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy, Khartoum. 
There are minor discrepancies between these totals and those 
in table 5.14 because of roundings. 
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TABLE S. 19 
Functional Classification of the Central Government Current 
Expenditures, 1969/70 - 1976/77 Average, (Percentages) 
Functional Category Average 
Economic Services 12.3 
Social Services 10.8 
Loan Repayments 9.6 
Defence and Security 23.3 
Local Governments 15.8 
Miscellaneous 28.2 
Total 100.0 
Source: The Economic Survey 1977/78, Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy, Khartoum. 
N. B. See Appendix 3 for further information. 
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TABLE 5.20 
The Five Year Plan Projection of Foreign Aid as a Percentage of the 
Annual Development Budget: 1970/71 - 1974/75 (ES. m. ) 
Fiscal Years Development Budget* 
Foreign 
Aid** 
Aid as % of 
the Total 
1970/71 36.0 18.7 '51.9 
1971/72 37.8 18.8 49.7 
1972/73 39.7 19.1 48.1 
1973/74 42.0 19.2 45.7 
1974/75 44.5 19.2 43.2 
Total 200.0 95.0 47.5 
Source: Ministry of Planning (1970); The 5-Year Plan of 
Economic and Social Development of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan for 1970/71 - 1974/75, Major 
Trends of Development, Vol. 1, p. 114. 
Capital investment. 
** Foreign loans, credits, grants and other receipts. 
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TABLE 5.21. 
The Percentage Ratio of Total Export Receipts to GDP for 1966-77 (CS. m. ) 
Years Exports * (X) 
GDP % Ratio of X 
to Y 
1966 84.8 575.0 14.8 
1967 87.7 613.2 14.3 
1968 102.9 647.8 15.9 
1969 104.2 701.5 14.9 
1970 116.9 761.1 15.4 
1971 127.0 832.4 15.3 
1972 133.1 896.8 14.8 
1973 174.1 1246.2 14.0 
1974 161.8 1510.8 10.7 
1975 181.0 1718.3 10.5 
1976 251.2 1954.8 12.9 
1977 287.8 2224.4 12.9 
Source: For GDP figures see The Economic Survey 1977/78, 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and data 
collected from the Department of Statistics, Khartoum. 
For exports, see Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1966-77. 
Exports of goods and services. 
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TABLE 5.22. 
Gross Receipt of Foreign Capital* as a Percentage of GDP : 
1966-77 (ES. M. ) 
Years % 
1966 4.5 
1967 4.2 
1968 1.9 
1969 2.6 
1970 1.7 
1971 1.3 
1972 4.1 
1973 2.5 
1974 9.1 
1975 4.2 
1976 2.7 
1977 1.2 
Average 3.3 
Source: Table 6.10 for Gross Receipt of Foreign Capital. 
Table S. 21. for GDP. 
* On account of public and semi-public sector. 
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TABLE S. 23 
Development Budget Estimates Compared with the Actual 
Expenditures, 1970/71-1976/77, (ES. m. ) 
Years Budget Estimates 
Actual 
Expenditure 
% of Actual to 
Estimates 
1970/71 37.1 26.6 71.7 
1971/72 65.9 29.8 45.2 
1972/73 65.5 29.6 45.2 
1973/74 105.8 41.8 39.5 
1974/75 156.6 102.4 6S. 4 
197S/76 131.7 113.1 8S. 9 
1976/77 254.2 216.4 8S. 1 
Total 816.8 S59.7 68. S 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1970-77. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Foreign Aid Inflow into the Sudan 
6.1. A Sectoral and a Source Analysis of Foreign Loans : 
Commitments 
The inflow of foreign aid into the Sudan started soon after the 
country became independent in 1956. Its size has greatly increased 
over time and its sources have become much more diversified. A new 
source of aid in recent years is the various Arab oil-producing countries' 
funds financed out of the surpluses that result from oil exports. 
The following analysis divides the donor countries into five 
groups: - The World Bank and its affiliates (IDA, IBRD ... ) represent 
the international multi-lateral sources of lending. The African 
Development Bank, the Islamic Bank and the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development are grouped under 'Regional Banks'. The Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development is quite often categorized 
under the 'Arab Funds', a term that includes all the lending activities 
of the Arab countries. 
I But since its lending operations are similar 
to other. regional banks (such as the African Development Bank, the 
Inter-American and the Asian Development Banks), it is misleading to 
regard it as a bilateral donor. The structure and nature of its loans is 
different from those bilateral funds that exist in the oil-rich Arab 
countries which are designated as 'Arab Funds'. Western European 
countries, United States of America, Canada and Japan are grouped 
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under 'Developed Market Economies' because of the similarity of their 
economic systems. ' East European countries, Russia, China and 
Northern Korea are grouped under 'Centrally-Planned Economies' 
because their approach to foreign assistance is more or less similar. 
The Sudanese economy is divided into four sectors: - agriculture 
and irrigation, industry, transport and communication and finally 
services. However, the analysis will treat the 'electricity and water 
supplies' and 'the purchase of equipment for different development 
purposes' as separate items. The size of the latter item provides an 
indication of the magnitude of the tied proportions of aid which . 
predominantly comes from 'Developed Market Economies. ' 
The present data have been collected from different sources; 
domestic and foreign. One of the main observations about data 
published by Sudanese sources is that up to very recently (1977), the 
administration and negotiation of foreign loans were left for each unit 
to use its own approach and there was no one administrative body that 
could effectively regulate and manage the inflow of foreign loans and 
hence could make available the necessary information. Information on 
foreign loans is therefore scattered among the different government and 
semi-government units and is, in some cases, contradictory. 
2 
This 
makes it difficult to find detailed information about certain loans. 
The World Bank and its affiliates are the source of international 
multi-lateral aid. The start of its lending operations to the Sudan dates 
back to 195 8 when Sudan Railways secured a ES. 13.6 m. loan that 
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carried 5 percent interest rate and was repayable in twenty years time. 
I 
In the period that followed, the World Bank extended its lending 
activities to cover all the sectors of the Sudanese economy. IDA 
generally extends development loans that are characterized by longer 
maturity periods (usually 50 years), 10 years of grace periods and are 
often interest-free. The terms of IDA loans are thus softer than the 
World Bank loans. The latter may charge interest rates up to 6 percent 
and usually allows only short maturity and grace periods. The Sudan 
received a number of loans from IDA. 
Table 6.1. shows that agriculture and irrigation together received 
the biggest share of Sudan's loans from the international multi-lateral 
agencies during 1958 to 1977, both in number and value. The loans to 
agriculture were invested in the Managil extension of the Gezira Scheme 
which was embodied in the 10-year Plan, mechanized agriculture in the 
Gadarif and Kasala areas, El Rahad project and two loans for regional 
development in the south and southern Darfur development project in 
1977. The average interest rate for all these loans was 2 percent. 
This was a relatively low average because of the inclusion of the six 
interest-free loans out of a total number of nine that were granted to the 
Sudan from IDA. The loans to transport and communication were extended 
to Sudan Railways (which then became the major beneficiary), followed 
by civil aviation authorities and the Roads Department in the Ministry of 
Transport. The industrial secior received the lowest value share of 
2.5 percent with two loans for the Industrial Bank of Sudan in 1973 and 
1975. 
153 
Hence, international multi-lateral aid to the Sudan was directed 
primarily to agriculture and transport reflecting the commonly held view 
3 
that the country's comparative advantage clearly lay in agriculture. 
Also, this reflected the view that a major bottleneck to development 
progress would remain as long as the transportation net-work was 
incapable of providing adequate services to move consumer goods, 
machinery and products to and from production and consumption areas 
and also from Port Sudan to the fields. 
Table 6.2. shows the contribution of 'Regional Banks' to 
development finance in the Sudan during 1971 to 1977. Transport and 
communications category was the main beneficiary, with all the loans 
from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development going into this 
category partly to cover the costs of the extension of the road between 
Gadarif and Kasala as part of Khartoum - Port Sudan highway, Sennar - 
El Damazin and'El Rahad project roads. Most of the loans from the 
African Development Bank were directed to transport (55.5 percent) and 
electricity supplies (41.0 percent) and the remaining (3.5 percent) was 
spent on the development of animal resources. The maturity periods of 
the Arab Fund's loans ranged from 50 years for two loans to less than 16 
years for another three. The Islamic Bank which was recently established 
granted the Sudan two interest-free loans with maturity periods of 18 and 
13 years for educational services and the transport sector respectively. 
These loans carried one year grace periods and both amounted to just 
over ES. 3 m. in value. It is worth mentioning that the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development joined with the African Development 
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Bank and the Kuwait Fund in financing Khartoum - Port Sudan road and 
Sennar - El Damazin road respectively. 
4 
Table 6.3. shows the lending activities of 'Developed Market 
Economies' countries to the Sudan. The most striking feature of this 
group of countries loans was the high proportion that was directed 
towards the purchase of machinery and equipment for different 
developmental purposes. 47.3 percent of the total value of their loans 
was in the form of equipment purchases that entered most of the economic 
activities in the country. These types of loans are usually extended on 
condition that they would be spent in the donor country's markets. 
This restriction on recipient countries often entails effective additional 
costs to the former and hence may reduce the 'true' grant element of 
such loans. 
5 
However, the* interest charges on these loans were lower 
than other types of loans andtheir average maturity periods were 
relatively longer. 
Of loans from U. K. ,43.5 percent of the total value was devoted 
to purchase equipment, 31.6 percent for transport and communication and 
22.8 percent for industrial development of which one loan was directed 
to the new sugar factory at north-west Sennar. It was noticeable that 
three British loans were directed to raise the efficiency of the two 
existing sugar factories which were facing technical and economic 
difficulties. 6A major contribution of the United States of America was 
the provision of three loans to Sudan Airways for the purchase of two 
Boeing 707 aircraft. 
iss 
Table 6.4. presents a picture of the structure and composition 
of the various Arab Funds and other Arab loans on a bi-lateral basis. 
These sources include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Egypt. 
Egyptian assistance was represented by two loans that were granted 
for digging wells in the western parts of the country for the provision 
of drinking water. All this category's loans - with the exception of 
three from the Kuwait Fund - were granted in the 1970's. The 
phenomenonal increase of aid from Arab countries is explained by two 
main factors: - (i) the Saudi Fund provided its first loan to the Sudan in 
1975 (the Fund was established in 1974), and the Abu Dhabi Fund 
extended its first loan in 1971 for'the purpose of digging wells as part 
of the Anti-thirst Campaign that was launched by the government at 
that time. (ii) The Arab countries realize that within the framework of 
the Arab World, the Sudan possesses a better potential for agricultural 
development than most other countries in the region. 
7 Hence, the 
Sudan stands reasonable chances of supplying the area with food and 
other agricultural products. As a consequence, the Arab countries 
escalated their lending to the Sudan. 
The construction of roads and the development of communication 
systems took a considerable share of the Arab loans. The Kuwait Fund 
provided two loans in 1973 and 1975 that amounted to more than ES. 20 
million for construction of a pipeline to link Port Sudan and Khartoum 
through Atbara. Thereafter, the pipeline relieved the growing pressure 
on an over-burdened Sudan Railways of moving petrol from Port Sudan to 
the interior of the country. Interest charges on these two loans were 
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8.5 percent with two years grace period and ten years for maturity. 
By all standards, they were relatively hard loans. 
'Centrally Planned Economies' granted the Sudan various loans 
that were designed to serve a multitude of interrelated activities. For 
example, we find one loan being allocated to agriculture, industry, 
transport and purchases of equipment. This made it difficult if not 
impossible to prepare a sectoral classification of such loans and their 
end-uses similar to that adopted for other categories unless we acquire 
detailed information on the particulars of how each individual loan was 
actually spent. Centrally planned economies had contributed in the 
establishment of the state-owned food-processing industries during the 
1960's. However, since 1956 - when the first loan from a socialist 
country was provided by Yugoslavia for transport and industry - to 
1972, a total of ES. 77.8 million was granted to the Sudan from these 
countries with an average interest rate of 2 percent. 
The previous tables (6.1. - 6.4. ) present a sectoral analysis of 
loans from different categories of donors. Table 6.5. shows the 
contribution of each category of donors in relation to total lending. 
Before the emergence of the various Arab Funds, the two major sources 
of aid to the Sudan were 'Developed Market Economies' and international 
multi-lateral agencies. In the last few years, the Arab Funds contribution 
had been building up to the present level of 25 percent of the total value 
of loans. - 
In terms of sectors, we found that transport and communications 
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were the main beneficiary activities; taking 36 percent of all loans. 
'Agriculture and irrigation' was the second main beneficiary sector with 
28.1 percent. The least benefiting sector was services. Table 6.6. 
presents the ranking of sectors with regard to foreign assistance. It 
reflects the importance attached by both donors and the Sudanese 
authorities to developing an adequate transport system that could 
underpin development efforts. 
The next section will deal with the disbursement of foreign 
loans that took place during the period 1966-77. This also will be 
examined in connection with both; the growing trade gap and the 
depletion of the country's foreign reserves which characterized the 
period under review. 
6.2. A Sectoral and a Source Analysis of Foreign Loans: 
Disbursement 
6.2.1. Some Conceptual Issues 
The analysis in the previous section was of foreign aid 
commitments. But that did not reflect the actual amounts of resources 
that actually entered the country because such commitments might not 
be fully drawn due to various economic and political factors that had 
dictated the disbursement of such loans. From an economic point of 
view, the implementation of development projects whether they are 
wholly or partially financed by foreign aid or even domes tically-f inanced 
may be subject to considerable delays because of the frequent emergence 
of unanticipated bottlenecks, an under-estimation of the existing 
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constraints on development or some other reasons. For example, 
inefficiency of the transport system, shortages of construction and other 
domes tically-produced materials, deficiencies in the required numbers 
of labourers and personnel, the incapability of the government to fulfil 
its commitments towards local currency components of projects and the 
extent of the country's success in keeping inflation at reasonably low 
levels so that it would not hamper the execution of the development 
programmes etc. , are factors that would 
lead to accumulation of 
undisbursed balances. When these factors are taken together, they 
represent a useful economic indicator of the absorptive capacity of the 
given economy. On the political side, the inflow of foreign aid that 
has already been committed may be interrupted or cancelled if political 
relations between the donor and the recipient country deteriorate; 
something that often characterizes bilateral aid. Also, drawings on 
development funds may lag behind commitments because such drawings 
may be linked with the results of some preliminary surveys or await 
further information about the specific project. However, drawings may 
not be subjected to such delays in the cases of cash loans, short-term 
borrowing from international financial institutions, IMF loans for 
stabilization programmes and grants whether in cash or in kind. For all 
these reasons, disbursements of foreign assistance funds do not 
necessarily match the size of commitments and so that undisbursed 
balances build up. 
Foreign assistance of course, is not necessarily given only for 
development purposes. To that extent, the inflow of foreign aid in gross 
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terms will differ from the funds that are drawn for developmental 
purposes. The former includes all foreign assistance that a country 
acquires of which the latter is one category. Gross receipts of foreign 
aid include IMF loans for stabilization measures designed to restore 
internal and external equilibrium. 
8 These dealings with IMF including 
the purchases and repurchases of the SDR's are not funds that are 
directly channelled to developmental purposes, but they contribute to 
the development process by improving the overall economic situation 
in the country. 
By the same reasoning, cash loans are not developmental funds. 
However, some of these loans may be used to support the development 
process rather than the ordinary budget or the imports of consumer goods. 
Also, loans from Developed Market Economies provided for the purchase 
of equipment are classified as developmental funds since they 
constitute a substantial part of the foreign exchange requirement of 
different development projects. However, loans may also be extended 
for purchase of direct consumption goods. For example, West Germany 
provided the Sudan with such types of loans bearing relatively low 
interest charges. Food aid for under-nourished people and refugees 
and also food extended under the United States of America PL 480 are 
treated similarly. In contrast, foreign technical assistance is an 
integral part of development aid. 
All the above-mentioned forms of foreign aid make up the 
category designated as 'total gross aid receipts. ' But they should be 
excluded when we consider the amounts of foreign aid resources that 
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directly enter the development budget of the recipient country. In 
other words, the main concern is about development aid rather than 
gross aid receipts. The latter includes loans and grants that are, 
for instance, designed to stop the depletion of the country's foreign 
exchange reserves, to offset the adverse effects *caused by deterioration 
of the terms of trade, to meet, short-term current expenditure requirement 
etc. Such a distinction is useful when one examines the future 
prospects of debt accumulation and attempts to define the different 
sectors of the economy that are likely to contribute in containing the 
indebtedness problem (if that becomes so) within manageable levels. 
6.2.2. Disbursement of Foreign Assistance 
This sectign presents an analysis of the source and the sectoral 
distribution of loan disbursement for development purposes and the 
Ahare of foreign aid in the actual public investment of each sector. 
Table 6.7. shows the percentage distribution of foreign loan 
disbursement by source for the period 1966-77. This period covers 
the second half of the 10-year Plan and the whole period of the Amended 
5 -year Plan which includes the- Two-year Interim Programme of Action. 
9 
The Interim Programme was intended to end in the fiscal year 1977/78 
when the 6-year Plan would then be put into effect. 
The source-mix of development loans has been subject to annual 
variations. For example, the 'Developed Market Economies' were the 
largest contributor in 1968, but their percentage share contribution fell 
drastically in 1969. Despite such fluctuations, the three main donors 
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to the Sudan remained the same over this period; namely international 
multi-lateral agencies, Developed Market Economies and Arab Funds. - 
The ranking of donor sources is similar to that of aid commitments 
except that in the latter the 'Arab Funds' group ranked in the first place. 
10 
The last row of table 6.7. shows the average percentage share of each 
source for 1966-77.21.4 percent of-the total disbursement came from 
the international multi-lateral agencies and only 3.5 percent came from 
the 'Regional Banks'. Both of these sources made up one-fifth of the 
total developmqnt Oisbursement during the period under review. 
Therefore three-quarters of disbursement came from bilateral sources. 
The changing pattern of the source-mix of aid may be mainly 
attributed to the strict definition of 'development loans' being adopted 
and the choice of the period under consideration which witnessed an 
increasing size of Arab Funds lending to the Sudan. Another possible 
explanation may be that the amounts of foreign aid from 'Developed 
Market Economies' was interrupted during the late, years of the 1960's 
and the early years of the 1970's because of political reasons. The 
'Centrally Planned Economies' increased their relative share in the total 
disbursement at the beginning of the 1970's but this did not make up for 
all the fall in the share of other sources and so the amounts of disbursed 
aid funds fell sharply to low levels during these years. The political 
instability that characterized those years might have been a retarding 
factor in this context. 
Table 6.8. presents a sector distribution of disbursed loans from 
all sources with the exception of Centrally Planned Economies for the 
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reasons that were mentioned in the previous section. The ranking of 
the sectors in accordance with disbursement does not significantly 
I 
change from that of commitments except for the industrial sector. 
The ranking order of the industrial sector deserves closer examination 
since it is usually given priority in the developing countries' allocation 
of development funds second to the agricultural sector. This is the 
reason we find that the amounts of loans commitment for industrial 
development are comparably large. Therefore, the situation of slow 
industrial development should be discussed with regard to the 
implementation speed more than to the availability of the necessary 
ca pital. Generally speaking, the Sudanese economy faces many 
difficulties, but the industrial sector is also confronted with particular 
problems of its own. 
Chapter 5 examined the main factors that limited the speed of 
the industrial sector expansion whether public or private during the 
period since independence when the authorities had been stressing the 
important role that agro-allied industries could play in shaping the 
future of the economy. Industrial development gathered momentum at 
the beginning of the sixties. Most of the projects included in the first 
plan (1961/62-1970/71) were completed by mid-sixties. The last few 
years of that plan did not witness the establishment of any major 
industrial undertaking. This could partly explain the absence of an 
appreciable foreign aid disbursement to the industrial sector in relation 
to other activities during the period under review. 
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Table 6.9. provides information on the contribution of foreign 
aid in the annual development expenditure of individual sectors. The 
analysis covers only the amended 5-year Plan (1970/71-1974/75) for 
data reasons. The three major sectors of the economy (namely, 
agriculture, industry and transport) are considered separately. Other 
activities including services, development budget reserves, allocation 
of regional funds ... etc. , are grouped under 
'Others'. In the 
development budgeting practice, the term 'Others' normally include 
services, United Nations technical assistance, unallocated funds and 
those funds being allocated for the southern part of the Sudan. In 
contrast, in disbursement data, 'Others' include services, foreign loans 
to purchase machineries and loans from 'Centrally Planned Economies' 
The latter two items may enter any sector in varying proportions, but 
to establish evidence about the manner they are spent and hence the 
beneficiary activities is difficult and in any event inconclusive. 
For the transport sector investment, 43 percent came from foreign 
aid, while one. -quarter of total development expenditure during this period 
was devoted to that sector. The transport sector received about a half 
of the total foreign aid development funds. However, it is still regarded 
as one of the main bottlenecks to the growth of the economy as a whole. 
The percentage of development funds devoted to the transport sector was 
relatively high, but the absolute amounts were, by all standards, small 
given the vast areas of the country and the long distances between 
production and consumption areas. This period witnessed the construction 
of various roads that linked Khartoum with different production areas, and 
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Port Sudan with Khartoum through the eastern parts of the country. The 
latter highway passes through Kasala, Gadarif and the Gezira areas 
which are prosperous regions and presently constitute a major support 
to the national economy. These production areas need seasonal labour 
particularly in the Gezira and Gadarif areas at harvest time of cotton, 
sesame and dura (sorghum) and also for land preparation. There had 
been times when farmers failed to collect their crops because of either 
inavailability of working force or because manual labour shortages 
resulted in demand for higher wages so that it would be more sensible 
to leave the crops uncollected rather than incur the relatively high costs 
of collection, packing and storage'. This situation had arisen because 
harvest time prices are normally low due to seasonal increases in 
supplies and limited capacity of the transport system to move large 
quantities of these goods to consumption areas. 
12 
Transport improvement 
should help to overcome these problems. 
Total investment in the transport sector has considerably 
increased since 1974 because the authorities related most of the 
difficulties which face the development programme to the inadequacy of 
the transport system more than to other factors. 
Table 6.9. shows that the agricultural sector received about 
one-fourth (on average) of public development expenditure during 1970/71- 
1976/77 which included one-quarter of the total foreign aid disbursement 
to the Sudanese authorities during this period. These funds were used 
to complete the unfinished projects carried over from the previous plan 
and also to construct modern irrigation systems such as those for El Rahad 
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project and the improvement and extension of mechanized farming by 
supporting the Mechanized Farming Corporation. As mentioned in 
chapter 5, the Northern and Nile Provinces (previously, the Northern 
Province) pumping schemes had been facing a number of'difficulties 
that resulted in low productivity and frequent stoppages due to the lack 
of essential spare-parts and replacements and insufficient supplies of 
fuel. To overcome these difficulties, part of aid from U. K. to the 
Sudan was directed to technical improvements in these schemes and 
their irrigation systems. However, aid amounted to one-fifth of the 
total public investment in agriculture. 
In contrast, the industrial sector had a low percentage of its 
total investment coming from foreign aid (4.1 percent), amounting to 
4.6 percent of total development funds disbursement. But, 26.4 
percent of total public investment during 1970/71-1976/77 went into the 
industrial sector. Most of aid to this sector went into new projects 
such as those for sugar, textile, kenaf ... etc. , but also into raising 
the productivity of the existing state-owned industrial establishments 
such as Babanousa milk factory. Figures in table 6.9. show that 
investment in this sector had gradually increased and it was substantially 
higher in the last three years (at the closing -period of the extended 
5-year Plan) when total annual development expenditure stood at a high 
record of all times. The total annual development expenditure increased 
by 145.9 percent in 1974/75 compared with 1973/74 and 10.5 percent, 
91.3 percent for 1975/76 and 1976/77 respectively. This period 
witnessed the largest inflow of foreign aid in gross terms so far. 
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Table 6.10. records the gross inflow of foreign aid in the Sudan. 
The components of this table include dealings with IMF cash loans, 
oil facilities ... etc. (items that are not directly related to development). 
As is seen in the table, 1974 witnessed the largest capital inflow in 
re cord. Cash loans amounted to ES. 82.7 m. from the Kuwait Fund, the 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Saudi Arabia, Iran oil 
facilities, Abu Dhabi$ Quatar and American Banks. The pattern of 
gross capital inflow was not stable, but was subject to considerable 
annual fluctuations. The economic factors that govern thý gKoss inflow 
of foreign aid are different from those of development aid. The balance 
of payments situation, the position of the country's foreign reserves, 
and the revenue -expenditure balance of the budget are among the main 
factors that usually influence the size of gross foreign aid. Development 
aid is of course one of the principal components of gross inflow so that 
any changes in its size woul d affect the size of gross inflow. However, 
during the twelve year period under consideration, gross receipts from 
foreign assistance averaged ES. 38.7 m. But if we exclude the year 1974 
because of its outstandingly large figure, we arrive at a modest average 
figure of CS. 29.7 m. 
6.3. Some Related Elements 
Table 6.11. shows the position of the current account of the 
balance of payments for 1966-1977. A deficit had been persistent all 
over this period except in 1973 when export revenue increased by 3S. 6 
percent compared with the previous year and imports by just 6.3 percent. 
The current account showed a surplus due to this significant improvement 
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in the terms of trade. But in 1974 export revenue declined by 11.9 
percent giving way to the largest deficit in record which was followed 
by an even larger one in 1975. There were two years where imports 
declined over previous levels. That was in 1969 and 1976 and appeared 
to be an outcome of government attempts to curb imports in the face of 
growing trade deficit. 1974 also witnessed the largest increase in 
imports (59.0 percent relative to 1973). The large inflow of foreign aid 
was partly to make up for the increasing costs- of imports. 'Development 
aid' also increased during this year. 
Measures to offset the effects of the adverse movement in the 
terms of trade included the negotiation of cash loans from different sources 
that would be used to pay for the import bill of consumer goods and oil. 
The country also drew on oil facilities from OPEC, Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia ... to make up for the increasing prices of oil after 1973. This 
problem is not confined to the Sudan, but is shared by most developing 
countries particularly those which are least-developed. Its urgency 
led to advocacy of special prices for those most affected by the upsurge 
of oil prices and the establishment of funds designed to help them overcome 
the adverse impact on their balance of payments and foreign reserves. 
Diagram 10 shows the trend line of exports and imports during the 
period under review. It shows that the visible trade deficit has been 
increasing over time. 
An important element is the size of foreign reserves which can be 
used to finance the deficit on current account. Their position in the 
168 
X, m 
(£S. m. ) 
ý, p 
Years 
Diagram 10: The Trend Line of Exports and Imports (1966-77). 
Sudan has been deteriorating since Independence as can be seen from 
table 6.12. They showed significant improvement in 1974, but at the 
1976 level, they represented only 3.5 % of the import bill of that year 
compared to 27.8% in 196 5 (see table 12.11). 
The deteriorating position of foreign reserves has been a cause 
of difficulties for foreign exchange budgeting. It causes delays in 
development financing because of the pressures to redirect foreign 
exchange to cure certain non-developmental economic problems such as 
imports of some consumer goods, oil ... etc. The underlying trend 
was that foreign reserves were sharply declining over years to 1977. 
Another important aspect is the apparent gap between foreign 
loans' commitment and disbursement which is explained by many factors: 
the general performance of the recipient economy is one main factor 
that results in such discrepancy. An important indicator in this context 
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is the divergence between the estimated development budget and actual 
development expenditure. Part of the development budget funds comes 
from foreign assistance. So, the failure to fulfil the annual development 
target is reflected in the speed by which scheduled drawings from 
foreign commitments are taking place. However, delays in the 
completion of loans' agreements may also cause considerable delays 
in project implementation. 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
Foreign assistance had significantly contributed to the public 
sector development expenditure programmes during the 1666-77 period, 
but its size fell well below the successive projections which had generally 
over-estimated the level of foreign capital inflow into the Sudan. Most 
of the acquired foreign development assistance was directed to the 
agricultural and the transport sectors in accordance with the development 
priorities suggested in the successive development plans. The 
agricultural development programme involved large-scale mechanized 
and rain-fed projects designed to produce both food-stuffs for domestic 
consumption, and material-inputs for the newly-established manufacturing 
industries. The development of the agricultural resources was 
paralleled by an industrial development stragegy which focussed primarily 
on food-processing and on the production of consumer goods. In 
addition to the substantial financial requirements of the infra-structural 
sector (particularly, transport and communications) the country's 
development strategy as a whole was prone to be capital-intensive and 
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therefore had a relatively high foreign exchange component. This led 
to a greater need for external resources particularly in aid form. 
The last few years of the period under consideration witnessed 
increasing balance of payments difficulties which eventually resulted 
in considerable cash and balance of payments support borrowing. The 
foreign exchange crises had certainly retarded the progress of the - 
development programme. The latter was also adversely affected by 
the increasing cost of the projects under progress, the shortage of 
domestic currency counterparts due to liquidity crises, and the 
inefficiency of the transport system. The relatively slow rate of 
development progress during this period had inevitably contributed to 
increases in the size of the undisbursed balances, as was shown by 
the growing differences between loans' commitments and their disbursed 
proportions. 
Taking the present economic circumstances into consideration, 
foreign resources remain vital to successful achievement of the targets 
set in the long-term development strategy of the Sudan in filling both the 
saving and the trade gaps. The size of domestic savings was 
considerably below the required levels. The trade gap had also assumed 
a great significance in the past (and is likely to remain so) since it had 
been increasing over the years as a result of the insufficient rate of 
expansion of the country's exports in contrast to the rapid rate of growth 
of imports. 
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Foreign aid to the Sudan had come from both bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral sources, but a larger proportion of that was provided by 
the former category of donors which included the oil-exporting Arab 
countries, the developed market economies and the centrally planned 
economies. Since the Arab countries provided an increasingly important 
source of such aid, the next chapter will therefore focus on the major 
aid agencies in the Arab World with particular emphasis on their 
lending activities to the Sudan and their future prospects in that 
connection. 
I 
172 
Notes and References. 
1. Demir, S. (1979); Arab Development Funds in the Middle East, 
Pergamon Policy-Studies, Pergamon Press, p. xv. Although the 
Author has pointed to the different nature of the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development compared with bilateral 
agencies such as the Kuwait Fund, he failed to separate its 
activities as a regional multi-lateral donor. 
2., The Economic Survey, 1977/78; Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy, Khartoum, p. 136 (in Arabic). 
3. ILO (1976); Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive 
Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, p. 31. 
4. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Annual Reports, 
1974 and 1977, Kuwait. 
5. Bhagwati, J. (1967); The Tying of Aid, Printed in Bhagwati, J. and 
Eckaus, R. S. eds. (19 7 0); Fore ign Aid, Penguin Modern Economics 
Readings, pp. 235-93. 
The Economic Survey, 1977/78, op. cit. , p. 20. 
7. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (1976); The Basic 
Programme for Agricultural Development in the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan, 1976-1985: Summary and Conclusions, 
Kuwait, pp. 9-13. 
8. The Sudan concluded an agreement with the IMF in September 1966 
to implement a 'stabilization programme'. The IMF granted the 
Sudan a loan amounting to 2 B. 5 m. U. S. $ and the government was 
to reduce the size of its domestic borrowing. 
9. The Interim Programme of Action (1975/76-1976/77) was an attempt 
to identify the various constraints to economic development and to 
focus on means to achieve 'self-sufficiency' in basic food-stuffs. 
10. Table 6. S. 
17 . 'A 
11. Table 6.6. 
12. For example, the 1967/68 agricultural season witnessed an 
increase in acreage under cultivation but the output reaching 
the markets was not considerably higher than previous seasons. 
See, Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 1968, p. 9-14. 
174 
TABLE 6.1 
Sectoral Distribution of Aid from International Multi-lateral 
Agencies, 1958-77 
Beneficiary Activities 
% of Total 
Number 
% of Total 
Value 
Average 
Interest 
Charges 
Agriculture &Irrigation 37.5 40.4 2.0 
Transport & Communications 33.0 39.4 3.0 
Electricity & Water Supplies 8.3 11.0 3.3 
Services 12.5 6.6 0.0 
Industry 8.3 2.6 0.0 
Source: Loans Division, Ministry of National Planning, Khartoum. 
Based on the Author's calculations. 
N. B. Totals may not add to'100 because of rounding. 
TABLE 6.2 
Sectoral Distribution of Loans from Regional Banks and 
Agencies, 1971-77 
Beneficiary Activities 
% of Total 
Number 
% of Total 
Value 
Average 
Interest 
Charges 
Transport & Communications 64.3 83.5 3.1 
Electricity & Water Supplies 14.3 7.1 3.0 
Agriculture & Irrigation 14.3 6.9 4.25 
Services 7.1 2.5 0.0 
Source: As for Table 6.1 
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TABLE 6.3 
Sectoral Distribution of Loans from 'Developed Market 
Economies', 1960-77 
Beneficiary Activities 
% of Total 
Number 
of Total 
Value 
Average 
Interest 
Charges 
Purchases of Equipment 25.5 47.3 2.1 
Transport & Communications 41.2 28.8 4.3* 
Industry 11.7 12.2 4.7 
Agriculture & Irrigation 21.6 11.7 2.4 
Source: As for Table 6.1 
* Includes 4 grants. 
TABLE 6.4 
Sectoral Distribution of 'Arab Loans', 1962-77 
Beneficiary Activities 
% of Total 
Number 
% of Total 
Value 
Average 
Interest 
Charges 
Agriculture & Irrigation 28.0 45.0 2.5 
Transport & Communications 28.0 26.7 2.6 
Industry 24.0 23.5 5.3 
Electricity & Water Supplies 12.0 3.3 0.8 
Services 8.0 1.5 1.5 
Source: As for Table 6.1 
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TABLE 6.5 
Percentage Distribution of Loans and Grants by Sources, 
1956-77 
Sources % of Total Value 
Developed Market Economies 31.9 
Arab Funds 24.9 
International Multi-lateral Agencies 22.0 
Centrally Planned Economies 12.9 
Regional Banks 8.2 
Total 100.0 
Source: Tables 6.1 - 6.4 
TABLE 6.6 
Sectoral Distribution of Development Aid to the Sudan, 
1956-77 (excluding Centrally Planned Economies)* 
Beneficiary Activities % of Total Value 
Transport & Communications 36.0 
Agriculture & Irrigation 28.1 
Purchases of Equipment 17.3 
Industry 11.8 
Electricity & Water Supplies 4.4 
Services 2.4 
Total 100.0 
Source: Tables 6.1 - 6.4 
* Reasons for this exclusion are cited in the text. 
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TART. F 6.7 
Disbursement of Development Aid by Source, 1966-77 
(Percentages) 
0 
0A -6 
International 
Multi-lateral 
Agencies 
Developed 
Market 
Economies 
Arab 
Funds 
Centrally 
Planned 
Economies 
Regional 
Banks Total 
1966 31.1 18.2 43.9 6.8 - 100.0 
1967 34.0 49.5 13.4 3.1 - 100.0 
1968 22.2 60.5 12.3 5.0 - 100.0 
1969 56.0 2.0 34.0 8.0 - 100.0 
1970 44.5 10.9 10.9 33.7 - 100.0 
1971 51.9 3.9 15.4 28.8 - 100.0 
1972 11.9 46.3 32.8 9.0 - 100.0 
1973 12.4 25.7 51.3 10.6 - 100.0 
1974 3.4 45.9 45.9 4.1 0.7 100.0 
1975 24.2 36.9 22.7 3.2 13.0 100.0 
1976 12.2 8.5 73.8 1.8 3.7 100.0 
1977 31.6 - 64.2 - 4.2 100.0 
verage 21.4 29.0 39.4 6.7 3.5 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1966-77. 
N. B. Calculations based on figures in appendix 4. 
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TART. R A-q 
The Contribution of Foreign Aid to the Public Sector Development 
Investment, 1970/71 - 1976/77 (ES. m. ) 
Fiscal Particulars* Agriculture Industry Transport Others Total Years 
1970/71 1 9.7 1.6 6.7 8.6 26.6 
A 1.8 - 4.2 3.2 9.2 
A% 18.6 - 62.7 37.2 34.6 
T 
1971/72 1 10.4 1.5 6.4 11.5 29.8 
A 0.4 - 3.1 1.7 5.2 
A% 3.9 - 48.4 14.8 17.5 
I 
1972/73 1 11.1 1.9 9.1 7.5 29.6 
A 1.6 - 4.5 7.3 13.4 
A% 
- 
14.4 - 49.5 97.3 45.3 T 
1973/74 1 13.0 12.7 10.2 S. 9 41.8 
A 4.7 2.0 0.6 4.0 11.3 
A% 36.2 15.8 5.9 67.8 27.0 
T 
1974/75 1 21.4 36.0 28.0 17.0 102.4 
A 3.6 1.2 18.1 6.3 29.2 
A% 16.8 3.3 64.6 37.1 28.5 
T 
1975/76 1 31.5 35.7 27.9 18.0 113.1 
A 9.4 1.7 15.8 7.8 34.7 
A% 29.4 4.8 56.6 43.3 30.7 
I 
1976/77 1 63.1 58.1 48.1 47.1 216.4 
A 10.8 1.1 12.4 2.8 27.1 
A% 17.1 1.9 2S. 8 6.0 12.5 
I 
1970/71 1 160.2 147.5 136.4 115.6 559.7 
1976/77 A 32.3 6.0 58.7 33.1 130.1 
(Totals) 'A % 20.2 4.1 43.0 28.6 23.2 F 
I I I 
%of 1 28.6 26.4 24 4 20.6 100.0 
96of A 24.8 4.6 45: 2 25.4 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports 1975 and 1976. Total investment 
for 1976/77 is taken from the Economic Survey 1977/78, p. 256. 
See Appendix 5 for data on aid disbursement. 
I stands for total public sector's development investment. 
A stands for total foreign aid (disbursed only). 
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TABLE 6.10 
Gross Receipts of Foreign Assistance, 1966-77 (CS. m. ) 
Years Amounts 
1966 26.0 
1967 26.0 
1968 12.3 
1969 18.4 
1970 12.8 
1971 10.8 
1972 36.4 
1973 31.3 
1974 137.6 
1975 73.0 
1976 53.4 
1977 26. S 
Total Average 38.7 
Average 29 7 (Excluding '74) . 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1966-77. 
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TABLE 6.11 
Position of the Current Account of the Balance of Payments, 
1966-77, Ns. M. ) 
Years Exports Imports Trade Balance 
Invisible 
Balance 
Position 
1966 74.2 79.4 -5.2 -11.2 -16.4 
1967 74.7 82.2 -7.5 -11.9 -19.4 
1968 87.9 96.9 -9.0 -9.8 -18.8 
1969 92.4 89.8 +2.6 -12.9 -10.3 
1970 101.8 104.5 -2.7 -12.1 -14.8 
1971 110.8 114.5 -3.7 -11.1 -14.8 
1972 116.3 122.5 -6.3 -15.9 -22.1 
1973 157.7 130.2 +27.5 -21.1 +6.4 
1974 139.0 207.0 -68.0 -35.0 -103.0 
1975 146.3 284.4 -138.1 -28.2 -166.3 
1976 209.2 239.4 - 30.2 -34.6 - 64.8 
1977 229.7 246.3 - 16.6 -15.9 - 32.5 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 1966-77 (Chapters on the 
Balance of Paymenfs). 
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TABLE 6.12 
Position of Foreign Reserves during the Period 1960-76, (ES. m. ) 
Years Reserves 
Increase or 
Decrease over 
previous year 
1960 58.2 
1961 53.2 - 
1962 50.1 - 
1963 34.8 - 
1964 24.7 - 
1965 20.9 - 
1966 19.9 - 
1967 19.2 - 
1968 16.7 - 
1969 12.5 
1970 7.7 
1971 9.8 + 
1972 10.5 + 
1973 15.7 + 
1974 34.1 + 
1975 9.8 
1976 8.4 
Source: United Nations Statistical Year-Book, 1960- 
New York. 
* is an increase. 
- is a decrease. 
N. B. See Table 12.11 for reserve/import ratios - 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Record of Major Arab Development Funds in the 
Sudan and some Related Issues 
1. A Background Note 
The Sudan receives foreign aid from different sources; from 
international multi-lateral agencies in its capacity as a member of the 
United Nations and an IMF subscriber; and from governments and their 
agencies. Bilateral foreign assistance has been accepted from any 
source, as long as acceptance does not conflict with sovereignty or 
territorial integrity. 
1 
The various Arab Funds' contribution to development financing 
only became important during the 1970's when most of the Arab oil- 
exporting countries established 'development funds' that were primarily 
intended to provide financial support for developmental programmes and 
projects in the other Arab countries. This development recycled funds 
between those Arab countries with large capital reserves and those with 
acute shortages of investment funds. 
The Sudan joined the Arab League in 1956 at the time of 
Independence. The latter was set up in 1945 as a political platform 
that included all the Arab countries but also served to co-ordinate these 
countries' efforts in economic, social and cultural fields with the 
ultimate goal of developing the-available resources in a complementary 
manner. This was assumed to entail the transfer of capital to member 
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countries which lacked the necessary capital to make effective use of 
their available resources. This broad ideal had been given substance 
by, among other things, the establishment of the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development which was a regional multi-lateral development 
agency designed to provide capital and technical assistance to 
subscribing members. 
2 Since this financial agency could not transfer 
all capital that may be necessary to develop the region in a 'complementary 
manner' because of its limited capacity, and also its multi-lateral 
nature that neutralizes it from direct policy interests, oil-rich Arab 
countries established bilateral agencies. Some of these bilateral 
agencies were not confined to lending to Arab countries only but extended 
their activities to other developing countries as well. This development 
brought a new group of donors into the international lending arena that 
were not themselves developed countries but merely relatively rich ones. 
Developed countries' bilateral assistance to developing countries is 
often tied to purchases of equipment from the donor's market or to a 
certain project or to both. In contrast, rich developing countries do not 
normally possess the necessary technology that can be transferred to 
other developing countries. Thus, grants and loans from the latter 
countries were rarely, if ever, tied to any source of supply in their own 
markets. This was particularly evident in the case of Arab loans 
because, after all, they were (and still are) importers of consumer goods, 
raw materials and capital goods. Therefore, loans were tied, if at all, 
at the recipient country side, that is, to specific projects or sectors. 
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7.2. Some Bilateral Arab Funds and their Lending Operations 
to the Sudan 
The oil boom of 1973 gave particular importance to OPEC members 
as a source of finance. Naturally, OPEC extends loans and grants to 
developing countries in the form of oil facilities primarily to enable 
the latter to pay for their oil imports. 
3 In addition to that, individual 
members of OPEC provide loans and grants in support of socio-economic 
development in the Third World countries similar to those provided by 
the bi-lateral aid programmes of the developed countries. 
This study is neither intended to cover all the lending facilities 
that are extended by oil-exporting Arab countries, nor to present a full 
account of the lending operations of Arab countries to the Sudan. The 
latter was examined in chapter 6 as a part of the analysis of foreign aid 
inflow and its sectoral distribution. This chapter is concerned more 
specifically with an assessment of the activities of Arab development 
funds both bilateral and regional multi-lateral and their contribution to 
different sectors of the Sudanese economy. This does not, however, 
reflect the full extent of any given donor country participation because 
of direct government-to -government dealings, apart from specific 
development funds' operations. 
7.2.1. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
The Kuwait Fund is the oldest aid agency in Arab countries 
having been established at the end of 1961 when Kuwait achieved 
Independence. 4 During the period leading to 1974, the Kuwait Fund had 
concentrated its activities entirely on Arab countries. But it was 
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re-organized in 1974 to widen its scope of activities and also to extend 
loans, presumably without affecting the size of its lending activities to 
the Arab countries, to developing countries in Africa and Asia. The 
Kuwait Fund provides loans and also technical assistance, for instance, 
for exploratory studies in natural resources development programmes. 
Table 7.1. shows the sectoral and geographical distribution of 
Kuwait Fund's loans since its establishment. It is evident that loans 
to Arab countries had constituted nearly'70 percent of the total lending 
operations of this Fund. Although it was not long since the scope of 
the Fund's lending activities was widened, the share of loans to non- 
Arab countries had nevertheless grown significantly, particularly to 
Asian countries. The activities of the Fund had been concentrated on 
three major sectors; namely, agriculture, industry and infra-structure 
which included transport and communications and electricity and water 
supplies. This was in line with the Fund's policies of 'providing finance 
for projects that would have a direct developmental impact and that are 
of high priority in the development strategies of recipient countries'. 
The Fund generally "shuns financing social projects in education, health 
or population. " 
5 
This is clearly evident from table 7.1. where not a 
single loan was provided for social projects in the Arab countries. 
Table 7.2. shows that among the major recipient countries of the 
Kuwait Fund's loans, the Sudan ranked second in order with about 15 
percent of the total amount of loans. These loans were directed to 
finance projects in agriculture, transport and industry in a manner that 
made the former sector the largest beneficiary followed by transport/ 
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communication and storage and then the industrial sector which had 
least benefited. 
Table 7.3. shows that the agricultural sector received 45.3 
percent of the total value of loans extended by the Kuwait Fund to the 
Sudanese government. The industrial sector received an almost one- 
fifth of the total value. The particulars of these loans are shown in 
table 7.4. All loans were characterized by long term maturity periods 
(average 23 years). Average maturity periods differed between sectors 
and were 26.6,21.4 and 17.5 years for agriculture, industry and 
transport respectively. The average grace period for all loans was 4.5 
years. Interest charges contained 0.5 percent as administrative charges 
by the Fund for each loan. This appears to be a common practice that 
applies to all loans extended by the Fund and is not peculiar in the case 
of the Sudan (Sudanese sources, such as the Bank of Sudan, which provide 
information on foreign loans do not normally add this administrative 
charges to the interest rates on the Fund's loans. ) 
6 
The average of 
interest charges was 3.25 percent for all loans with a3 percent flat rate 
applicable to agricultural sector's loans, while loans to the industrial 
sector carried a4 percent charge except for a 0.9 m. K. D. loan extended 
to 'Project Preparation Unit' of the Ministry of Finance for feasibility 
studies which carried only 1.5 percent interest rate. However, the 
latter loan can, in fact, be classified as being for 'general developmental 
purposes' rather than for the industrial sector. 
7 It was a softer loan 
compared with others. 
The main beneficiary on the agricultural side was El Rahad project 
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which received two loans for both phases I and II amounting to 14.5 
m. K. D. bringing the total participation of the Kuwait Fund in the financing 
of this project to 15 percent of its total cost and 31 percent of its foreign 
exchange component. Reasons for the second loan included the rising 
cost of this project and certain essential alterations in its initial plan. 
Here the Kuwait Fund joined many other donors in the finance of El Rahad 
project; namely, IDA, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
and the United States AID. 
8 
7.2.2. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development 
The Abu Dhabi Fund was established in 1971, the year in which 
the Federation of the United Arab Emirates came into existence; 
"to provide assistance to Arab, African and Asian 
countries for the development of their economies 
through loans and financial contributions towards 
capital investment in development projects and by means 
of extending technical assistance for carrying out field 
studies. " 9 
The Fund extends loans to projects that have high priority ranking in 
accordance with recipient countries' development programmes and that 
are also economically viable, particularly where such investment provides 
incentives for-individuals and private financial institutions to participate 
in the financing of the given project. Co-financing for relatively large 
projects is normally sought with other regional and international 
financial agencies. 
Table 7. S. shows that Abu Dhabi Fund lending activities had 
concentrated on industry and on electricity and water supplies with less 
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than 10 percent of total value of its loans for agricultural development. 
This. approach, particularly the emphasis on financing electricity and 
water supplies projects, was justified in this way: - 
"Adequate economic infra-structure is an 
essential pre-requisite to the economic 
development of any nation. Moreover, the 
construction of such vast and important projects 
requires huge volume of capital on concessional 
terms. " 10 
Table 7.6. shows that among the six main recipient countries 
of Abu Dhabi Fund loans (together they received about three-quArters of 
the total value of loans), the Sudan ranked third in order with about 
10 percent of the total value of loans. On the other hand, table 7.7. 
shows that the Sudan secured only three loans in total; two in 1976 - 
one for agriculture and the other for industry - and the third in 1977 for 
Sudan Railways. The largest of these loans was provided for the 
I 
establishment of a new textile factory at Haj Abdulla. The terms of 
this loan were relatively harder than the other two loans, perhaps 
i 
because of the commercial nature of this project. 
It should be noted that the Abu Dhabi Fund had only started its 
lending operation to the Sudan in 1976 and that the Sudan had received 
only a few loans during this relatively short period. So, the experience 
so far may not provide a good guide to the level or pattern of its future 
lending to the Sudan. 
7.2.3. The Saudi Fund for Development 
The Saudi Fund started its lending operations in 1975 with 
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policies to provide concessionary loans for 'public sector's projects - 
typically, agriculture, infra-structure, health and education - because 
although such projects are basic to economic development, they apparently 
have limited access to conventional sources of financing. ' 
11 The main 
criteria for lending were to include: the effective contribution of the 
particular project to the economic and social welfare of the borrowing 
country, the over-all regional impact of the project on countries in the 
region, and the financial viability of the project including its ability to 
contribute to the repayment of the incurred debt. The Saudi Fund 
activities were not to be restricted solely to the Arab countries, but 
were extended to African, Asian and, more recently, to some South 
American countries (a loan was committed to Brazil in support of an 
electrification project). 
During the first year of its lending operation, the Saudi Fund 
provided loans to four African countries; namely - Egypt, Tunisia, the 
Sudan and Uganda. As can be seen from table 7.8., the Saudi Fund's 
classification of regions is based on defining recipient countries by 
their continents rather than by any economic or political criteria. The 
scope of the Fund's activities was wide, however, the Arab countries 
remained the main recipients of its loans in both Africa and Asia. 
Table 7.9. shows that the Sudan ranked high among the four 
African countries that received an almost three-quarters of the Saudi 
Fund loans during the fiscal year 1976/77. The Sudan received a total 
of three loans during the three years of the Fund's lending operations 
covered in this profile. As reported in table 7.10. the first loans was 
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extended to El Rahad project. The other two loans provided to the 
Sudan were to support the transport system. One of these loans was 
for financing a part of Port Sudan-Khartoum highway project and the 
other was for modernizing and increasing the capacity and efficiency 
of Port Sudan airport. The latter loan represented half of the total cost 
of the mentioned project. The two loans carried 2 percent interest 
charges; with 20 years maturity period and 5 year grace period for each. 
The total amount of the Saudi Fund's loans to the Sudan was equivalent 
to ES. 22.5 million. In percentage terms, 56.5 percent of this amount 
went, into the transport sector's development programme while the rest 
was directed to El Rahad project. 
Summar 
Having presented a profile for the main characteristics of the 
three bilateral Arab Development Funds, their lending activities and 
their scope of coverage; table 7.11. gathers together the relevant 
information on the Sudan. Bearing in mind the obvious limitation of 
any comparison between the different Funds, it is however clearly 
evident that the three main sectors of the Sudanese economy found 
va. . rying levels of financial support from each Fund. This preference 
reflects each Fund's own foreign lending priorities as a bilateral donor 
that is influenced by the policies of its mother country. 
The mentioned Development Funds were established to channel 
foreign assistance to other developing countries, but this does not 
necessarily mean that they are the only sources of development aid 
from these countries. There are in addition, direct government-to- 
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government loans and grants. These are significant in the case of 
Saudi Arabian government cash and development loans to the Sudan. 
Section 7.5 examines the impact of Arab capital including these funds, 
on the Sudanese economy and suggests ways of making- the most 
effective use of that increasingly important participation. 
7.3. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
The Arab Fund is a regional multi-lateral development agency 
initiated by the Economic Council of the Arab League in 1968, but did 
not begin its operational phase until the beginning of 1972.. 
12 Two 
functions are normally performed by such regional financial agencies; 
"These are, first the mobilization of additional 
external resources either from governments or 
from the world's capital markets, and secondly 
the financing of projects which will contribute 
not only to the development of the individual 
member countries, but also to the integrated 
development of the region as a whole. " 13 
Like the Asian, African and Inter-American Development Banks which 
were established to enhance developmental efforts in the respective 
regions for regional economic co-operation, the Arab Fund addressed 
itself to achieve similar objectives. It was intended to participate in 
the financing of economic and social development projects in the Arab 
countries by, 
"financing economic projects of an investment 
character by means of Loans granted on easy terms 
to governments and to public or private organisations 
and institutions, giving preference to economic 
projects that are vital to the Arab entity and to joint 
Arab projects. " 14 
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Accordingly, apart from financing projects of national interest 
to its members, the Arab Fund provides loans to projects that are 
designed to facilitate transport and communication between various Arab 
countries. For example, the Arab Fund financed the 'Telecommunication 
project' between Algeria and Morocco and 'Aden-Taiz highway' between 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic. 
is 
Such Inter-Arab development projects are deemed crucial to achieve an 
integrated development programme in the region. 
The Arab Fund also gives prominence to feasibility studies 
a iming at identifying inter-Arab projects, but normally carries these 
studies in co-operation with technical missions from international 
agencies in this field such as UNDP. An intensive study was undertaken 
for agricultural resources in the Sudan which resulted in the establishment 
of an_authority' to implement the recommendations of that study 
designated as the Basic Programme ... ) and also to carry out similar 
studies in other Arab countries. Both; the significance of 'Basic 
Programme' and the role of the 'agricultural development authority', will 
be examined in the next section. 
Table 7.12. provides information on the sectoral-composition 
of the Arab Fund loans to all countries since its establishment. It 
shows that the Arab Fund apparently favoured capital investment in all 
types of infra. -structural facilities. This included electricity, water 
supply, transport, communication ... etc. which received three-quarters 
of the total loans of the Fund up to the end of 1977. The agricultural 
sector least benefited relative to other activities having less than 10 
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percent of the total amounts of loans. 
extended to the agricultural sector. 
Only three loans were, in fact, 
The largest of these (16 m. K. D. ) 
was provided for irrigation and agricultural credit support in Morocco 
and the other two loans were extended to Syria and Somalia. The. 
industrial sector received about 15 percent of the total amount of the 
Arab Fund loans. 
Table 7.13 reveals that the Sudan ranked second in order of the 
main recipient countries of the Arab Fund's loans (which received more 
than 60 percent of the total value of its loans) with just over 11 percent 
of the total value of all its loans. All this Fund's loans to the Sudan 
were for the trans port/communica tion sector with 4.4 m. K. D. (equivalent 
to ES. S. 28 m. ) granted on behalf of El Rahad project and were partly 
allocated for surfacing the road from Medadi to El Rahad and partly for 
building several feeder-roads inside the project itself. The latter roads 
were complementary to El Rahad project and were vital for its successful 
completion. 
The Arab Fund charged interest rates on long-term development 
loans that ranged between 4 and 6 percent. A glance at the interest - 
rates that were being charged during the period 1973-77 reveals that the 
Arab Fund charged 6 percent on most of its loans. Table 7.14. shows 
that the Arab Fund charged the Sudan a4 percent flat rate on all loans. 
The Sudan had been grouped by this Fund as one of the least developed 
Arab countries which included Somalia, the Yemen Arab Republic, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania. These relatively poorer countries received 43.3 percent of 
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the total amounts of loans that was extended by the Arab Fund in 1976.16 
It can easily be discerned from the same source that the countries that 
were classified as 'least developed' were normally charged a4 percent 
interest rate (being the lowest interest rate the Arab Fund ever charged) 
on the Fund's loans. * This does not imply that the other 'relatively 
better off' countries were necessarily charged the highest rate of 6 
percent since Egypt was also charged a similar rate (that is, 4 percent). 
However, special considerations might have been applicable to Egypt 
because of the circumstances that surrounded its economy at that time. 
The Arab Fund and the Kuwait Fund were co-financing Sennar/ 
Damazin highway - which was estimated to cost more than ES. 30 million - 
by providing all its foreign exchange requirement in addition to an almost 
one-third of the local currency component of the total cost leaving the 
remaining part for the 'Roads and Bridges Public Corporation. j17 This 
was only one example of the practice of co-financing between different 
aid donors. Co-financing however does not necessarily have to be 
only among regional multi-lateral and bilateral lending agencies but 
usually includes international agencies and other donors outside the 
specific region. Anyway, this is not peculiar to certain Development 
Funds but is applicable to almost all donors who normally seek 
co-financing and tec4nical co-operation from other donors in order to 
ensure the implementation of the specific project or programme in 
accordance with the initial projection by the availability of adequate 
and continuous financial support. Such arrangements should contribute 
to the completion of the particular projects as scheduled and so might 
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help in avoiding debt service difficulties, if the project is of a direct 
yield nature. The approach of co-financing is quite common in the Sudan 
particularly in relation to the large-scale agricicultural and infra- 
structural development projects. 
Finally, the Arab Fund, in addition to the provision of loans to 
finance different development projects, also extends technical assistance 
in co-operation with international agencies for the pursuance of 
feasibility studies in various fields of national and regional importance. 
An example of such practices was the 'Basic Programme for Agricultural 
Development in the Sudan' which was produced in collaboration with 
international agencies and foreign private organizations involved in 
agricultural and related-activities development in the Third World 
countries and the Sudanese authorities. 
7.4. The Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in 
18 
the Sudan 1976-1985. , 
This important study of the agricultural resources of the Sudan was 
undertaken under the technical assistance programme of the Arab Fund. 
As the Fund's 1975 Annual Report had put it: 
"the Sudan was chosen by the Arab Fund as the 
subject of an intensive study aimed at formulating a 
Joint Arab effort for agricultural development and 
investment. This choice was influenced by the 
fact that the Sudan has the most extensive, yet 
the least utilized agricultural resources of all 
Arab countries. " 
The 'Basic Programme' was primarily intended to clear the way for 
an effective Arab participation in the long-term agricultural development 
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of the Sudan. It was an integral part of the long-term 18-year 
comprehensive plan for socio-economic development of the Sudan and 
had reflected the priorities set in the 6-year Plan. It pledged to 
achieve two main objectives: - First, the achievement-of self-sufficiency 
in basic food-stuffs and consumer goods for the Sudan. Second, to turn 
the Sudan into a net exporter of certain basic food-stuffs such as sugar 
and wheat. The whole programme was thought to take 25 years to 
complete but the crux of the strategy lay in the first 10 years' achievement 
which was composed of 100 projects in crop and forestry production, 
livestock and fishery, agro-allied industries, transport, water resources, 
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electric power and the supporting infrastructural projects and services. 
As can be seen from table 7. IS... the 'Basic Programme' was 
composed of two broad sets of development projects - one was direct- 
productive investment in agriculture, agro-related industries and transport 
and the other was the necessary infrastructure. The 'Basic Programme' 
recommended that a substantial part of the total projected investment 
should be directed to 'commercially viable' projects which included the 
production of basic food-stuffs and the establishment of processing 
industries particularly for the production of edible oil, kenaf (similar to 
jute), cement and chemicals. It also included the development of 
lives tock-rais ing and the establishment of the related industries. 
Investment in the infrastructural type of projects constituted just over 
one-quarter of the total capital requirement that was estimated for the 
whole Basic Programme. The foreign exchange component of the Basic 
Programme was calculated as 65 percent of the total amount of investment 
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envisaged to take place during the 10 years implementation period. 
Sources of financing were to include private foreign capital, but there 
was greater emphasis on loans (in particular soft loans) as can be seen 
from table 7.16.; which shows that about one-quarter of capital investment 
was envisaged to be in a form of equity capital participation in the 
commercially-viable part of the Basic Programme whose finance would, 
almost, be shared between equity participation and conventional loans. 
In order to ensure sustained flow of the substantial financial resources 
deemed necessary for the implementation of this Programme, the total 
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investment package should prove to be economically via le. 
Therefore, a deliberate balance ought to be maintained between the 
commercially-viable investment that required equity capital and 
conventional loans and the infrastructural development that required 
concessionary financing in form of soft loans and grants. 
Table 7.17. shows that crop production constituted one-third of 
the total cost of the Basic Programme (only ES. 2 m. for forestry 
development). This included sugar and other basic food-stuffs production 
schemes that were throught to be crucial in the drive to achieve self- 
sufficiency. The transport sector would secure about one-fifth of the 
total capital investment (13.3 percent of investment in this sector was 
regarded as 'commercially -viable investment). More than 90 percent 
of the capital investment in the industrial sector was planned to be in 
'commercially -viable' projects. 
The successful implementation of the Basic Programme would 
demand two important pre-requisites of an institutional nature: - First, 
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investment promotion laws were required to encourage the participation 
of foreign capital in the financing of the proposed development projects. 
Such laws were already in existence for industry before the publication 
of the Basic Programme. 
21 
A law to encourage investment in agriculture 
was, for the first time, enacted in 1976.22 These promotion laws 
primarily intend to protect foreign capital against nationalization or 
confiscation and to provide investors with state's guarantees in case of 
liquidation of business. They also provide a favourable treatment in 
tax levies and duties. Second, as recommended in the Basic Programme, 
the establishment of an institutional authority (supported by the Arab 
countries) primarily to ensure the implementation of the former, and also 
other similar programmes in member countries as might be agreed upon, 
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was deemed necessary. This institutional body was termed 'The Arab 
Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development'. Its purpose, 
set out in its charter, was expressed as follows: - 
"This Authority embodies the Joint Arab economic 
effort aimed at an optimal utilization of Arab 
agricultural resources, enhancing the agricultural 
production capabilities of the region, meeting a 
greater proportion of the food security requirements 
of the Arab World, and promoting economic integration 
between its various parts. , 
23 
Thirteen Arab countries have, so far, subscribed in varying amounts to 
the Authority's initial capital of 150 m. K. D. (equivalent to ES. 180 m. ) 
24 
The Authority had then undertaken to help the Sudan in funding its 
agricultural development programme with long-term loans that should 
not cause debt-servicing problems. 
25 
The financing of the Basic 
Programme was not to be confined to the Arab countries alone, but was 
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to include international bilateral and multi-lateral agencies and private 
foreign capital. International participation had been seen as an 
essential ingredient to the successful implementation of the Basic 
Programme because of the need for managerial and technical assistance 
in addition to that for finance. 
However, the success of the Authority in implementing the 
'Basic Programme' will certainly depend on its ability to mobilize the 
necessary financial support and to acquire the required technology. 
Part of the problem which the Basic Programme sets itself to tackle may 
prove to be a considerable constraint to complete it within the planned 
period, plainly, the question of absorptive capacity and the capability 
of the existing infrastructural facilities pose difficulties, particularly 
in the initial stages of its implementation. "Also the sudden influx of 
capital into the country could result, at least in the short-run, in 
significant inflationary pressures for the national economy. " 
26 
7.5. General Remarks and Evaluation 
Traditionally, the principal sources of foreign aid to developing 
countries have been the advanced countries of the world. However, the 
last few decades witnessed the emergence of certain developing countries 
as exporters of large quantities of oil which eventually enabled them to 
accumulate an increasing amount of capital. These rich developing 
countries have accepted their moral obligation to assist the relatively 
poor ones by extending soft loans and grants to support the latter's 
development programmes and to relieve the growing pressure on their 
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balance of payments. A new source of foreign aid has thus emerged 
in the rich developing countries which are primarily oil exporters. 
Similar to the conventional sources of aid, it involved the extension 
of funds through the channels of the existing international multi-lateral 
agencies, regional development banks which were specially established 
for such purposes and on bilateral basis from both governments and their 
official development agencies. 
The current terms of bilateral aid from the oil-rich developing 
countries are, in fact, differenI iri many respects from their counterpart 
in the advanced countries: (i) Since the former countries are, at the 
moment, embarking on long-term development programmes, they 
themselves need to purchase the necessary capital goods and technology 
from the industrialized countries. This implies that a loan from one of 
these countries to a developing country can hardly be tied to purchases 
from the donor's own markets. This is generally true with regard to 
capital goods imports. Therefore, the extra cost of tied aid incurred 
by the recipient does not exist in the case of aid from these countries. 
This does not necessarily mean that these donors normally extend 
development assistance and other funds without being concerned about 
their end-use and their over-all development impact on the recipient 
economies. However, these countries provide project-tied loans in a 
way similar to the practices of the developed countries. (ii) Most 
bilateral aid programmes are confined to specific regions, for instance, 
the Islamic, the Arab and the African countries. Globally, this means 
that certain developing countries are likely to acquire more aid funds 
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than others. Of course, this takes place in accordance with historical 
and political factors and presumably in the interest of long-term 
regional integration. The latter is clear in the case of loans from the 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, which tends to favour 
those proJects which would eventually benefit more than one of its 
members particularly inter 7- countries transport and communication 
proJects. (iii) Developed countries have established institutions and 
administration systems to run their foreign aid programmes while the 
major oil-expoTting countries have only recently been involved on 
significant foreign aid programmes. Some of the newly emerging donors 
have yet to develop satisfactory criteria and administration procedures 
for aid provision. (iv) Some of these oil exporting countries have 
already established autonomous development agencies in addition to 
direct government-to -government dealings. In addition to channelling 
public funds, the former are also designed to encourage the involvement 
of private entrepreneurs in the development process of those countries 
which receive loans from these development agencies. Also, these 
Funds tend to co-ordinate their assistance with those international 
agencies involved in the development programmes of the Third World. 
This practice assumes particular importance because of the need for 
foreign technical expertise by the recipient countries and also the desire 
to ensure the provision of the required complementary inputs. This may 
result in a development fund financing the purchase of capital goods 
from a third party. However, the provision of capital goods may also 
be wholly or partly financed by a loan or grant from the government of 
the country where these goods originate on a source-tied type of loan, 
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or the 'developing donor' may specify the source of capital goods supply, 
for any one of a variety of reasons which have nothing to do with the 
recipient country. These reasons range from the desire to mobilize 
support of developed countries which may only be by tied-loans and the 
willingness of the donor country to make the recipient to purchase the 
necessary technology from a particular source. 
Generally speaking, the practices and the lending operations of 
the different Arab Development Funds reflect most of the above 
characteristics. Above all, the emergence of these Development Funds 
had provided the Sudan and certain other developing countries with an 
increasingly important source of development finance and general 
financial support. Loans from these funds had been extended to almost 
all economic activities in the Sudan with special emphasis on transport 
and agro-allied industries. These loans added to the stream of foreign 
capital to assist the country in achieving its objectives of self-sufficiency 
in basic food-stuffs and the other necessary consumers' goods. The 
suggested long-term development strategy emphasizes the importance of 
exporting the excess of these products and goods particularly to the Arab 
markets to meet a significant proportion of their growing demand in basic 
food-stuffs such as vegetables, meat, edible oil, wheat, sugar, rise 
and perhaps some other consumer goods such as textiles. These 
arguments are among the main economic factors which draw forth an 
increasing Arab participation in the economic development of the Sudan. 
The impact of the relatively growing size of Arab capital 
investment on the development strategy of the Sudan is clearly evident 
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in many ways: (i) The possibility that the country can acquire foreign 
capital from these countries in addition to the traditional donors has 
led the country to embark on large-scale agricultural development 
proJects with emphasis on the agricultural -related industries. The 
establishment of such brojects requires a relatively high foreign 
capital input and this may only be possible by joint-ventures between 
two or more donors and participants. Right from the beginning, the 
realities of the economic situation in the Sudan had call for more basic 
infrastructure which was either inadequate or completely lacking. 
However, the general economic policy of the government had been to 
carry out the whole programme simultaneously in the sense of speeding 
up the provision of some basic infra -structural facilities and at the 
same time embarking on the suggested development projects. Such a 
type of development strategy may frequently suffer from the adverse 
impact of an inadequate physical infra-structure on the development 
projects. Perhaps the choice of such an approach to development. had 
been in response to an anticipation of a substantial foreign support in 
particular from the different lending agencies in the oil-rich Arab 
countries. (ii) The availability of loans from the Arab Funds may 
attract more international participation in the development programme 
of the Sudan. An example of the increasing non-Arab foreign 
participation is the- Kenana sugar plantation project and work on the 
Junguli Canal. Both of these projects are anticipated to mark a major 
developmental breakthrough in the Sudan. (iii) The 1970's witnessed 
the construction of a number of modern hotels in Khartoum. The capital 
which has been invested in these and other similar activities has mainly 
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come from Arab countries in joint-ventures with the Sudanese government 
and/or domestic entrepreneurs. (iv) The geographical importance of 
the Sudan to both the Middle East and Africa has enabled Khartoum to 
develop the reputation of a financial centre, for example, the Arab- 
African Development Bank is located in Khartoum. (v) These develop- 
ments have forced the Sudanese authorities to develop the activities of 
its own domestic financial agencies (sých as the Sudan Development 
Corporation) in order to facilitate the process of channelling foreign 
funds into the different investment outlays. The development of these 
internal agencies also helps to raise the level of domestic resources' 
contribution to development financing. 
These developments illustrate the importance of the growing 
Arab Funds' participation in financing the development programme in the 
Sudan and the implications of that on the development path of the country. 
The emergence of these funds has, indeed, provided the Sudan with an 
opportunity to acquire additional foreign capital and to diversify the 
sources., The co-ordination between these Development Funds and 
international multi-lateral agencies as well as the sources of capital 
goods supply may also prove to be of great benefit to the long-term 
development programme. At the least, it may help to ensure a 
satisfactory implementation of projects and to reduce the impact of 
unanticipated bottlenecks that may completely halt progress on any 
project(s) or programme(s). Finally, the country has, for the first 
time, access to borrowing in international capital markets on guarantees 
from these countries similar to the 200 m. dollars Euro-dollar loan that 
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is guaranteed by the Saudi Monetary Authorities. 
The following are the prime motives of Arab capital investment 
in the Sudan and the main difficulties which it fa. ces. -- (i) The Sudan 
possesses vast unused land as was broadly described in the Basic 
Programme for Agricultural Devel9pment. Therefore, the Arab Funds 
have found an investment opportunity for parts of their considerable 
funds. (ii) With respect to the present economic situation of the country 
there are many obstacles to develop. Chief among these is the transport 
and communication problem. The difficulties caused by the inadequacy ' 
-of the transport and communication facilities underline a general 
constraint to development in the Sudan. Consequently, a considerable 
part of Arab capital is directed to that sector. (iii) The Arab Funds rely 
on foreign experts to pursue the necessary feasibility studies in 
co-operation with international agencies (such as UNDP) although their 
own technical staff is increasing its participation in such field missions. 
However, the lack of co-ordination between the different parties involved 
in such studies may, in some cases, delay the final agreement on a given 
loan. (iv) The lack of complementary finance has been one of the main 
factors that led to an accumulation of undisbursed balances on behalf of 
and 
certain. project4/to renegotiation with the donors to increase the size of 
a particular loan because of the rising cost of a particular project. 
However, this has been more evident on the side of domestic currency 
counterpart cost borne by the Sudanese authorities because of liquidity 
crises. 
Although the terms of loans from the different Arab Funds were 
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diverse, they also varied with respect to the beneficiary activities. 
For example, the Kuwait Fund charged a flat rate of 3 percent on all 
loans to the agricultural sector in contrast to loans for industrial 
development which carried a4 percent flat rate charge. The cumulative 
terms of all the loans from the four Arab Development Funds that were 
examined in this chapter show that the average interest charges ranged 
between 2 and 4 percent per annum with about 20 years maturities and 
an average of 4.5 years grace periods. These terms lie well below 
commercial borrowing but at the top of the average terms of loans from 
international multi-lateral agencies and developed market economies 
(see chapter 6 for further comparisons in this connection) - 
The main question is whether it is desirable for the Sudan to 
depend so heavily on borrowing from the oil-exporting Arab countries 
rather than to put more effort in to acquire more foreign aid from the 
other sources. In any case, it is certainly undesirable for the Sudan 
to rely so heavily on one such source of foreign finance and hence to 
lose the financial and most importantly, the technical contribution 
which accompanies the traditional sources of aid. Most of these Arab 
Funds provide loans on bi-lateral basis. This form of aid is particularly 
prone to discontinuity. On the other hand, the diversity of foreign aid 
sources could provide the Sudan with an opportunity to finance both the 
infra -structural and the directly productive parts of its development 
programme. Also this could enable the country to reduce the adverse 
impacts on the development programme arising from the inavailability of 
imported and other complementary inputs by seeking the participation of 
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more than one donor in the finance of large-scale projects. 
Loans and grants provided by the Arab countries to the Sudan 
should be seen in connection with a desirable aim to achieve integration 
between all the Arab countries. The Sudan, with its vast unutilized 
natural resources, came to be the focus of these countries primarily as 
a potential supplier of agricultural products and related food items. 
This, in turn, had had a direct impact on the formulation of the long-term 
development strategy of the country in the sense of an 'over-emphasis' 
on large-scale mechanized agricultural projects primarily designed to 
raise the present low levels of Sudanese exports to these (Zountries. 
These types of projects which have been chosen as the only effective 
method to bring vast areas of land under cultivation on a modern basis, 
are capital -intensive ventures with a relatively high foreign exchange 
component. Unless the future amounts of aid to the Sudan are therefore 
considerably increased, most of the incoming aid could be easily 
absorbed by these projects leaving very little for the other equally 
important developmental activities. 
209 
Notes and References 
The Industrial Survey 1970/71, Vol. I, Department of Statistics, 
pp. 347-8. It is reported that West Germany is the major single 
contributor to the manufacturing sector, then, Kuwait, Britain, 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. 
2. The Agreement to establish the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (1968). Reproduced in Demir, S. (1979); Arab 
Development Funds in the Middle East, Pergamon Policy Studies, 
Pergamon Press, pp. 81-96. 
3. Shihata, I. and Mabro, R. (1979); The OPEC Record, World 
Development, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 161-72. 
4.. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Annual Report 
1974/75, Kuwait, p. 3. 
S. Demir, S. (1979); op. cit., p. 23. 
6. For example, the loan which was extended to the agricultural 
sector in 1976 was reported to be bearing a 2.5 % interest charge. 
See the Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 1967, p. 65. 
7. The Bank of Sudan 17th Annual Report 1976, p. 45. 
8. The Kuwait Fund Annual Report, 1976/77, p. 32. 
9. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, Annual Report 
1977, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, p. 14. 
10. Demir, S. (1979); op. cit., p. 38. This justification was presented 
in response to a question put to the Head of the Fund's Research 
Department. However, the Author himself thought of this approach 
to aid as part of traditional attitudes of multi-lateral agencies which 
primarily focus on financing infrastructural development projects. 
11. The Saudi Fund for Development, 1 st Annual Report (March-July 1975), 
Riyadh, p. 8. 
12. Demir, S. (1979); op. cit., p. 40. 
210 
13. White, J. (1970); Regional Development Banks: A Study of 
Institutional Style, ODI, London, p. 26. 
14. Article II of the Agreement to establish the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development, Reproduced in Demir, S. (1979); 
op. cit. , pp. 81-96. 
15. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Annual Reports, 
1975-76. 
16. Ibid., Annual Report 1976 under the heading 'Lending Operations'. 
17. The Arab Fund Annual Report 1976; The Kuwait Fund Annual 
Report 1976/77 and the 6-YearýPlan (1977/78-1982/83), op. cit., 
pp. 122-68. 
18. The Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan (1976-85) was formulated 
under the auspices of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development as part of its feasibility studies programme. 
19. The Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan (1976-85): Summary and Conclusions, the 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Kuwait, p. 22. 
20. Ibid. , p. 28. 
21. Organization and Encouragement of Investment in Economic 
Services Act 1973 and the Development and Encouragement of 
Industrial Investment Act 1974. 
22. The Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act 1976. 
23. The Arab Fund for Economic and'Social Development, Annual Report 
1976. 
24. Salacuse, J. W. (1978); The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development: A New Model for Capital Transfer 
in the Middle East, journal of World Trade La-w, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
pp. 56-66. 
25. Ca plan, B. (19 7 8); Sudan - Acid Te st for Arab Inve s tment, 
The Banker, Vol. 128, No. 623, p. 35. 
26. Salacuse, T. W. (1978); op. cit., p. 65. 
211 
TABLE 7.1 
Sectoral and Geographical Distribution of the Kuwait Fund Loans 
- January 1962 to June 1977, (Percentages)* 
Country 
Groupings Agriculture Transport Electricity Industry Total 
% of 
Grand 
I 
Total 
Arab 23.5 32.6 17.5 26.3 100.0 69.4 
African 31.8 25.3 32.2 10.7 100.0 9.6 
Asian 13.6 9.8 58.5 18.2 100.0 20.7 
European** - 100.0 - - 100.0 0.3 
% of Grand 22.2 27.4 27.4 23.1 1,00.0 100.0 Total 
Source: The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
Annual Report 1976/77, Kuwait, table C, p. 101. 
Percentages may not add to 100 because of roundings. 
** The two European countries that benefited from the scope 
widening of the Fund's activities are Malta and Cyprus. 
N. B. The total lending amounted to about 435 m. K. D. 
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TABLE 7.2. 
The Main Recipients of the Kuwait Fund's Loans as at 
June 1977, (Percentages) 
Countries Egypt Sudan Morocco Jordan Tunisia Total 
% of Total 19.4 14.9 10.9 10.8 10.5 66.5 Loans 
Source: The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
Annpal Report 1976/77, Table D, p. 102. 
TABLE 7.3 
Sectoral Distribution of the Kuwait Fund's Loans to the 
Sudan as at June 1977, (K. D. m. ) 
Sectors Amounts Percentages 
Agriculture 20.310 45.3 
Transport 16.000 35.6 
Industry 8.570 19.1 
Total 44.880* 100.0 
Source: As for Table 7.2 
* Does not include 0.4 m. K. D. as technical assistance. 
(ES. 1' = 1.2 K. D. ) 
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TABLE 7.4 
Project Classification of Loans from the Kuwait Fund to 
Individual Sectors, (KD. m. ) 
Sectors & Projects Date Amount Interest Maturity Grace Charges Periods Periods 
Agriculture 
Agricultural 1967 4.21 3.0 21.3 2.8 development 
Mechanized Farming 1972 1.60 3.0 24.2 4.2 Corporation 
El Rahad project 1973 3.30 3.0 30.0 4.5 (Phase I) 
El Rahad project 1974 11.20 3.0 31 0 5 S (Phase II) . . 
Industry 
El Girba sugar 1965 1.67 4.0 14.4 2.4 factory 
North-West Sennar 1973 4.50 4.0 16.0 4.0 
sugar project 
The Industrial 1975 1.50 4.0 16.0 4.0 Bank 
Feasibility Studies 1976 0.90 1.5 39.0 9.0 
Transport 
Sudan Railways 1962 7.0 4.0 15.7 3.7 
Sennar/Damazin 
Road 1977 9.0 3.0 20.0 5.3 
Source: The Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the 
United Nations, Press Release No. 2/77, Reproduced 
in Demir, S. (1979); Arab Development Funds in the 
Middle East, Pergamon Policy Studies, Pergamon Press, 
Table 1.1, pp. 10-16. 
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TABLE 7.5 
Sectoral Classification of the Abu Dhabi Fund's Loans, 1974-77 
(Percentages)* 
Sectors 1974 1975 1976 1977 % of Total 
Agriculture 8.8 22.9 14.5 - 9.7 
Transport 5.5 2.9 9.3 35.8 16.9 
Electricity & 39.0 74.3 26.1 29.7 34.5 
Water Supplies 
Industry 26.3 - 43.9 34.5 33.3 
Services" 20.3 6,; 1 5.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
Annual Report 1977, Abu Dhabi, table I, p. 90. 
Totals may not add to 100 because of roundings. 
Services include housing, tourism, etc. which are 
reported under separate headings. 
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TABLE 7.6 
The Main Recipients of the Abu Dhabi Fund's Loans as at 
end -1977 (Percentages) 
Countries Egypt Bahrain Sudan Jordan Morocco Syria Total 
Percentage 20.8 17.2 10.7 - 9.9 8.6 8.4 75.6 Share 
Source: As that for Table 7.5, table 3, p. 9 2. 
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TABLE 7.7 
Project Classification of the Abu Dhabi Fund's Loans to 
the Sudan and their Terms (U. A. E. Dirhams m. ) 
Beneficiary Sectors Interest Maturity Grace 
and Proj e cts 
Date Amount Charqes Periods Periods 
Agriculture 
(12.1) 
South Darfur 1976 16.5 3.0 20.0 S. 0 develop. project 
Industry 
(58.6) 
HaJ Abdulla 1976 80.0 4. S 13.0 3.0 
spinning mill 
Transport (29; 3) 
Sudan Railways 1977 40.0 3.0 20.0 4.0 
Grand Total (100.01 
and Average * 136.5 3.5 17.7 4.0 
Terms I I I I 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1976 and the Abu Dhabi 
Fund Annual Report 19 77, p. 33. 
Refers to the percentage share of each sector. 
** Equivalent to ES. 10.92 m. 
(ES. I= 12.5 U. A. E. Dtrhams). 
N. B. U. A. E. =United Arab Emirates. 
217 
TABLE 7.8 
Distribution of the Saudi Development Fund's Loans by 
Regions, 1974/75 - 1976/77 (Percentages)* 
Regions 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 
Africa 
Asia 
100.0 
- 
28.2 
71.8 
41.5 
58.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The Saudi Development Fund, Annual Reports for 
1974/75 - 1976/77. 
* Includes loans signed during the specific year. 
TABLE 7.9 
The Main African Countries which received Loans from 
the Saudi Fund during 1976/77 (Percentages) 
Countries Egypt Sudan Ghana Cameroon Total 
Percentage 24.7 17.8 16.0 14.8 73.3 Share 
I 
Source: The Saudi Development Fund, Annual Report 1976/77. 
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TABLE 7.10 
Project Classification of the Saudi Development Fund's 
Loans to the Sudan (S. R. m. ) 
Beneficiary Sectors Date Amount Interest Maturity Grace 
and Projects Charges Periods Periods 
Agriculture (4 3.5) * 
El Rahad project 1975 98.00 N. A. N. A. N. A. 
Transport 
Haya/kasala road 1976 91.78 2.0 20.0 5.0 
Port Sudan 1976 35.30 2.0 20.0 5.0 Airport 
Grand Total (100.0) 
and Average 225.08 
'A 2.0 20.0 5.0 
Terms I I 
Source: The Saudi Development Fund, Annua. 1 Report 1976/77 
and Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1976. 
Refers to the percentage share of each sector. 
Equivalent to CS. 2 2.5 m. 
(ES -1= 10 S. R. ) 
S. R. stands for Saudi Rials. 
N. A. means Not Available. 
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TABLE 7.11 
Distribution of Arab Funds' Loans to the Sudan by Beneficiary 
Sectors as at end -1977 (Percentages) 
Total 
Fund's Name Agriculture Industry Transport Total Amount in 
ES. M. 
The Kuwait Fund 45.3 19.1 35.6 100.0 53.90 
The Saudi Fund 43.5 - 56.5 100.0 22.50 
Abu Dhabi Fund 12.1 58.6 29.3 100.01 1 
Source: Tables 7.3,7.7,7.10. 
TABLE 7.12 
Distribution of Loans from the Arab Fund by Beneficiary Sectors 
as at end -1977 (Percentages), (loans to all countries) 
Beneficiary Sectors and Activities % Share 
Electricity and Water Supplies and Sewerage 39.0 
Transport, Communications, Gas and Oil Storage 36.8 
Manufacturing Industries 14.8 
Agriculture and Settlement 9.4 
Total* 100.0 
Source: The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 
Annual Report 1977, Kuwait, Table 2. 
* The total amount of all loans is 295.3 m. K. D. 
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TABLE 7.13 
The Major Recipients of Loans from the Arab Fund as at end 
-1977 (Percentages) 
Countries Egypt Sudan Morocco 
Yemen 
Arab Syria Total 
Republic 
Percentage 23.0 11.2 9.5 9.4 8.6 61.7 Share I 
Source: As for table 7.12 
TABLE 7.14 
Project Classification of the Arab Fund's Loans to the Sudan 
and their Terms, (K. D. m. ) 
Projects Da te Amount 
Interest 
Charges 
Maturity 
Periods 
Grace 
Periods 
Gadarif /Kasala 1974 8.0 4.0 20.0 6.0 Road 
Telecommunic- 1975 4.8 4.0 20.0 4.0 
ations 
El Rahad project 1975 4.4 4.0 20.0 5.0 
roads 
Sennar/Damazin 
road 
1976 11.0 4.0 21.0 6.0 
Sudan Railways 1977 5.0 4.0 21 . .0 4.0 
Grand Total & 
Average Terms 33.2 4.0 20.4 5.0 
Source: The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 
Annual Reports 1973-77. 
* Equivalent to ES. 39.84 
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TABLE 7.15 
A Summary of the Contents of 'the Basic Programme' for 
Agricultural Development in the Sudan, 1976-85, (ES. m. ) 
I 
Cost Components" 
I 
Nature of Projects 
Total 
Cost 
Foreign Local 
No. of 
Proiects 
1 Commercially viable 1043 632 411 31 
investments (45.6)* (60.6) (39.5) 
2 Agriculture and 573 356 217 25 
related activities (25.1)* (62.1) (37.9) 
3 W Direct revenue 350 271 79 20 
producing infra- (15.3) (77.4) (22.6) 
structure 
(ii) Non-direct 261 179 82 14 
revenue producing (11.4) (68.6) (31.4) 
infrastructure 
Sub-Total 3 611 450 161 34 
(i and 11) (26.7)* (73.6) (26.4) 
4 Institutional support 60 48 12 10 
(2.6) (80.0) (20.0) 
Grand Total 2287 1486 801 100 
I 1 (100.0) 
(65.0) (35.0) 
-1 
Source: The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (1976); 
The Basic Programme for Agr. Development in the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1976-85: Summary 
and Conclusions, Kuwait, Appendix 3, pp. 32-33. 
* Percentages of the Grand total. 
** Figures between brackets are the percentage distribution of the 
total cost of each set of projects between foreign and 
local components. 
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TABLE 7.16 
Projected Types of Financing for 'the Basic Programme. . .' 
(Percentages) 
I 
Loans I 
Type of Financing Soft Conventional Equity Grants Total 
% Share 50.0 24.8 23.6 1.6 100.0 
Source: As for table 7.15. 
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TABLE 7.17 
Distribution of "the Basic Programme's" Capital Investment among 
the different Economic Activities, (CS. m. ) 
Cost Componen`9 
Economic Activities Total* Fore ign Local Commercially Cost Viable 
Invest. 
Crop and. forestry 761 447 314 385 
(33.3) (58.7) (41.3) (50.6) 
Transport 474 358 1-16- 63 
(20.7) (75.5) (24.5) (13.3) 
Livestock & fisheries 409 230 179 240 
(17.9) (56.2) (43.9) (58.7) 
Agro-industries 383 259 124 355 
(16.8) (67.6) (32.4) (92.7) 
Agricultural & 138 105 33 
supporting services (6.0) (76.1) (23.9) 
Water & power 122 87 35 - 
resources (5.3) (71.3) (28.7) 
Total 2287 1486 801 1043 
(100.0) (65.0) (35.0) (45.6)*** 
Source: As for table 7.15, Append Lx 4, pp. 34 -4 2. 
Figures between brackets are percentages of the total. 
Figures between -brackets are the percentage distribution of 
the total cost of each economic activity between foreign 
and local components. 
As percentage of the total cost. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Domestic Savings: An Application of 
the Wetsskopf Behavioural Model to the Sudan 
8.1. The Weisskopf Behavioural Model 
1 
Weisskopf has developed a model to test the hypothesis that 
the level of domestic savings in the developing countries is behaviourally 
related not only to the level of national income but also to the level of 
net foreign capital inflow. It is a simple aggregative model of an 
economy, and is based on standard macro-economic relationships to 
evaluate the role of foreign capital in economic development. The 
behavioural equation is specified as : 
S=a+ bY + cF + dE +u 
where S represents ex-ante gross domestic savings as distinct from 
ex-post savings. The former is the level of domestic savings that is 
potentially available to the economy but not necessarily always realized. 
Ex-ante and ex-post domestic savings can only be equalized when a 
saving constraint is active; and only then can the behavioural savings 
function be identified from observed time-series data. 
2 
Y, F and E 
represent GDP, foreign capital inflow and export proceeds respectively. 
b, c and d are the marginal propensities to save out of Y, F and E 
respectively and u is the stochastic term. 
The described model assumes that there is a priori knowledge 
that the estimated correlation coefficients b and d are non-negative 
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(i. e. b >, 0 and d -, - 0) and that c is non-positive (i. e. c -_-_ 0). The 
restriction imposed on the value of the coefficient c was basically 
justified by the reason that "if external resources are to be used solely 
in order to augment investment, the rate of domestic savings remains 
unaffected by F, and c equals zero; but to the extent that the external 
resources are intended to augment consumption, c becomes negative". 
3 
In addition to the Introduction of foreign capital inflow as one 
of the determinants of gross domestic savings in a developing country, 
the model incorporates the export sector because, according to 
Weisskopf, of its critical importance to private savings and/or 
government revenues and the significant impact of these on the aggregate 
level of domestic savings. The main argument turns on the estimated 
value of the coefficient c, that is, that part'of domestic savings which 
is explained by foreign capital inflow. A pooled regression analysis 
was carried out on 17 developing countries (see appendix 6) using 
standard UN data. The estimated equation was as follows: 
Sa+0.183Y - 0.227F + 0.176E 
(65.9) (-5.3) (4.6) 
t-ratios are between brackets. In only eight countries was the 
negative value of c significant at the 5% level of significance. The 
.2-2 values of R, R and the significance level for the above equation 
I 
were not reported. 
Since the values of the coefficients b and d were positive and 
that of c was negative, this was consistent with the a prior assumed 
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constraints on the values of each of these coefficients. The estimated 
value of the coefficient c indicated that F had an adverse impact on S. 
Specifically, a unit increase in F resulted in a 0.23 unit fall in S. 
Therefore, the proposition that 'foreign capital inflow supplants rather 
than supplements domestic savings' finds statistical support in 
Weisskopf's work. 
As mentioned before, the above statistical tests were applicable 
only to those developing countries with an active savings constraint. 
In contrast, when a trade limit is dominant, foreign capital inflow should 
act to remove the constraints imposed on further investment by enabling 
the country to import more of the needed capital goods. The impact of 
foreign capital on ex-post domestic savings is, therefore, likely to be 
positive when a trade limit is dominant. However, the post-war 
experience of developing countries had shown that those which faced a 
savings constraint were more numerous than those which faced a trade 
limit. 4 Subsequently, Weisskopf concluded that most developing 
countries are unlikely to face an independent trade limit in the future. 
Accordingly, he cast doubt on the significance attributed to an 
independent trade limit to economic growth suggested by the two-gap 
analysis. 
Weisskopf's empirical analysis leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that foreign capital inflow into developing countries is 
unproductive because it has a negative impact on domestic savings. 
This suggests that foreign aid - which accounts for the largest 
proportion of that capital inflow - should be terminated if it is intended 
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to raise the capacity of the recipient economy to mobilize domestic 
savings. 
8.2. Domestic Saving. s in the Sudan 
The Sudan was classified by the UN as one of the least- 
developed countries. Its per capita income for the years 1971/72 to 
1974/75 respectively was ES. 54.7, ES. 60.0, ES. 81.3 and ES. 
'96.1.5 
The average national savings rates (table 8.1) for the Sudan were 
generally below the rates for comparable categories of countries. Table 
8.1. also shows that while the average rates of national savings of 
developing countries were lower than those of advanced countries, the 
lower-income developing countries had the lowest rates of all. This 
suggests that there is a direct relationship between the level of GDP 
and saving rates. Although the average rates of the Sudan remained on 
the low side relative to other countries, 1970 was exceptional. As 
noted earlier, that year marked the beginning of the Five Year Plan 
which estimated that about half of the necessary development funds 
should come from domestic savings. Measures taken at that time, 
including nationalization, probably contributed to the rise in 1970 in 
the ratio of national savings to the GDP. 
The size of national savings is partly determined by the success 
of official efforts to mobilize domestic resources to finance the 
development programme. To do this effectively requires the development 
of an efficient fiscal and financial system . The latter is composed of 
commercial, savings and specialized banks, post office saving schemes, 
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insurance companies and investment corporations. At present, 
there is an extreme concentration of these institutions in large urban 
areas while hardly any are found in some parts of the country. 
6A 
wider country coverage could help to raise the proportion of private 
savings and to encourage the rural population to deal with modern 
banks making it possible to mobilize small private savings. Domestic 
resources can also be mobilized by the state's encouragement and 
assistance to co-operative societies. In addition to the vital 
services they could provide to the community, the latter can also be 
very effective in attracting small savings. 
In an attempt to mobilize more resources, some commercial 
banks have recently extended their services beyond the Sudanese 
borders to tap the resources of the emigrants working in the Arab 
countries. The state also encourages emigrant Sudanese to transmit 
their savings to the Sudan by offering higher exchange values for 
foreign currencies than the prevailing official exchange rates in addition 
to the existing 'nil-value' licence system. 
7 Thence, the amount of 
inward private transfers of Sudanese working abroad increased from 
CS. 2.1 m. in 197S to ES. 14.0 m. in 1977.8 These added to domestic 
savings and contributed directly to foreign exchange reserves. 
If savings through the budget are to be increased, efforts will 
have to be directed towards the reduction of lavish consumption 
expenditure and to reforming and raising the efficiency of the public 
revenue collecting bodies. In particular, the formation of a broader 
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taxation basis is necessary in that connection. Finally, an 
improvement in the performance of autonomous corporations is required 
so that they can, not only finance their own development plans, but 
also contribute surpluses to support other parts of the developed 
programme. In addition to that, the economy should gain an adequate 
degree of flexibility to transfer an increasing proportion of its savings 
into foreign exchange to pay for imports and also to service foreign debts. 
The above considerations should be taken into account in 
interpreting the results of any econometric test on the determinants of 
domestic savings in the Sudan focusing on the impact of foreign capital 
inflow on the latter. 
The following econometric test designed to determine the impadt 
of foreign aid on domestic savings was carried out: a dominant saving 
constraint was assumed throughout the years 1966-77.9 This 
assumption was based on the conclusions derived from the evaluation of 
the structure of the Sudanese economy in chapter 5 including the 
inability of fiscal measures to create sizeable budget surpluses over 
the past decade as well as the inability of existing financial institutions 
to mobilize a rising level of private savings for development purposes. 
Moreover, the lack of marketing boards to squeeze funds from 
agriculfural husbandry which dominates the Sudanese economy is among 
the prime factors that have contributed to the present low level of 
national savings. The assumption of a saving constraint should not in 
any way be taken to indicate that the country's development progress is 
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hindered by shortages of domestic savings alone, but simply means 
that while both the shortage of saving and of foreign exchange pose 
limits on growth, the former was dominant during the period under 
consideration. 
For calculation purposes, net foreign financial aid is defined 
as the annual gross receipts'from abroad minus gross repayments of 
total debt service. Domestic savings are defined as gross domestic 
capital formation minus the deficit on the current account of the balance 
of payments. The period considered covers the second half of the Ten 
Year Plan (1961/62-1970/71) and the whole of the Five Year Plan period 
(1970/71-1974/75) plus the two years of the Interim Programme of 
Action (1975/76-1976/77). This period witnessed sharp fluctuations 
in the percentage ratios of net foreign financial aid to GDP as can be 
seen from table 8.2. In addition to the support of the development 
programme, foreign assistance was provided for other purposes, 
particularly to support the balance of payments and the ordinary budget. 
8.3. The Statistical Results and their Interpretations 
Domestic savings were regressed on GDP, net foreign financial 
aid and export proceeds. F represents net foreign financial aid and 
the other symbols represent the different variables as was stated 
earlier in this chapter. The regression analysis resulted in the 
I 
following saving function for the period 1966-77: - 
10 
Sa+0.085Y - 0.209F + 0.029E R20.979 (2.842) (-1.112) (0.091) 2 
R 0.948 
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According to the above equation, there had been a negative correlation 
between S and. F in the sense that a unit increase in the latter resulted 
in a 0.21 unit fall in the former. However, this estimate is not 
statistically significant. 
The same analysis was pursued on only two independent 
variables CY and F) eliminating E from the specified equation because 
of the insignificance of the value of its correlation coefficient in the 
above estimate and the fact that it is one of the components of GDP. 
The regression analysis produced the following result: - 
Sa+0.088Y - 0.220F R20.979 
(13.257) (-1.597) 
1ý2 0.953 
According to the above estimate, a unit increase in F resulted in a 
0.22 unit fall in S, but this is only significant at the 10% level. It 
became clearly evident that the inclusion of E in the first estimate did 
not significantly improve the explanation. For this reason, it would 
be appropriate to specify S in terms of Y and F only. But since the 
explanatory power of Y was quite significant, the inclusion of other 
independent variables (in this case F) did not improve the estimate. 
We conclude from the above analysis that the proposition that 
the inflow of foreign aid into developing countries has a negative impact 
on domestic savings does not find statistically significant support for 
the Sudan. This means that we cannot infer causation between these 
two variables. The critics of foreign aid programmes produced similar 
statistical findings to substantiate their arguments that the former Ld 
232 
hampered the mobilization of domestic resources for developmental 
purposes. They suggested that the provision of foreign aid funds to 
the developing countries had distorted the process of economic 
development rather than supported it as should be the case. The 
adverse effects on the recipient economy would be reflected by the 
reduction of total domestic savings, by the accompanying distortion of 
development priorities, and by the persistence of unmaintainable 
patterns of consumption which are difficult to reverse. The ultimate 
outcome could be a delayed attainment of a self -sustained growth rate. 
In my view, any final judgement on these matters in relation to the 
Sudan should take into consideration the particular characteristics of 
the period under discussion and the end-use of foreign aid funds. 
The period under review was characterized by a relative degree 
of political instability, ranging from a military take-over in 1969 to 
later armed confrontations between the new regime and the opposing 
political factions all of which had important economic repercussions. 
The structure of the economy was slightly altered in 1970 in favour of 
an enlargement of the public sector. At that time, the banking system 
was brought under public ownership and the insurance market was 
re-organized under five Sudanese companies. In addition, foreign trade 
in main products came under state control. The twelve-year period can , 
be roughly divided into three more or less distinct economic phases: 
1966-69,1970-73 and 1974-77. 
The first phase (1966-69) witnessed a relatively modest level of 
foreign aid inflow in the Sudan and was characterized by two main 
233 
features: - W The United States of American halted its aid programme 
to the Sudan because of the break in the diplomatic representation 
between the two countries and this reduced the total size of foreign 
assistance to the Sudan. (ii) The Sudan experienced an IMF 
stabilization programme to restore internal and external balances to 
the economy. The IMF extended a two-phase loan on condition that 
the govemment should take the appropriate measures to curb public 
expenditure and to reduce its ýorrowing requirements. This marked 
the first time that a major foreign loan was used for non-developmental 
purposes. 
The second phase (1970-73) was characterized by a new regime 
coming to power, an increase of the state's grip on the productive 
sectors of the economy and a draft of a five-year plan resting on 
ambitious projections of both domestic savings and foreign aid. At 
the end of this phase, there was a significant change in the attitudes 
of the regime in international'relations. The political instability that 
characterized this period had contributed to a relatively low level of 
foreign aid, which was at its ever lowest level in 1973. 
The third phase (1974-77) started with the highest level of 
foreign assistance ever witnessed in the Sudan so far. 1974 was 
primarily characterized by a large balance of payments deficit. Among 
the measures implemented to reverse that situation was to obtain cash 
loans mostly from the Arab members of OPEC and for the first time the 
Sudan obtained a 200 million Euro-dollar loan. This high level of 
foreign aid coincided with lower levels of both export revenue and 
domestic savings than was in 1973. In fact a large proportion of aid 
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funds was used to finance imports. Though this trend did not 
continue during the rest of the period, the level of foreign aid remained 
well above previous years. 
It can be seen, therefore, that the period under review was 
not characterized by a stable package of consistently operated policies 
which could be expected to have contributed to a systematic behaviour 
of both savings and foreign aid inflow, and henceforth a meaningful 
statistical relationship could be established between them. On. the 
contrary, the inflow of foreign aid had been frequently interrupted by 
non-economic factors and its size did not follow a steady pattern. 
Sharp annual fluctuations occurred in officially reported aid figures 
making it difficult to establish any meaningful relationship between 
these and other variables. 
Domestic savings originate from both public and private 
activities. During this period, the public sector had been involved in 
almost all productive economic activities and so its performance in 
this area had an important influence on the final outcome. More 
specifically, the level of national savings was largely determined by 
the success of government's efforts to create a considerable budget 
surplus. However, the ordinary budget surplus was less than 10 percent 
of total government revenue over the period under review as was revealed 
earlier in chapter S. In this connection, the low productivity in the 
state -controlled agricultural, industrial and services activities had a 
considerable impact on the level of public savings. 
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In Papanek's 
11 
criticism of the hypothesis of Weisskopf and 
others about the impact of aid on recipients' savings, he pointed out 
that low-saver developing countries (i. e. those that save 9 percent of the 
their GDP or less) received higher levels of aid than that received by 
high-saver ones (i. e. those that savb 18 percent of their GDP or more) 
during the 1960's. Table 8.3. shows that although the Sudan was one 
of the exceptionally low-saver developing countries, according to 
Papanek's classification, its level of net foreign aid fell well below 
the average of the six low-saver developing countries. This supports 
the argument presented in our analysis of the overall position of aid 
in the Sudan; namely, that the country seemed to have received*less 
aid throughout the specified period by comparison with similar 
develqpirxj countries. In this case, the criterion for comparison being 
the saving ratio to GDP and the specific comparison being with the 
average of six low-saver developing countries. 
Papanek presented the above evidence to support his argument 
that although high levels of foreign assistance coincided with low 
levels of domestic savings in some countries, the causal relationship 
was rather that low levels of the latter caused high inflow of the former 
and not vice versa. More specifically, the statistical tests which 
produced a negative relationship between foreign aid and domestic 
W 
savings should be seen in connection with the circumstances of the 
particular economy and the behavioural pattern of its national savings. 
The appropriate question should then be: had the low saver developing 
countries (which received a relatively higher level of aid than their 
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counterparts at high saving levels) shown signs of raising the levels 
of their national savings? Data provided by Papanek on South Korea 
-a country which received large amounts of aid - showed that its 
saving rate in the 1960's was substantially higher than that was in the 
1950's. It seems by contrast that foreign aid inflow into the Sudanese 
economy was a direct response to low levels of national savings, but 
there was no causal relationship between these two variables as the 
statistical findings might indicate. However inconclusive these are, 
this in no way detracts from the importance of attempts to make a more 
effective use of foreign aid funds to supplement domestic resources. 
There are a number of issues which have to be considered in 
relation to the Sudan: - (i) the size of aid in relation to GDP; (ii) the 
end-use of financial aid; (iii) the determinants of the saving function. 
(i) The size of net foreign financial aid remained below 2 percent 
on average in relation to GDP during the period 1966-77 (see table 8.2. ). 
This suggests that the Sudan did not receive relatively larger amounts of 
foreign assistance that could have a significant impact on the level of 
domestic savings. It is clearly evident from the statistical estimates 
that GDP had explained a considerably large proportion of domestic 
savings during the specified period. This suggests that other explanatory 
variables, such as the size of foreign aid, had little direct impact on the 
latter. 
(ii) As was revealed in preceding chapters, aid was directed to 
finance development projects and to overcome certain immediate economic 
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difficulties. The latter included aid for the finance of the current 
account deficit and for domestic consumption purposes such as the 
'anti-thirst campaign' and resettlement programmes. Even though 
parts of aid had been invested in sound development projects; the 
latter were either large scale agricultural projects with relatively long 
gestation periods or agro-related industries. In both of these cases, 
the ultimate impact on the economy was yet to be seen. In connection 
with the present statistical results, it should be borne in mind that the 
impact of the latter investments on savings could come through the 
eventual rise in the level of GDP, as the latter has been seen to be 
the major contributor to savings. 
(Iii) Savings in the Sudan were primarily determined by GDP, 
suggesting that any act of consumption was not necessarily an act of 
dis-saving as the simple aggregate income model would indicate. This 
could explain the negative correlation coefficient between savings and 
aid since parts of the latter were not, in any sense, directly related 
to the former. However, aid for consumption purposes could have 
long-term positive effects on development and could help to release 
domestic resources that would otherwise be redirected from the development 
budget to meet such consumption needs. Also, it cannot be too strongly 
emphasized that a stable economic system is a necessary condition for 
the mobilization of domestic resources for developmental purposes, and 
from this point of view, the contribution of consumption aid may, in a 
broader prospective, be invaluable. 
10 
238 
To sum up, the regression analysis to determine the 
relationship between savings and aid produces a negative correlation 
coefficient between these two variables but it is statistically 
insignificant. It also shows that GDP is the prime determinant of I 
savings in the Sudan. Hence, the statistical evidence is inconclusive 
to support the proposition that aid should be suspended either because 
it had not supplemented domestic savings at all or because it supplanted 
a proportion of it. 
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TABLE 8.1. 
Average National Savings as Percentage of GDP for Categories of 
Countries compared with the Sudan 
Categories of Countries 1965 1970 1973 
Industrialized Countries 22.8 23.2 23.8 
Developing Countries 19.4 18.5 19.5 
High-income Developing 19.4 18.5 19.5 
Countries 
Low-income Developing 12.6 13.1 12.8 
Countries 
African Countries 14.7- 16.9 20.8 
Sudan 9.5 16.8 11.9 
Source: World Bank, World Tables 1976, John Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, pp. 480-3. 
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TABLE 8.2. 
Net Foreign Financial Aid as a Percentage of GDP in the Sudan, 1966-77 
Years % Ratios* Increase or Decrease over the previous Year 
1966 2.9 
1967 1.5 
1968 0.9 
1969 1.7 
1970 0.5 
1971 0.8 + 
1972 0.9 -r 
1973 0.1 
1974 6.8 -1" 
1975 1.9 
1976 1.2 
1977 1.5 + 
Period 
Average 1.7 
Source: Department of Statistics and Bank of Sudan Annual 
Reports 1966-77, Khartoum. 
Figures are to the nearest one-decimal point. 
indicates a decrease 
+ indicates an increase 
243 
TABLE 8.3. 
Savings and Net Aid Ratios: * A Comparison between some 
Developing Countries and the Sudan for the 1960's 
Particulars Savings Net Aid 
10 High-saver Developing 23.2 0.4 
Countries" 
6 Low-saver Developing 4.3 7.8 
Countries" 
Sudan*** 8.8 1 
1.8 
Source: Papanek, G. F. (1972); The Effects of Aid and Other 
Resource Transfers on Savings and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries, ET, Vol. 83, table V, p. 946. 
For the Sudan see table 8.2. 
Percentage ratios of GDP 
Average ratios 
Average ratio for 1966-69. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Towards an Effective Management of Foreign Aid Funds 
in Recipient Countries 
The advocates of foreign aid usually recommend that part of 
such funds should be extended in the form of technical assistance 
which includes the training of personnel inside the recipient country 
and/or abroad, and seconding expatriates to make up for the short-term 
shortages in high-skill jobs and senior consultative and administrative 
posts. In the latter case, foreign expatriates might act as advisors on 
various issues. Enormous difficulties are encountered in estimating the 
appropriate size and form of foreign technical assistance programme for 
a given country. This basically originates from the inadequacy of 
information on the recipient country's manpower structure and composition 
on which its foreign requirement could be estimated. This issue has two 
dimensions: the administrative machine and the skill requirement. This 
chapter. emphasizes the importance of establishing an effective 
development planning machine and in particular a foreign aid management 
system in a country which seeks significant foreign participation in its 
development finance. The next chapter will discuss the problems 
associated with manpower requirement and the role of technical 
assistance in this context. 
9.1. The Dimensions of the Problem 
Both donors and recipients of foreign aid recognize the necessity 
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of having a well-trained and a competent staff to assume the 
responsibilities of carrying out the development programme. This is 
partly reflected by the effectiveness and efficiency of the different 
institutional bodies involved in the various stages of the development 
process. The capacity and scope of the development planning machinery 
have a great impact on the various stages of a development programme; 
beginning with preliminary investigations and feasibility studies and 
ending up with completed projects. The scope of the development 
planning machine should therefore be broad enough to include specialists 
from the directly interrelated disciplines such as agricultural, industrial 
and transport economists, engineers, veterinarians ... e tc. The f inal 
judgement on the effectiveness of the planning machinery will be broadly 
based on what it carries out in relation to what it is entrusted to do. 
Its functions differ among developing countries with mixed economies. 
They range from fully-fledged executive functions to a limited advisory 
role. 
The following analysis is an attempt to formulate the requirements 
of an effective foreign aid management system in a developing country. 
As mentioned before, it is to be discussed in the general framework of 
a development planning machine. It is one of the aspects of foreign aid 
that has not been adequately treated in the literature, although of 
critical importance to the success of aid-financed activities. 
Methods of project financing are, perhaps, one of the main 
problems that face the planning authorities in developing countries. This 
is because although resources are limited there. are often political 
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pressures to formulate ambitious development programmes. In fact, 
such projections may be based on implausible assumptions about. the 
future behaviour of the aggregate economic variables such as domestic 
savings, foreign trade, inflation and above all, the level of foreign 
capital inflow into the country. At the end of the plan period, the 
country may find that either the rate of fulfilment is below the projections 
or that development priorities have been distorted because certain 
variables had not responded favourably or some unforeseen circumstances 
1 
surrounded the economy during the plan period, for instance, war. 
Such discrepancies may also be due to the unreliability of some basic 
data or in some instances its absolute absence and so the projection is 
only an official "guess -estimate. " 
The projection of foreign resources requirement during a specified 
time period should be based on the size of the potential gaps between 
domestic resources that would be expected to be available for development 
financing and the total investment required for the achievement of a 
target growth rate. This also includes a projection of foreign exchange 
requirement and the anticipated proceeds from exports and other dealings 
with the outside world. If foreign capital inflow fills these gaps, foreign 
exchange itself should not be a constraint to achieving the target growth 
rate, if other predictions are correct. Considering the economic 
situation of individual countries and their level of development, the 
relatively poorer developing countries typically envisage that substantial 
proportions of foreign resources can be acquired on relatively soft terms 
and/or grants., Of course, the factors that practically influence the 
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magnitude of foreign participation in financing a development programme 
at a given time period are very diverse: ranging from economic and 
commercial considerations to political, historical and some other factors. 
But although the projection of foreign capital inflow might be based on 
reasonable assumptions on the impact of these variables on the economy, 
things may dramatically change. This is particularly relevant to 
countries with unstable economic systems. 
Therefore, even though development programmes might have 
been formulated on sound economic bases and donors were willing to 
participate at the forecasted levels, the whole process may be disrupted 
by some exogenous variables that have no direct relevance to the 
development process itself. The successful completion of the development 
programme then depends on the ability of the country to reduce the adverse 
effects of these factors (for instance, the discontinuity of foreign support 
for a given project). This largely depends on the efficiency and 
capability of the development planning machineryand in particular that 
dealing with foreign aid. to switch resources. In this connection it 
seems important to establish an autonomous administrative unit within 
the general framework of the planning body in order to more effectively 
mobilize foreign support for the country's development programme. Also 
in this connection, the maintenance of an up-to-date record on the 
particulars of foreign loans such as commitments, disbursement, arising 
debt-service obligations and the over-all position of outstanding foreign 
debt is vital for purposes of long-term planning, budgetary projections 
and balance of payments management. Such information is indispensable 
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for constructing a debt profile for the country, which is a tool with 
important practical uses. 
The above analysis suggests the importance of establishing a 
central body that would be given responsibilities of seeking various 
sources of loans, negotiating loan terms, following-up disbursement 
and finally of monitoring debt-servicing. All this is vital since 
deficient information on foreign loans is likely to lead to unreliable 
projection of future inflow of foreign aid and debt service repayments, 
and certainly to unreasonable development targets. If one particular 
donor contributes significant proportions of the total foreign aid to a 
given country, then special administrative arrangements established as 
a result of mutual agreement between both sides may be appropriate. 
Such arrangements could facilitate the monitoring of aid programmes as 
is the case between Britain and Kenya. 
2 
A development loan can be considered to pass through three main 
stages: negotiation, use and repayment. The last two stages may 
overlap, as will be seen later. The following paragraphs examine these 
stages, account the problems incurred during each of them and then 
focus on the implications of that on the effective use of foreign funds. 
After the necessary feasibility studies are carried out 
satisfactorily and the project is formulated into its final form (and its 
foreign exchange component had been determined), the first step is to 
seek firm commitments from potential foreign supporters. In most cases, 
the project itself would be formulated under the advice of foreign 
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experts and hence the potential donor (or group of donors) may* have 
already been committed to provide technical assistance and part or all 
of its foreign exchange component. The stage of technical negotiations 
and the conclusion of the loan terms are normally the responsibility of 
the specific corporation in the case of further development in an 
existing establishment or of the administrative body of the new project. 
In general, this is the practice in the Sudan at the present time as far 
as public or publicly-guaranteed foreign'loans are concerned. An 
important issue in this connection is to seek foreign sources of finance 
that are willing to extend their support on terms that are appropriate 
for the particular type of project. 
(ii) The second and perhaps most important stage is drawing 
on the approved funds in accordance with the terms, conditions and 
time schedule that have been agreed. Drawings on a development 
loan are distributed over the implementation period of the project, and 
successive instalment drawing may be conditional on the completion of 
a certain phase. This may not be entirely true in the case of a loan 
which is wholly devoted to the purchase of basic capital goods to take 
place at the very start of the project. Even in such cases, however, 
capital goods may be required at different phases of the project 
implementation and each phase would depend on the completion of its 
predecessor. 
During this second stage, a discrepancy between scheduled and 
actual drawings (commitments and disbursement) may take place if some 
unanticipated bottlenecks, such as the inadequacy of complementary 
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inputs or the inefficiency of other supporting sectors (for instance, 
transport), emerge. Such complications which lead to delays in 
completing the project will result in a growing size of undisbursed 
balances. Also, during this stage it is necessary to follow-up the 
utilization of foreign funds to ensure that they have been effectively 
used in accordance with the plan. This helps to avoid un-intended 
switching of foreign funds among the different requirements of a 
project and most importantly between different projects. During this 
phase, donors usually require regular 'progress reports' from the 
recipient country. Such reports can either come from the executing 
authorities, from foreign expertise or from the donors own representatives 
who can inspect the project sites and report to their governments or 
institutions. A satisfactory completion of a given project despite 
hindrances assists in developing a good reputation for the country 
concerned, and might encourage more donors to participate in future 
projects. Success will also have a positive impact on debt-servicing 
particularly in cases where projects are direct revenue -yielding. These 
are the situations where projects would either directly contribute to 
export revenues or substitute imports. 
An effective and capable management during. the implementation 
phase of a project is essential to ensure the continuity of resource 
supplies to the project by seeking alternative sources of financing if 
one or more complementary inputs were inadequate or that some donors 
fail to honour their commitments. Such management flexibility is crucial 
for successful completion of the project because resources may fall 
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below the required levels during implementation when substantial 
resources have already been spent on the particular project. Also - 
depending on the terms of individual loans - debt-service repayments 
may be due at a time when the project is yet. to produce (if that is the 
case) and hence repayments will have to be arranged from other sources 
or perhaps by seeking new arrangements with the relevant donors. 
(iii) The third and final phase in the story of a loan (not 
necessarily that of a project) would be when its instalments are repaid 
unless its altered terms do not require that. At the present time, the 
question of debt-servicing capacity of developing countries is one of the 
most important issues of foreign aid. However, 'the more disappointing 
the development experience is (projects failure), the more one can 
expect foreign debt crises'. Although'this is generally true, in some 
cases difficulties in debt-servicing are caused by other factors such as 
the terms of the loans. But the success of any loan-financed project 
is normally partly a function of the over-all performance of the economy 
and however good in itself the management and performance of the 
particular project may be, it may not entirely succeed if the general ' 
performance of the economy is poor. As mentioned before, the 
management of the debt arising from loans to a given project must depend 
on the nature of that project, specifically on whether it is a direct 
revenue -yielding activity or not. In the latter case, other activities or 
sources would have to pay for servicing the arising debt. 
If foreign aid-financed projects are administered and evaluated 
in the manner outlined above, the recipient country could acýieve various 
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objectives: - (i) An indicative categorization of foreign loans' uses 
according to the nature of the projects and their present and potential 
contribution to the economy could be established. This will assist in 
finding donors' support for the different types of projects on the 
appropriate terms because individual donors may have an interest in 
certain types of development activities in developing countries. This 
would help in presenting the appropriate types of projects to the relevant 
donors. (ii) It would give indications of the magnitude of foreign 
indebtedness and the sectors and/or projects that are likely to contribute 
to annual debt-service repayments. It would also help to indicate the 
extent of the economy's capacity to use effectively and to service 
foreign loans, that is, the size of foreign indebtedness that the economy 
can accommodate without disrupting its development programmes. 
(iii) It would show the areas or activities where deficiencies have taken 
place and help to establish the factors behind that. This is one of the 
main ingredients in the attempts to avoid projects' failures and overcome 
these difficulties in future. (iv) Such scrutiny would result in keeping 
an up to-date and available record of the various types of loans, amounts 
of disbursement (rates of utilization), amounts due for repayments and . 
an over-all picture on the position of foreign borrowing. This would 
make it easier to predict (with some degree of accuracy) the future 
magnitude of foreign indebtedness. 
The above general analysis is also applicable in the case of 
the Sudan. However, the following section will focus on those issues 
which are particularly relevant to the Sudan at the present time and will 
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then suggest - in the light of the above discussions - the areas where 
reform may be critically needed. 
9.2. The Present Practice in the Sudan and Recommendations 
for Reform 
The Sudan - like most developing countries - created a 
development planning commission to be in charge of the country's 
development strategy by formulating successive plans in accordance 
with the future needs and the available resources. The resource 
requirement of these plans will be partly met by foreign participation in 
various forms. The predicted source and sector distribution of future 
foreign funds has been guided by three considerations*. - (i) The carry-over 
projects from previous plans has been assumed to continue with the 
support of the original donors, although unanticipated delays may in some 
instances, increase the initially estimated costs of these projects. 
In the latter case, it would be necessary to seek new sources of 
financing if the original supporters were unwilling to extend more 
resources. Also some projects would be implemented in distinct phases 
(such as El Rahad project) and hence the new development projections 
assumed that such projects would continue to find support from the 
already committed donors. (ii) A large part of envisaged foreign aid is 
broadly based on preliminary commitments from different donors. In 
fact, some of these donors undertake to conduct the necessary feasibility 
studies and to support the particular project. (iii) In the case of 
projects other than the above two categories (that is, those which lack 
initial foreign support), the planners may consider that there seems to be 
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reasonable general prospect of mobilizing foreign support for them 
during the Plan period. 
The above categories of projects which need different levels of 
foreign support form the basis on which the required size of loans would 
be projected. Of course, there is allowance for private foreign capital 
participation but this is determined by different factors. Proj ections 
may not necessarily be realized and an evaluation at the end of the 
Plan period may reveal discrepancies between the actual and the 
envisaged size of foreign aid, as was revealed in previous chapters. 
All these projections can hardly be realized in the absence of an 
effective administrative system to co-ordinate between the different 
beneficiaries of foreign loans and to ensure the effective use of these 
funds. 
The administration of foreign loans in the Sudan lies with three 
distinct bodies; namely, the National Planning Commissi. o, The Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy and the Bank of Sudan. 
3 
The Foreign 
Loans Section in the National Planning Commission is responsible to 
keep a record of the utilized amounts of foreign loans from developed 
market economies, multi-lateral agencies and suppliers' credits to the 
government. (This does not include fiscally autonomous government 
enterprises such as the Gezira Board). The Planning Commission 
therefore oversees nearly all direct government development loans and 
grants. The Bank of Sudan maintains data on drawings from cash loans 
and the borrowing from Centrally Planned Economies, Middle Eastern 
and the Arab countries. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
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provides estimates of the envisaged foreign capital inflow during each 
fiscal year and also an estimation of the annual debt-service obligations. 
These estimates are based on information from both the Planning 
Commission and the Bank of Sudan on the amounts and terms of foreign 
loans. 
The Bank of Sudan is in charge of the mechanism of actual debt- 
service repayments. The estimates of the Ministry qf Finance and the 
amounts it approves to be repaid do not coincide with the actual 
repayments of the Bank of Sudan because the latter authorizes the 
effective payments and this depends on the position of foreign exchange 
at the particular time. Such discrepancies can be avoided if the two 
bodies exchange information more often and on regular bases. - 
There are certain loans of relatively small amounts that are 
normally negotiated between international donors and the Sudanese 
beneficiary enterprises within a framework of a general agreement 
between the specific donor and the government. A World Bank mission 
report stated that neither the government (probably, referring to the 
Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission) nor the Bank of Sudan 
have complete information on the final agreements and the terms of such 
loans. 4 But since all foreign exchange spending is subject tcx official 
control and all transmissions will necessarily have to be conducted 
through the Bank of Sudan, the latter will certainly be informed when the 
first instalment of debt-service is due. These loans are generally 
'tied aid' acquired by the fiscally autonomous enterprises and their 
disbursement may depend on shipment facilities or certain phased 
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completion of a given project rather than dates of commitment. 
However, this may also be true for most types of tied aid. 
From this description of the situation in the Sudan, the most 
salient feature of the present administration system is clearly the 
absence of a centralized body that would provide information on the 
different aspects of foreign aid and its magnitude. Chart I outlines 
the responsibilities of the different bodies with regard to foreign aid. 
Information provided by these establishments concern only public and 
publ icly- guaranteed loans and there is noticeable absence of information 
on private loans that might be acquired by private firms without the 
backing of official guarantees. Information on the latter, although 
crucial to any comprehensive study of outstanding foreign indebtedness 
of a country, are inadequately reported in most developing countries. 
The reconciliation of data from different establishments involved 
in seeking, using and repaying foreign loans is one of the main factors 
that necessitate the establishment of an effective foreign aid 
administration at recipient countries' levels. This will be of utmost 
value for long-term projections of the magnitude and direction of foreign 
aid and the implications of that on annual debt-service repayments. It 
will also eliminate unnecessary duplication and over-lapping of 
information. The need for such information increases with the rising 
level of outstanding debt and the growing need for further foreign 
f inancing. In addition to that, the country will benefit because it can 
assess the impact of international initiatives regarding developing 
countries indebtedness on its own position. 
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The compilation and analysis of foreign aid data should be 
entrusted with one of the existing establishments, for instance, Bank 
of Sudan or the Planning Commission. In addition to this, there is a 
need to establish a flexible administration system to control the 
spending of foreign funds in the public sector to depict any shortcomings 
and accordingly to recommend alternative options. In other words, the 
neW body will ensure that foreign resources are spent according to plan 
rather than switched to some other unplanned outlays. So, the spending 
enterprises or bodies will not be left to disburse development f unds 
contrary to that specified in the national plan. Particularly important 
in this connection is that the proposed administration machine can 
serve to assess the progress of the different development projects and 
to recommend re-allocation of resources if that is deemed necessary. 
As an independent body, it can also ensure that a satisfactory progress 
towards achievement of the country's development targets is being 
maintained at all levels. This administration body can be named 
'Foreign Financing Commission'. . It will also be in a position to gather 
information on foreign private investment and private loans, and play 
the role described earlier in this chapter with regard to the importance 
of an effective management system to deal with foreign funds in capital- 
receiving developing countries. 
This section has focussed on two main issues concerning foreign 
aid; namely, the consolidation of data and the control of spending. 
The former will serve many purposes particularly a long-term projection 
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of the foreign debt and the latter can help to reduce the inefficiencies 
in using foreign funds. Both will help the country to achieve its 
development targets and to use available foreign resources more 
effectively. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Manpower Resources, Foreign Technical Assistance 
and Emigration from the Sudan 
It is an established theme in the development literature that 
unless both capital and human resources are developed simultaneously, 
" developing economy will not be capable of achieving and maintaining 
" self-supported growth rate. Investment in human capital broadly 
refers to spending on education, training, health . .. etc. to raise the 
size and skills of manpower to carry out the different phases of the 
development programme efficiently. The two-gap analysis suggests 
that a developing economy is likely to be constrained during the early 
phases of development by its existing absorptive capacity. This could 
prove to be among the main hindrances to development for an appreciable 
period of time. The limited extent of absorptive capacity partly 
manifests itself in shortage of skilled and adequately trained manpower 
who are an indispensable input into the production process. In the light 
of these considerations, it is not surprising to find that significant 
proportions of foreign aid to developing countries are extended in the 
form of technical assistance with a view to expand and to broaden the 
bases of recipient economies. 
The following sections will consider the manpower requirement 
in accordance with the Six-year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) projections, 
will assess the role of foreign technical assistance and will examine the 
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recent phenomenon of emigration from the Sudan. 
10.1. Manpower Requirement for the long-term Developmen 
Strategy of the Sudan 
The concept of "forecasting manpower requirement is today 
the leading method throughout the world for integrating educational 
and economic planning. " 
I*A 
country forecasts its long-term manpower 
requirement because of the length of the timv normally required to 
produce skilled and adequately trained working force. This enables 
countries to redirect their educational systems in a manner which would 
serve the long-term manpower needs in accordance with the stated 
development objectives. 
Manpower forecasting is a function of various elements - The 
most prominent among these is the formal system of education that 
exists at a given time period. The forecast will be based on the in-take 
and the turn-out at each schooling level and the category classification 
of higher education graduates. The critical issue is to strike a balance 
between the anticipated future demand for each manpower category and 
its potential supply in order to avoid a situation of sharp discrepancies 
between the supply ofand the demand for certain skills and/or 
qualifications. The contribution of formal education to the total 
manpower input is crucial because the total mix of the latter would be 
, influenced by the output of the former. 
Other elements include work experience and off-the-job 
training as distinct from on-the-job training. The former is usually 
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provided for those whose formal education was not completed. By 
contrast, the latter takes place either within the particular 
establishment or outside depending on the size of the labour force in 
individual establishments and their training programmes. The purpose 
of these training schemes is to raise the productivity of the labour 
force and to prepare for future needs. 
The capacities of individual developing countries to pursue 
adequate manpower forecasts are limited by the relative degrees of 
imperfection in labour markets and the unreliability of information on 
their structure and the composition of supply and demand. The 
development programme may not require relatively large numbers of 
highly skilled and trained manpower in its early stages (since demand 
is relatively low, temporary shortages could be avoided by using foreign 
experts and foreign technical assistance), but as development proceeds, 
there will be a growing demand for such skills. This pattern will be 
clearly seen when capital -intensive modes of production which require 
high skills dominate the development spectrum. However, when a 
country's development programme is impeded by shortages of manpower, 
the other complementary inputs will be redundant. But this may not be 
the case, if the given economy possesses an adequate degree of 
flexibility that enables it to transform its production modes in a manner 
that can overcome the impact of human resources' shortage. 
A Iternatively, foreign technical assistance is essential as a short- or 
medium-term relief measure, but in the long-run the domestic jabour 
market should respond to the development requirements. However, a 
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resort to foreign technical assistance to make up for the short-falls 
may not be a once -and -for-a 11 need, but the former may prove to be 
of critical Importance at different levels during the successive 
development stages. 
On the basis of the first (1955/56) census, and the then 
forecasted growth rate, Sudan's population in 1979/80 would have been 
20 million. But on the basis of the second (1973) census, and the 
actual growth rate recorded since 1955/56, the population in 1979/80 
would be less than 17 million. 
2 
The economically -active population 
was well above 4 million in 1969/70 compared with over 5 million in 
1976/77. Table 10.1. shows that the over-all rate of increase of 
manpower during'the Amended 5 year Plan (1970/71-1976/77) was 22.8 per 
percent. The agricultural sector and related activities increased its 
manpower by about one-fifth being the lowest rate compared with the 
other main activities. This reflects the growing size of the industrial 
sector and also the magnitude of rural-urban migration. The size of 
economically-active population that were absorbed by the industrial 
sector had increased by 35.8 percent over the mentioned period and this 
was the highest rate comparable to that of other sectors. 
The modem activities were drawing labour from the industrial 
informal sector and from traditional agriculture. This is so, because 
the unclassified categories of labour (others) increased by less than the 
total average and their proportion in the total decreased from 6.7 to 6.4 
percent. . These modern activities include industry, construction, 
transport and electricity supplies. The proportional distribution of 
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manpower also reflects the emphasis on developing basic infrastructure 
in transport and communications, building and construction, electricity 
and water supplies ... etc. 
In addition, table 10.1. provides an aggregate estimate of the 
anticipated demand for manpower according to a broad classification 
of the main activities of the economy from 1976/77, the base yearto 
1982/83, the target year. This forecast is based on a 7.5 percent 
target growth rate for the whole economy. Individual sectors' 
estimated demand for manpower reflects their present position in relation 
to the national economy and their envisaged future contribution which 
is shown by the Plan's emphasis and the relative allocation of 
development funds. In this connection, it will be recalled that the 
main theme of the 6-year Plan is the provision of infrastructure and 
raising the growth of the industrial sector. 
With the exception of agricultural activities, the demand for 
manpower over the Plan's period is expected to grow at rates ranging 
from 46.9 percent in the case of services to 93.6 percent in the case of 
building and construction. The highest demand increases are expected 
to be in industry, construction and electricity supplies. Generally, 
these activities employ a small proportion of manpower at the present 
time., but are expected to make an effective contribution to future 
employment partly by transforming their present structure onto modern 
bases. However, their manpower requirement certainly depends on the 
level of capital-intensity in each of these sectors which itself depends 
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on the choice of technology. In general, these sectors include the 
economic activities that normally require highly-skilled and trained 
manpower relative to the others. 
Table 10.1. also raises two important issues: - the declining 
size of the informal sector as development proceeds and the proportionate 
decline of manpower to be employed in agriculture and related 
activities in future. 
(i) The informal sector lies on the boundaries between industry 
and agriculture and acquires a mix of characteristics from both. As 
demand for manpower increases, it'could be expected to become oiie 
of the main suppliers of labour force to the emerging modern activities 
and for the traditional sources of employment. High levels of demand 
may result in a rate of labour outflow from the informal sector that is 
greater than the rate of inflow into it and this is expected to take place 
during the 6-year Plan. It is estimated that its size should shrink by 
about one-fifth at the end of the Plan period. 
(ii) As for the agricultural sector, it is expected that the 
process of modernization and mechanization that is taking place should 
reduce the over-all relative proportion of manpower requirement of this 
sector, however, the demand should increase by one-fifth in absolute 
terms. The over-all rate of increase in demand for classified skills 
and training levels is anticipated to be 27.3 percent in relation to 
1976/77. This rate is held low because of the expected contraction of 
the size of the informal sector and the projected low rate of increase in 
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agricultural employment. The forecast of demand for manpower can 
only be realized if the development targets of individual sectors are 
achieved. 
On the supply side of manpower, many factors must be taken 
into account to arrive at final estimates. (i) The in-take and the 
turn-out of the formal system of education at different levels - from the 
basic primary schools to the very top academic and technical education - 
constitute the basis of the potential supply of manpower. (ii) The 
supply of highly educated professional and technical manpower is a 
function of the existing structure of higher education. The anticipated 
demand for particular types of skills requires alterations in the present 
composition of higher education. (iii) The composition of demand 
requires certain basic formal qualifications in addition to the subsequent 
training in technical or professional institutions. Such a relationship 
between educational levels and occupations means that a certain 
pattern of supply has to be maintained if, future demand is to be met. 
Therefore, in a country where education is substantially financed and 
also controlled by the state, only policies designed to influence the 
composition of its turn-out will reduce the discrepancies between its 
over-all supply and the potential demand, especially for those 
particularly needed skills and qualifications. (iv) The potential supply 
of manpower must be projected on the anticipated turn-out of the 
different educational institutions, training programmes, size of annual 
retirement, up-grading and promotions, mobility between different 
activities and between public and private sectors and the magnitude of 
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emigration from the country. 
Table 10.2. presents an aggregate picture of the forecasted 
requirement of manpower at the end of the 6-year Plan period (1982/83) 
and the anticipated shortages in certain occupational categories. Two 
characteristics deserve mentioning: - (i) Potential supply of manpower 
is envisaged to fall short of demand as one moves up the scale towards 
higher skills. However the apparent excess supply of semi-skilled Is 
insignificant, being below S percent of both supply and demand and 
could be absorbed by training in different skills. (ii) There is an 
apparent excess of supply of graduates from high educational 
institutions (for instance, universities) - particularly in humanities - 
over the present and anticipated future demand if the composition of 
the present turn-out is maintained. It might therefore be concluded on 
the basis of this forecast that the development process in the Sudan is 
likely to be constrained by shortages of skilled and trained manpower. 
However, shortages of certain skills may be overcome by appropriate 
changes in production techniques. The degree of complementary 
between different categories of manpower in a productive unit or a sector 
1 indicates that the absence of some critically important skills will lead 
to lower demand as we move down to the bottom of the ladder. 
The 6-year Plan spoke in broader terms about the pattern of 
manpower requirements and the reasons for the shortfalls of supply over 
anticipated demand, for example, technicians, doctors, engineers etc. 
It relates the present situation in the Sudanese labour market to many 
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factors: - (i) The lack of national educational policies based on the 
future manpower requirement of the country's long-term development 
strategy. In other words, the existing pattern of educational system, 
besides being limited in scope and capacity, is not flexible enough to 
respond to the changing composition of manpower needs. (1i) The 
existing ad hoc system of job allocation with, sometimes, little regard 
to the particular job specifications. (iii) The absence of a 
comprehensive training strategy and the apparent reluctance of some 
establishments (public or private) to engage in manpower training. 
(iv) The lack of effective co-ordination between the different employers 
in the public activities and autonomous enterprises which resulted in 
diverse wages and salaries structure for those doing similar jobs. 
(v) The degree of over-lapping. and duplication between different 
goverrunent units especially in the services sector leading to the 
draining of scarce skills and confusion among users. 
To the extent that the above characterisation of the labour 
market is valid, it could be accompanied by a number of adverse 
consequences: - (i) Lower productivity would be expected in different 
spheres than could be possible. (ii) A situation would arise where 
certain activities are comparably over-crowded with particular skills while 
others suffer critical shortages of these same skills such as engineers. 
(iii) This could result in sizeable unemployment among certain manpower 
categories (for instance, University graduates in humanities), not 
I 
necessarily because their numbers exceed actual demand but largely due 
to the confusion arising from an inadequate specification and allocation 
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of Jobs. (iv) The size of outward emigration will increase adding 
more strains to the already scarce skills. (v) The size of migration 
of skills from the public sector to join the private and joint-venture 
activities for the sake of better job terms will grow. 
Short-term measures to ease the adverse effects of these flaws 
in the labour market might be based on the following measures: - 
(i) The creation of a flexible system of payment that would reduce the 
existing variations in the public and semi-public entities. (ii) The 
introduction of appropriate incentive schemes for public employees so 
that they stay effectively in their jobs. (iii) A-re-organisation of the 
present payment system and re-allocation of jobs within the public 
sector in order to remove duplication. (iv) The creation of pilot 
training schemes in accordance with the requirements of development 
programme s. (v) A resort to international donors to ease the 
shortages in high skills and managerial levels and to develop training 
programmes for other categories. 
In the long-run, a more satisfactory outcome would depend on 
the extent to which the labour market reshapes itself in a manner which 
can provide the required composition of manpower. This should involve: - 
(i) New policies towards the present educational system so as to provide 
the long-term requirement of the economy at various development phases. 
(ii) Most importantly required is the provision of the necessary 
facilities to encourage younger generations to embark on technical 
education and apprenticeship-training programmes in accordance with 
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potential demand. (iii) There is need to develop long-term training 
programmes for different skills. 
The forecasts of future manpower requirement will not be fully 
realized unless the capacity of the economy to provide other necessary 
complementary inputs for the production process is adequate. The 
actual supply of manpower depends on the success of policies designated 
to restructure the labour market so as to satisfy the expected future 
demand. The following section examines the contribution of foreign 
technical assistance to economic development and the extent to which 
it will ease manpower shortages. 
10.2. Foreign Technical Assistance 
Foreign technical assistance is generally regarded as one of 
the least documented items of foreign aid on the recipients' side and 
Sudan is not exceptional in this connection. This is explained by,, 
partly a general deficiency of statistical data on these countries but 
more particularly by the nature of technical assistance programmes 
because they do not normally entail physical capital movements between 
the recipient and the donor countries. This makes it difficult to record 
the nominal values of technical assistance and to assess its contribution 
to the recipient country. 
Technical assistance can be acquired in various forms 
depending on the size and type of shortages in manpower supply in a 
given country. That includes manpower supplementation, advisory and 
'training assistance. 
3 
Manpower supplementation takes two forms: - 
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consultancy on various issues, and expatriates to do professional Jobs 
in areas where the temporarily fixed supply falls short of the effective 
permanent demand. Training assistance may also take place in the 
recipient and/or the donor country or possibly in a third country. The 
above forms of technical assistance may be provided on a grant basis. 
But in some cases, a recipient couhtry may have to pay for such services 
from a financial loan acquired from the home country of the expatriates. 
Also, a bilateral donor may subsidize the expatriates salaries and 
provide them with other incentives. Technical assistance grants are 
perhaps more useful where the purchase of such services involves a 
high foreign exchange component for a country with limited foreign 
exchange earnings. 
The place of technical assistance in foreign aid programmes is 
shown in table 10.3. This shows the size of technical assistance that 
was extended by DAC members of the OECD from 1961 to 1971. The 
percentage of technical assistance in both the total and bilateral ODA 
was on the increase over the specified period. The proportion of ODA 
provided in the form of technical assistance showed an appreciable 
increase in relation to the total amounts of aid and in absolute terms. 
At a time when total ODA from DAC members increased by 49.3 percent 
over the eleven years period under review and that part in the form of 
bilateral aid increased by only 37.3 percent, technical assistance 
increased by 112.8 percent. This reflects the growing need on the part 
of recipient developing countries for foreign technical assistance in 
areas where critical shortages are evident. It also reflects a growing 
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willingness among DAC members to assist developing countries in 
bridging the human resources gap. 
There appears often to be some specific connection between the 
proportions of the different components of foreign aid from different 
sources. In other words, financial and technical assistance are 
usually combined in some proportionate ratios for a given project. Such 
combinations should be determined on the basis of the need of 
individual economies for technical assistance. ' However, a technical 
assistance grant may not be project-oriented, in the sense that it is 
not related to financial aid for the same project or establishment. 
The Sudan has received foreign technical assistance in 
different forms: namely, expatriates in various spheres, grants for 
training manpower at home or abroad, teams of consultants for pursuit 
of feasibility studies, higher education teaching staff ... etc. 
Detailed data on the actual size of technical assistance programmes 
and its money equivalent value is scarce. The Information presented 
here may under-estimate the real value of technical assistance, but, 
despite its flaws, it is probably a reasonably dependable indicator of 
its magnitude. 
Table 10.4. shows that during the years 1965/66-1971/72, 
foreign technical assistance and grants to the Sudan did not exceed 
B. 7 percent of the total development expenditure during any single year 
and the average for the whole period was 5.9 percent, but it showed an 
over-all average of 20.8 percent in relation to the total disbursement of 
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foreign development funds. The main sources of technical assistance 
during this period were international multi-lateral agencies, United 
States of America and the United Kingdom. Technical assistance 
ratios fluctuated in a similar manner to those of development aid 
disbursement although for some years (e. g. 1968/69), they were 
particularly high because development funds were relatively small. 
The proportion of technical assistance and grants in total foreign 
development funds is comparable to the average percentage of technical 
assistance to bilateral ODA by DAC members of 21.4 percent in table 
10.3. 
Sudanese sources provide inadequate information on foreign 
technical assistance. Because of this, donors' data will be used in 
the rest of this section. On the international multi-lateral donors' 
side, "UNDP is the main technical assistance arm of the United 
Nations system and plays a key role in international technical 
4 
co-operation. " During the period up to the end of 1972, UNDP 
extended an equivalent of 17 m. U. S. dollars in technical assistance 
to the Sudan in support of United Nations agencies -financed projects. 
5 
This comprised 46 percent of the total costs of these projects and the 
rest was the Sudanese government counterpart contribution. These 
programmes c-overed almost all the activitiýs of the economy primarily 
to increase its absorptive capacity. 
On the bilateral side, United Kingdom is one of the main sources 
of technical assistance to the Sudan. This stems from direct economic 
relations between the two countries and also historical ties. The 
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British aid programme concentrates on renewal natural resources, 
transport, public administration, health, education ... and includes 
assistance in the forms of expertise, consultancy and training. 
Britain finances many small-scale projects involving a single expert 
or a group of experts sometimes for short periods. These include 
advisors on veterinary matters, experts in pest control, agricultural 
engineering (and food processing), civil engineering and lecturers in 
higher education institutions and the universities - 
Table 10.5. indicates that Britain attaches great significance 
to technical assistance in its aid programme to the Sudan. The reduction 
in percentages did not mean that the size of the technical assistance 
programme was scaled down but rather reflected the increasing volume 
of financial aid during some years. 
The Sudan has received a significant proportion of the total 
British technical assistance extended to non-commonwealth African 
countries as table 10.6. indicates. In 1978, that proportion was 41.7 
percent. The allocation to the Sudan has shown a pattern of increase 
in most of the years under review. This is primarily in response to the 
development needs of the country. An important ingredient of British 
technical assistance to the Sudan is that concerned with manpower 
training programmes. In 1978, a total number of 339 Sudanese 
benefited from this programme of whom 114 were having training courses 
in Britain. 6 
Table 10.7. shows that the percentage ratios of technical 
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co-operation grants to total net and gross ODA on a bilateral basis 
from DAC members of OECD was 30.3 and 25.7 percent on average for 
each respectively over the period 1972-77. The main contributors were 
United Kingdom and Germany whose percentage share amounted to 19.8 
percent and 48.7 percent consecutively (or 68.5 percent of the total 
technical co-operation grants from DAC countries). The EEC members 
of DAC had a very substantial contribution to such bilateral technical 
aid (93.1 percent in 1976 and 91.4 percent in 1977). Technical - 
co-operation grants from multi-lateral sources constituted 32.5 percent 
of total net ODA as average for the period 1972-1977.7 
In general, technical assistance extended for development 
purposes is usually part of a loan or a grant. It is a tied form of foreign 
aid. Even though, since the international price of skills is relatively 
high, foreign technical assistance can be of great benefit to developing 
countries because they may not be able to acquire such skills through 
the normal market because that entails a high foreign exchange component. 
Finally, it is necessary to note that technical assistance 
benefits to human resources in one country (in particular manpower 
training) may accrue to other countries by the process of shifting through 
emigration. An illustrative example will explain this phenomenon. 
Suppose that country X is training 1,000 of its nationals abroad and 
20 percent (i. e. 200) of these are benefiting from foreign technical 
assistance programmes. If the underlying rate of emigration is 10 
percent, then, in normal circumstances, 100 of the total number trained 
during that year are expected to emigrate. By applying the same rate 
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of emigration to those sponsored by technical assistance schemes, 
the country will end up with only 180 trainees out of 200. Therefore, 
10 percent of the total number trained under foreign technical assistance 
programmes will not benefit their home country unless, of course, they 
are forced to do so. The full direct impact of technical assistance, 
therefore, does not accrue to the originally intended recipient country. 
Donors are, therefore, providing technical assistance in an indirect 
way to other countries. However, the long-term impact on the 
intended recipient country would depend on its policies towards 
emigration and how it views this issue in the context of the present 
situation and future manpower requirements. 
10.3. The Trend of Manpower Emigration from the Sudan 
and its over-all Impact on the Econom 
The recent phenomenon of labour emigration from the Sudan is 
a cause of great concern in both academic and policy-making Circles. 
8 
This growing concern is predictable since the country is embarking on 
the largest developmental programme in its history which requires an 
increasing number of skilled, qualified and trained manpower. Many 
factors have contributed to this growing concern about the magnitude 
and composition of manpower emigration from the Sudan: - (i) The 
discrepancies between the available and forecasted manpower in 
relation to the anticipated requirement of the present Development Plan 
and the long-term development objectives is an important factor. It 
was shown earlier in this chapter that the over-all manpower supply 
is anticipated to fall short of the potential demand by the end-period 
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of the present Plan in 1982/83. (ii) As development proceeds, there 
will certainly be a growing demand for more technical and professional 
cadres in general and for highly-specialized manpower in particular. 
The irony of the matter is that the former are the categories which are, 
at the present time, subject to high rates of emigration. (iii) The lack 
of reliable information on the magnitude and pattern of emigration led 
some Commentators to over-estimate its size and this itself might lead 
the authorities to impose inappropriate policy measures that might 
neither be in the long-term interest of the country nor the emigrants. 
(iv) Most of the countries to which the bulk of Sudanese emigrants 
go are involved, in one way or another, in development financing in 
the Sudan which might suggest that there is some sort of relationship 
between the two. This might also be the case of private and joint- 
venture projects from the same countries that normally offer better 
terms of employment than the existing earned-income structure, 
particularly for those involved in the services sector, finance 
corporations and banks. 
In a perfectly competitive world, factors of production will move 
across the political boundaries seeking high rates of return. So, 
labour is expected to move to countries where there are higher earnings 
than those offered in their home country in order to raise their standard 
of living. This seems to be one of the prime motives behind emigration. 
Other motives include political frustration, social discontent and the 
desire to assist other nations in building their economies. In some 
cases, the latter reasons may be the dominant factors behind emigration 
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rather than high earnings. Particularly relevant to the Sudan is that 
the existence of a common language has much facilitated emigration 
of manpower to the oil-exporting Arab countries. 
Successive governments in the Sudan have appreciated the 
significance of developing and maintaining mutually beneficial economic 
and cultural relations with the outside world generally and with 
particular countries in the region. Among the measures taken to 
promote mutually beneficial relations with the latter countries, the 
Sudan has assisted them in overcoming the shortages of some manpower 
categories, when it could release labour without any harmful effects to 
the Sudanese economy. Thus, school teachers and others have been 
seconded to countries such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Libya 
etc. In addition, individuals have entered into private contracts 
with foreign governments, private businesses and international 
institutions This phenomenon has been going on for quite a long 
period in the Sudan but passed largely without comment. This may be 
b ecause it was of small size in relation to the then available manpower 
or that it did not seem to have a considerable impact on the scarce 
skills and qualifications as was then required. Perhaps one main 
reason is that there was not a great deal of concern about manpower 
planning itself. 
Present concern with emigration is the result of the present 
composition of the labour market, and the anticipation of acute 
shortages in specific skills and qualifications. The present trend of 
emigration has also aroused concern because of its magnitude and 
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composition. The crucial concern has been whether the Sudanese 
labour market can bear this level of manpower export or whether it 
should eventually be restructured so as to accommodate the present 
size of emigration without causing adverse effects on the economy. 
An up-to-date and accurate record of the number of emigrant 
Sudanese nationals andtheir category composition does not exist. This 
includes all forms of emigration. Nevertheless, everyone would agree 
that the direction of the recent flood of emigrants is the oil-rich Arab 
countries. It was estimated by Birks and Sinclair that in the year 
1971, about 75 percent of the total number of Sudanese nationals being 
employed outside the country were skilled labourers. 
9 
Table 10.8. 
also reveals that only 5 percent of emigrants was from white-collars 
and other related professtons. According to Birks and Sinclair, the 
size of emigrant manpower during the sixties was not significant in 
comparison with the total labour force and there was no point in 
attaching great emphasis on this phenomenon. But, however small 
its size was, the composition of emigration at that time was a drain 
in the skilled manpower (as can be seen from table 10.8. where skilled 
labourers constituted more than 80 percent of the total number of 
emigrants) By 1975/76, the number of Sudanese who were granted 
permission to travel to other Arab countries increased by one and a half 
times relative to the total of the four preceding years - 
10 
Emigration to 
Arab countries gathered momentum after the oil price increases of 1973 
and its impact on the size of development investment in beneficiary 
countries. The increase in the rate of emigration from the Sudan 
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happened at a time when the country was preparing to undertake a 
larger development programme with substantial foreign support. The 
6-year Plan spoke about emigration in the context of developing the 
manpower resources of the country to cope with the forecasted demand 
and called on concerned bodies to gather information on its size and 
pattern and to suggest ways and means to accommodate it without 
causing harmful effects on the development process. 
11 
Table 10.9. suggests that certain categories of skilled 
manpower had lost significant percentages of their total lab(ýur iorce 
through emigration. If these estimates are correct, the situation is 
particularly alarming in the case of engineers of whom, according to 
this table, one-third had, at that time, already emigrated. This 
category of manpower is of critical importance to the present development 
programme which involves investments in construction, irrigation, 
indu s try ... etc. Almost 20 percent of university teaching staff work 
abroad. That causes concern because of the anticipated horizontal 
and vertical expansion of higher education in the Sudan which is 
supported by the establishment of two new universities, at Juba and 
at Wadi Medani. The over-all proportion of the Sudanese workforce 
working abroad is 3 percent of the total number of economically-active 
Population and is one-eighth of the modern sector labour force. 
12 
(Immigration into the Sudan, apart from technical assistance, is 
composed predominantly of unskilled seasonal labourers from central 
and west Africa, but information about its dimensions is meagre). 
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Despite the caution with which the above estimates should be 
treated, it can hardly be doubted that the Impact of emigration on the 
modern sector is greater than that on the traditional sector and this 
is one aspect of emigration that causes concern, because the size of 
the modern sector should increase in both absolute and relative terms 
as development proceeds. - The latter absorbs most of the highly 
skilled and trained manpower of whom relatively large numbers emigrate. 
- Available information on emigration from the Sudan can only be 
taken as an indication of its magnitude because not every individual 
emigrant will necessarily be granted official approval from his unit or 
the government authorities and so be included in the official record. 
Some simply absent themselves from work without any prior notice and 
subsequently emigrate. This proportion of emigration takes place 
without the consent of the authorities and therefore its size and 
composition can not be accurately estimated. These so-called 'illegal 
emigrants' represent withdrawal of labour from the public and the 
private sectors in both forms; modern and traditional. Some of them 
however are also from the professional cadres such as university 
teaching staff. But, the bulk of 'illegal emigration' comes from the 
semi- and un-skilled categories of manpower. On arriving at their 
intended destinations, some skilled labourers may not find the specific 
Job which suits their experience and skill and so may settle for any 
other Job offer although it may not relate to their fields of specialities. 
In fact, some skilled labourers may find themselves doing unskilled 
mapual jobs but on relatively higher wages than that they can be offered 
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13 
at home. The phenomenon of switching to inferior jobs casts some 
doubt on the theme that an emigrant will necessarily 'acquire new 
experiences' as a long-term merit to the exporting country if he ends 
up there. 
An obvious adverse impact of emigration on the Sudanese 
economy is to exacerbate temporary shortages in certain manpower 
categories, particularly that the manpower forecast during the 6-year 
Plan period envisaged critical shortages in technically-professional 
categories such as engineers, technicians, managers, personnel and 
medical doctors. These are the same categories which are prone to 
face the highest level of outflow from the country relative to other 
groups if the present trend of emigration continues. Certainly, the 
future composition of emigrant manpower can be expected to contain 
significant numbers from these categories since there is likely to be a 
high level of demand for such skills in the present labour-receiving 
countries. The destination of most of the Sudanese emigrants is the 
oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and Africa. However, 
emigration to these countries is not only from the Sudan but affects 
other countries in the region such as Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon 
etc. Migrants also come from other countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Malaysia ... etc. 
The main issue is that since the present composition of 
Sudanese labour-force supply already falls short of the present effective 
demand, as well as the anticipated requirements, the observed pattern 
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and composition of emigration exacerbate the difficulties. When a 
highly-skilled or professionally-trained person emigrates and no 
effective counterpart can Immediately replace him, he often leaves 
junior staff without adequate supervision and guidance frequently 
resulting in inefficient operation and administration. The same thing 
is also applicable to senior administration and management personnel. 
The full impact of emigration on the economy might not be felt 
immediately but only in the long-run through deterioration of services 
such as medical care and education and perhaps lower output in the 
case of productive units as well as delays in the fulfilment of the 
planned development programme. With the possibilities of higher 
earning opportunities abroad than at home spreading, a considerable 
part of the remaining manpower may feel frustrated and so intends to 
emigrate or else may seek illegitimate means to become relatively 
better-off. The spillover of the luxurious pattern of consumption like 
fashionable dresses, expensive wedding parties, luxury housing ... etc. 
may encourage further emigration and also increase the rate of inflation. 
The present pattern in which most of the emigrants spend their savings 
in the services sector will also grossly increase the proportionate size 
of that sector relative to others. 
14 
Emigration may, of course, have some positive effects on the 
economy. It will reduce the level of unemployment if the composition 
of the emigrant population is biased towards the unemployed categories. 
There ishoweverno evidence that the Sudan is exporting significant 
numbers of its unemployed people to other countries. Another important 
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contribution stems from the emigrants' remittances to support the 
balance of payments similar to that in the case of Turkey. 
is In fact, 
the Sudanese authorities have taken certain steps to encourage 
emigrants to undertake their financial dealings though the Sudanese 
banking system and also to influence the pattern by which they spend 
their earnings. A 'nil-value' system of import licences has been 
introduced which enables an emigrant to import commodities for 
commercial purposes without foreign exchange transmission from 
Sudan. 16 This system intends to mobilize the savings of Sudanese 
nationals who have permanent jobs abroad. There is also a system 
whereby emigrants are paid a rate higher than the official exchange 
rate if they deposit their savings in a special bank account and for a 
minimum period of time. 
17 They are allowed to draw their savings in 
local currency or in foreign exchange. Also there is a system whereby 
an emigrant can purchase a plot of land for housing in Khartoum or 
other urban centres at reduced prices if he can pay the cost in foreign 
currencies. In addition to attracting emigrants' savings, this can 
help to ease the housing problem in big cities such as Khartoum, 
Khartoum North and Omdurman. 
One of the encouraging signs concerning the effectiveness of 
these measures is the sharp increase in the remittance of savings from 
Sudanese emigrants. Table 10.10. shows that these remittances have 
significantly increased by 1977. Figures for 1978 and 1979 are not 
comparable because they include the value of imports covered under 
the 'nil value' import system. 
18 
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The basic economic factor behind international migration is 
wage differentials between different countries and particularly those 
in the same region. If the present capacity of the Sudanese labour 
market cannot tolerate the present outflow of manpower, the question 
might then be posed: - can the country change the structure of job 
earnings to become relatively competitive with other counthes to whom 
emigrants move, so as to reduce the size of emigration? Present 
difficulties are so enormous that this is clearly out of the question. 
In fact, internally the public sector is already facing movement of 
personnel to autonomous enterprises, foreign joint-ventures and the 
private sector which offer relatively better terms of employment. The 
capacity of the public sector to increase the wage bill is limited by 
the ordinary budget allocations. So, it seems that if the above 
employers should go on bidding in the present inelastic labour market 
supply situation, then the public sector will certainly be at a 
disadvantageous position. This is primarily because the pattern of 
existing wage policies could be distorted and shortages will be shifted 
to the public sector. In that situation, the development programme 
might well face bottlenecks arising from skill limits because the public 
sector assumes the upper hand in the development drive of the country. 
But if the type of employment emerging outside the public sector is 
only temporary (for instance, construction), then one would expect the 
trend to reverse in future as long as the public sector remains the 
largest employer in the Sudan. 
The nominal cost to the economy arising from emigration can be 
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partly reduced if the major recipients of emigrants contribute to 
finance training programmes in the Sudan; however, they provide the 
Sudan with foreign aid but not specifically for manpower planning. 
If the aid funds for such manpower planning were increased, this 
could enable the Sudan to increase the supply of manpower and 
thereby to strike in future a balance in the various critical skills. 
The money cost of emigration to the Sudan would be reduced and 
recipient countries could be assured of a more continuous supply at 
least during a specified period of time. 
Some have suggested that the authorities should impose an 
administrative embargo on the exportation of certain skills. But such 
policy may prove ineffective and self-deficient because of the impact 
of restricting the movement of labour force by limiting their job 
opportunities and also the phenomenon of 'illegal emigration'. Such 
a policy may also adversely affect the size of foreign aid the country 
is at the moment receiving from these labour recipient countries. 
At the present time, it would be helpful if, at least, policy-makers 
had a thorough knowledge on the various aspects of emigration and the 
possibilities of reversing the trend. As a de facto, the country should 
make the most of it by implementing policies to minimize the adverse 
impact on the economy in part by utilizing the possibilities for improving 
the balance of payments. Careful consideration of the long-term 
magnitude and pattern of emigration coupled with the forecast requirement 
of domestic manpower should both be reflected in the manpower plans. 
This should enable the country to avoid bottlenecks that could deprive the 
economy from certain critically-needed skills and qualifications at a 
particular development phase. 
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TABLE 10.2 
The Balance between Supply and Demand for Labour During the 
6-Year Plan Period (1977/78 - 1982/83) by Occupational 
Levels (, 000) 
Occupational Levels 
1 
supply 
2 
Demand 
3 
Balance Position 
3/2% 
Professionals 26.0 23.5 +2.5 +10.6 
Technicians 13.7 24.0 -10.3 -42.9 
Assistant Technicians 17.5 24.0 -6.5 -27.1 
Skilled Labour 48.8 72.0 -23.2 -32.2 
Clerks 45.0 -41.0 -4.0 -9.8 
Semi-skilled 679.0 648.0 +31.0 +4.8 Labour I I 
Source: The 6 -Year Plan, op. cit., table 7.10, p. 149. 
N. B. The supply of 'managers' cannot be projected because they 
include various professional and educational levels. 
Even their demand is difficult to predict. 
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TABLE 10.3 
Technical Assistance as a Percentage of Total and Bilateral ODA 
extended by DAC members of OECD to Developing Countries and 
their Increase over the Period (1961-71) 
I. 
Technical Aisistance as Percentage of: Years 
Total ODA Bilateral ODA 
1961 15.0 16.6 
1962 13.7 15.2 
1963 15.1 16.1 
1964 16.1 17.2 
1965 18.0 19.2 
1966 20.6 21.8 
1967 20.1 22.7 
1968 23.3 26.1 
1969 23.1 27.4 
1970 22.4 26.8 
1971 21.3 25.8 
Average 19.0 21.4 
(1971 
ý) 2. Increas 
.e 
Over Period (1961 90 ) 
Total ODA 49.3 
Bilateral ODA 37.3 
Technical Assistance 112.8 
Source: OECD (1973); Flow of Resources to Developing Countries, 
Paris, table 1, p. 431. 
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TABLE 10.4 
Foreign 'Technical Assistance and Grants' as a Percentage of 
Development Expenditures and Disbursement of Foreign Development 
Funds for 1965/66 - 1971/72 (ES. m. ) 
Fiscal Years 
1 
Technical Assistance 
and Grants 
1 as %of 
Development 
Expenditures 
I as %of 
Foreign Aid 
Disbursement 
1965/66 2.9 8.7 22.0 
1966/67 2.2 7.9 22.7 
1967/68* 1.1 5.3 11.3 
1968/69 1.5 3.4 30.0 
1969/70 1.4 4.0 15.3 
1970/71 1.6 6.0 30.8 
1971/72 1.8 6.0 13.4 
Averages 5.9 20.8 
Source: The Economic Surveys 1969 onwards (Author's Calculations). 
Disbursement figures to calculate the last column are 
from Appendix 5- 
The U. S. A. government suspended its aid programme to 
the Sudan. 
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TABLE 10.5 
Technical Assistance as Proportions of the British Government Aid 
to the Sudan for 1973/74-1980/81 (Percentages) 
Fiscal Years Percentages 
1973/74 88.8 
1974/75 68.6 
1975/76 33.6 
1976/77 49.9* 
1977/78 43.0** 
1978/79 33.6** 
1979/80 30.2** 
1980/81 41.7** 
Source: North and General Africa Department, ODM, London, 
February 1978, table 1, (provided on request). 
N. B. Percentages are the Author's calculations. 
Provisional. 
Estimates. 
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TABLE 10.6 
Percentage Share of British Bilateral Technical Assistance Granted 
to the Sudan among Groups of Developing Countries, 1974-78. 
Groups of Countries 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Non-Commonwealth 25.9 31.3 34.0 37.7 7 41 Wrica) . 
Non-Commonwealth 6.9 9.2 10.1 9.0 11 8 (All) . 
All Developing 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 Countries 
Source: British Aid Statistics, 1974/78, HMSO, table 22, pp. 68-73. 
N. B. Percentages are calculated -by the Author. 
TABLE 10.7 
Technical Co-operation Grants from DAC Members of OECD as 
Percentage of the total Gross and Net ODA, 1972-77. 
Years TCG* as % of Net 
ODA 
TCG* as % of Gross 
ODA 
1972 33.7 22.7 
1973 29.8 22.8 
1974 20.9 18.5 
1975 23.3 21.3 
1976 32.3 30.1 
1977 41.7 38.9 
Average 30.3 2S. 7 
Source: OECD, Development Co-operation Directorate, Paris 
(Supplied on request). 
* TCG stands for Technical Co-operation Grants. 
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TABLE 10.8 
Sudanese Employed Outside the Country by Occupational Categories (1971)* 
Categories Number Percentage 
Professional and Administrative jobs 106 1.2 
Sub-administrators, Sub-professionals, 
Clerical and Accountants jobs 
333 3.3 
Skilled Labour 6574 75.1 
Unskilled Labour 1040 11.9 
Others 703 8.0 
Total 8756 100.0 
Source: Birks, J. S. and Sinclair, C. A. (1978); International 
Migration Project, Country Case Study, the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan, Durham University, table 29, 
p. 49. (Original Source Unspecified). ' 
Includes Sudanese who work for foreign governments and 
organizations only. 
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TABLE 10.9 
The Proportion of a Number of Selected* Skilled Sudanese Manpower 
Categories Working Abroad in Relation to the Total Stock in 
the Country (1978) 
Occupations 
Total 
No. 
No. Working 
Abroad Percentage 
Medical Doctors & Dentists 2615 446 17.1 
Engineers 1539 461 30.0 
Surveyors & Survey 440 198 4S. 0 
Technicians 
University Teaching Staff 1330 265 19.9 
Source: ' Mustafa, M. El Murtada (1980); Development Planning and 
International Migration in the Sudan, Labour and Society 
Vol. 5, No. 1, table 2, p. 88. (Original Source Unspecified). 
Selected for their critical importance to the development 
progress of the Sudan. 
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TABLE 10.10 
Private Transfers of the Sudanese Working Abroad 
--(ES. m. 
) 
Years Amounts 
1970 0.4 
1971 0.4 
1972 1.1 
1973 1.2 
1974 1.3 
1975 2.1 
1976 4.3 
1977 14.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1970-77 (Invisible receipts 
of the current account of the balance of payments). 
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PART III 
FOREIGN INDE9TEDNESS OF THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF THE DEBT 
POSITION OF THE SUDAN 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Developing Countries Indebtedness: A growing Concem 
11.1. Introductory Background 
Since almost all developing countries need foreign capital to 
help them to maintain adequate levels of investment to reach a self- 
sustained growth path and since not all such capital can be acquired 
in the form of grants, these countries incur foreign debt which must be 
served. The size of debt-service depends on the terms and amounts 
of foreign loans. Debt difficulties may arise for various reasons: A 
recipient economy may not have reached a state of generating adequate 
domestic resources to finance the required level of investment or has 
not completed a process of exports diversification. On the other hand, 
factors beyond the recipient country's control may add to those 
difficulties; for example, the unanticipated increase in oil prices of 
1973; the state of the industrialized economies in relation to demand 
for its exports; the relative hardening of loan terms and the resort to 
more borrowing from private financial institutions. When it became 
clear - judging from the pattern of relevant indicators - that there 
exists a possibility of some developing countries not being able to meet 
regular debt-service repayments at the present time or in the foreseeable 
future, the issue of developing countries' indebtedness became a cause 
of great concern. It is widely perceived that a debt problem would 
certainly affect both donors and recipients and would also have an 
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impact on the functioning of the present system of international 
economic relations. 
A debate on developing countries' indebtedness has been going 
on for a number of years in the academic field, various United Nations 
agencies and policy-making bodies in both developed and developing 
countries. 
1 Among the main reasons for this growing concern is the 
possibility of default on debt by some recipient countries. Such an 
act may seem attractive to other developing countries which do not 
necessarily face critical difficulties at the present time and so it may 
become a universal practice which would affect the whole process of 
capital transfer to the developing world. With these difficulties in 
mind, the United Nations Second Development Strategy stated that 
"arrangements for forecasting, and if possible, 
forestalling debt crises will be improved. Developed 
countries will help in preventing such crises by 
providing assistance on appropriate terms and 
conditions, and developing countries by undertaking 
sound pplicies of debt management. Where difficulties 
do arise, the countries concerned will stand ready to 
deal reasonably with them within the framework of an 
appropriate forum in co-operation with the international 
institutions concerned, drawing upon the full range of 
available methods including, as may be required, 
measures such as arrangements for rescheduling and 
refinancing of existing debts on appropriate terms and 
conditions. "2 
These propositions emphasize'the importance of co-operation between 
all concerned parties to overcome debt difficulties. The United Nations 
suggests a target transfer of one percent of each developed country's 
GNP to the developing countries for its 'Second Development Decade'. 
3 
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However, the 1970's witnessed the emergence of particular problems. 
Prices of manufactured goods, and especially fuel, have sharply 
increased since 1973. Developing countries that entirely depend on 
imported oil were badly affected and their balance of payments positions 
have seriously deteriorated. This, coupled with a general decline of 
demand for primary products in international markets could render their 
debt service problems quite uninanageabld. 
4 
The examination of the debt problems of developing countries 
focuses on the factors that determine their debt-servicing capacity 
which is the ability to maintain regular debt-service payments without 
causing balance of payments difficulties. Such an approach entails 
the examination of ratio indicators to evaluate the impact of annual 
debt-service, on the balance of payments of the recipient country and 
5 its economy as a whole. These indicators include the debt-service 
ratio, reserve/import ratio, growth rate of exports ... etc. However, 
the most commonly used indicator in this connection is the debt-service 
ratio. 
The debt-service ratio is defined as "total debt-service 
(repayments of principal and payments of interest) on external public 
debt as a percentage of exports of goods and services. " 
6 There are, 
however, difficulties in interpreting the figures. Since data on debt- 
service only account for actual debt repayments during any given year, 
a country that has not met all the contractual repayments would appear 
to have lower debt-service in relation to other countries. This flaw 
can be overcome if the contractual rather than the actual debt 
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repayments is related to foreign exchange earnings during the 
particular year. The debt-service ratio reflects a given economy's 
ability to alter its structure by transforming increasing proportions 
of domestic savings into foreign exchange through raising the share 
of exports in national income or by reducing importation by successful 
import-substitution industrialization programme or, more often, a 
mixture of both. In the literature, "the debt-service ratio is one of 
the most common rules of thumb related to assessment of debt-servicing 
ca pa city. "7 
Other indicators of the position of a country's debt comprise 
with per capita income and its growth rate, the ratio of foreign capital 
inflow to debt-service payments, exports growth rate, the ratio of . 
imports to reserves .... These indicators, besides reflecting the 
ability of the country to service its debt and to acquire further loans, 
also reflect the actual performance of the economy and its extent of 
structural flexibility. 
The debt-servicing capacity of a country is often used as an 
indication of the creditworthiness of that country by both official and 
private lenders. Also, private foreign investors may not be readily 
willing to undertake further investment in a country with low debt- 
servicing capacity. Such a situation may even lead to the loss of 
'approved status' with consequent difficulties for trade, for example, 
the withdrawal of E. C. G. D. cover in the case of Brita In. The size of 
foreign assistance may subsequently decline unless measures are 
304 
undertaken by lending sources to ensure a continuous flow of 
resources to this country. 
Measures that could ease the consequent undesirable economic 
pressures on a country with debt difficulties may take different forms. 
Among these are: - the provision of more external capital resources in 
grant form; the cancellation of past debt obligations; more multi- 
lateral aid on more favourable terms; the alteration of the terms of 
past loans by extending maturity and grace periods; and reducing 
interest charges thereby increasing their 'grant elements. ' These - 
remedies are not alternative policy options, but they can form an 
important part of a total package to deal with the debt problem of a 
certain country. 
The preceding paragraphs examined the difficulties that could 
face a developing country which depends on the support of foreign aid 
in development finance. The following section will discuss the present 
situation in the developing countries by attempting to answer certain 
questions which are directly related to the 'debt debate. Such 
questions include: - whether developing countries have borrowed too 
much in the past which makes it inevitable for the indebtedness issue 
to come to the surface as one of the main challenges to the development 
of the Third World at the present time. If not, then, is there a global 
debt crisis? But, if this problem is not common to all developing 
countries, then what is the justification for a global generalization if 
it is supported only by the experience of a few countries? At the same 
time, if we accept the rationale that there are real potential dangers from 
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the present rates of debt accumulation, then we should inquire into 
the elements that contribute to this situation. Finally, what are 
the possible alternative options that could - hopefully - reduce the 
magnitude of this problem and prevent similar situations from occurring 
in the future? 
The remaining parts of this chapter attempt to present answers 
for the above questions. Before proceeding with that, it is essential 
to be aware of how much significance we should attach to the different 
ratio indicators in determining whether a certain country is actually 
facing or in fact likely to face future debt difficulties. In particular, 
we need to inquire into the circumstances which would inevitably lead 
to a debt problem and the particular situations where foreign debt can 
be perceived to be a problem. Financial ratio indicators have various 
limitations which suggest that they are of limited use unless 
substantiated by further evidence which incorporates other aspects of 
the particular country. The following paragraphs consider the main 
problems encountered in utilizing such ratio indicators and others which 
are usually associated with the determination of the debt servicing 
capacity of a given country. 
(i) Most of the ratio indicators utilized in determining the debt- 
servicing capacity of a country include information on debt as an 
independent variable although it is generally acknowledged that such 
information usually suffer from many flaws, particularly noticeable is 
the limited scope of their coverage. For instance, the frequently used 
United Nations data on foreign indebtedness of developing countries 
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include only public and publ icly- guaranteed loans of an original or 
extended maturity of over one year and also provide insufficient 
information on short-term loans and those private non-guaranteed loans 
which bear more than one year maturity. This implies that such ratio 
indicators are likely to underestimate the size of foreign debt and 
hence overestimate the present debt-servicing capacity of a given 
country. (ii) The ability to forecast debt-servicing difficulties on 
the basis of analyses of past behaviour may be severely limited 
because of the structural shifts that normally take place over time in 
a typical developing country. It is therefore essential to combine 
these ratios with thorough consideration of the situation of a particular 
country at any given period of time rather than to rely solely on long- 
term proJections based on the past pattern of behaviour. (iii) A case 
of rescheduling is generally believed to be the culmination of debt- 
servicing difficulties but this may not always be true for two main 
reasons: - (1) There are alternatives to formal rescheduling which may 
indeed indicate a debt problem, such as refinancing and restructuring, 
emergency control on foreign exchange and trade and major balance of 
payments support. (2) It is necessary to distinguish between voluntary 
and involuntary rescheduling as the former could indicate efforts to 
increase foreign resource transfers rather than being due to balance of 
payments difficulties. Therefore, rescheduling is not necessarily an 
indication of debt-servicing difficulties. (iv) There is a need to 
incorporate the different factors which enter in determining the debt- 
servicing capacity of a given country. For example, in addition to 
the conventional financial ratio approach which emphasizes that debt 
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problems arise as a result of fluctuation in export earnings, there, 
are also monetary aspects, such as over-valuation of domestic 
currencies and inflation, which are deemed to increase demand for 
imported goods, cause export stagnation and in turn lead to a rapid 
accumulation of debt. (v) A given ratio may be insupportable for 
some countries but not for others due to differences in levels of 
development, varying growth rates, relative size of the external sector 
... e tc. For instance, one country may be facing a 
debt-service ratio 
of 20 percent, but this may not have a significant adverse impact on 
its economy or on its ability to service foreign debt and to acquire more 
foreign capital. This may be because it can easily transform the 
excess of domestic saving over investment into foreign exchange by 
either adding to exports or reducing imports or by both. In contrast, 
another country which happens to face a similar debt-service ratio may 
experience severe debt difficulties because of the backward nature of 
its economy and the shortage of domestic savings or otherwise its 
inability to transform an increasing proportion of the latter into foreign 
exchange because of binding structural constraints. 
Generally speaking, the above factors limit the significance 
of inter-country comparisons solely based on financial ratio indicators. 
There is always a need to consider the particular characteristics of 
individual developing countries and the special factors that determine 
its debt-servicing capacity. Despite their shortcomings, such ratios 
serve as a supplement to an in depth qualitative country analyses. 
9 
Chapter 12 will touch on many of these issues in relation to the debt 
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position of the Sudan and will consider the various policy options 
that face the country in that connection. 
11.2. The Sources and the Magnitude of Foreign Resources 
Inflow into the Developing Countries 
The growing concern about the possible adverse effects of a 
rapid accumulation of foreign debt by developing countries on their 
development programmes and on the continuity of aid inflow into these 
countries has brought into focus the whole question of foreign resource 
, transfers into developing countries and their effective contribution. 
The main issue in this connection is whether developing countries 
(as a group) have borrowed too much in relation to their absorptive 
capacity. The establishment of evidence to support this theme or 
the contrary could provide a basis for discussion on the indebtedness 
problem of developing countries. Also, such evidence could provide 
an answer to questions on whether this is a common problem to all 
developing countries at the present time or just a problem for a few 
countries. Before going into a detailed discussion of these matters, 
there are a few points that deserve mentioning about the adoption of an 
'aggregate approach' to the debt problem and its policy implications. 
There are great differences among developing countries with 
regard to resources endowment, choice of leading sectors, development 
perfon-nance, size of foreign resources inflow and hence the nature and 
magnitude of foreign Indebtedness. Because of these factors, it would 
be misleading to treat the debt problem in a global manner. Instead, a 
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case-by-case approach can most usefully bring out the causes and 
the further implications of foreign indebtedness on individual economies. 
This approach is more informative on the particular countries which face 
debt difficulties because it helps to identify the multitude of factors 
that have combined to create such a situation. However, the 'aggregate 
approach' to indebtedness has the merits of affording an early warning 
about a potentially widespread situation which might be damaging if it 
is not accommodated in its early stages. It also provides information 
on the direction of indebtedness which helps in assessing the over-all 
debt position of developing countries and in indicating the common 
causes of that problem and hence a general framework for its solution 
could be established. In fact, early indications on the issue of 
indebtedness has led to a series of dialogues between the advanced 
and developing countries focusing on aid and trade. 
10 
The question previously raised about whether the debt problem 
is an outcome of an excessive borrowing by the developing countries 
has been widely discussed in finance and development literature. 
For example, the general causes of debt difficulties were identified 
by the World Bank, as early as 1968, as: 
"excessive use of short-term debt such as suppliers' 
credits; inadequate increase in exports due either 
to a lack of proper incentives or to unfavourable 
changes in external market conditions; or an 
insufficient volume of aid on appropriate terms. In 
some countries there has been a combination of the 
above factors. Unsatisfactory management of 
over-all economic and financial affairs has in 
certain cases aggravated debt servicing problems. " 
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The present section examines the source -structure of foreign 
resource transfers into developing countries from 1970 to 1976 and 
simultaneously focuses on other directly related aspects to the debt 
issue in an attempt to identify the main causes of debt difficulties. 
Table 11.1. shows the tbtal commitment and disbursement 87 non-oil 
producing countries 
12 from all lenders during the period from 1970 to 
1976. It is evident that the absolute amounts of both commitment and 
disbursement have increased since the start of the period under review. 
However, there were annual fluctuations during years particularly in 
1974 when the impact of the first major increase in oil prices and its 
subsequent implications were felt by the non-oil exporting developing 
countries. 
The source break-down of table 11.1. shows that private 
commitments, which include suppliers' credits and credits from 
international financial markets as well as other obligations to private 
lenders, was S. 1 percent lower in 1975 compared to 1974. There was 
no evidence that the size of private lenders' lending to non-oil 
producing countries was declining amid the growing concern that some 
developing countries maybe facing debt difficulties. Despite the 
i 
reduction in 1975 commitments compared with 1974 and a decrease in 
the annual rate of increase of disbursement by nearly half in that year, 
private lenders have maintained a marginally fluctuating share in the 
total capital inflow into this group of developing countries. 
13 
The 
percentage share of government-to-government bilateral aid has however 
been on the decline. This is particularly evident in the case of 
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disbursement when in 1970 bilateral aid constituted 40.4 percent of 
total aid to these countries but in 1976 it was only 27.0 percent of 
that. International Organization maintained a percentage share In 
total disbursement between 15 and 13.1 percent. In contrast, private 
lenders have increased their percentage contribution over these years. 
Table 11.2. shows that nearly half of capital inflow that was 
disbursed to non-oil producing countries came from private lending 
sources. These capital resources were obtained on commercial terms. 
The significant share of private lending has a direct impact on the size 
and the ttme-horizon of indebtedness because of the possibility of 
'bunching' of maturities. In fact, the Euro-dollar market has increased 
the size of its lending to non-oil producing developing countries - the 
percentage share of these countries in the total publicized Euro- 
currency credits increased from 6 percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 
1977.14 Seiber, M. J. related this rise in borrowing in Euro-dollar 
markets to factors other than the creditworthiness of the borrowing 
countries: 
"This marked rise in borrowing in the Euro- 
currency markets does not owe as much to 
improved conditions and economic performance 
in the borrowing countries as it does to 
developments and chany in the Euro-currency 
markets themselves. " - 
However, he partly related this Ancrease in borrowing by developing 
countries to the relative stagnation in the flow of official development 
assistance which resulted in greater demand for other means of external 
financing. 
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Table 11.3. shows that the components of private sources 
borrowing have been changing during the period under review. There 
is a growing tendency among non-oil producing developing countries 
to depend on credits from financial markets (loans from private banks 
and other private financial institutions and publicly-issued and private- 
placed bonds) whose percentage share in total private lending 
tricreased from 48.3 percent to 83.2 percent tn 1970 and 1976 
respectively in the case of disbursement. In the same manner, there 
is an increasing reliance on borrowing from private financial institutions 
versus publicly-issued and privately-placed bonds. The main 
suppliers of credits to these countries are the European financial 
institutions. 
As mentioned before, the reasons behind the increase in the 
size of loans and credits, particularly that remarkable increase in the 
percentage share of private lenders (table 11.2), to non-oil exporting 
developing countries can be partly explained by the desire of those 
countries to finance larger development programmes than before and 
partly to offset the adverse effects on their balance of payments. 
Table 11.4. shows that these countries faced persistent trade deficits 
during the 1970-76 period. The trade deficit increased since 1974 
partly due to the rise in both cost and size of imports. The index of 
import to export values was at its highest level in 1975 (it averaged 
13 0.7 for the whole period). 
Diagram 11 shows that the trade gap of non-oil producing 
developing countries has been widening during this period. The deficit 
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was partly financed by drawing on reserves. Table ll. S. shows that 
even though the size of total foreign reserves of non-oil producing 
developing countries was increasing during the period under review, 
but the rate of increase was sharply reduced in 1974 and 1975. This 
period started with a low rate of annual increase, however, during the 
years other than the two mentioned before the accumulation of foreign 
reserves was significantly high. The percentage share of these 
countries in total world reserves has not generally been subject to 
drastic fluctuations despite the failing annual rate of increase in some 
years. Therefore, the rise in the percentage share of OPEC members' 
reserves has been almost entirely at the expense of the industrialized 
countries' reserves and not non-oil exporting developing countries. 
The latter could maintain their share largely because of OPEC members' 
aid channelling. 
X, M 
Exports, 
Imports. 
Years 
Diagram 11 : The trend line for Imports and Exports of non-oil producing 
Developing Countries (1970-76). 
Based on data in table 11.4. 
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Table 11.6. compares the reserve/import ratios for the above 
three groups of countries. This ratio exceeded 100 in 1974-76 in the 
case of oil-producing countries. During 1974 and 1976 the percentage 
share of these countries into total world reserves was one-fifth and 
one-quarter respectively (table 11.5). The reserve/import ratios for 
non-oil developing countries witnessed a decline during some years. 
Almost the same fluctuations occurred to the industrialized countries' 
ratios. The average percentage ratio for the 1970-76 period was 
29.2 for industrialized countries, 29.7 for non-oil exporting developing 
countries and 90.9 for oil-exporting countries. In the next chapter 
these ratios will be compared with those for the Sudan. 
Table 11.7. shows the percentage share in net transfer of 
resources to developing countries of the different lending sources (see 
appendix 7). For the group of 94 developing countries, bilateral aid 
remained the largest contributor during the years under consideration. 
But 1976 witnessed a reduction of 14.3 percent relative to 1975 and so 
its percentage share fell from 50.7 percent in 1975 to 39.1 percent in 
1976 mainly because net transfers from private sources had increased 
by 37.5 percent relative to the preceding year. High-income developing 
countries (per capita income of 801 U. S. dollars and above) were 
dependent on private lending sources for more than 50 percent of foreign 
capital transfer. 1974 recorded a surprise fall of private sources 
transfers to this group of developing countries amounting to 40 percent 
in comparison with 1973. 
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One of the interesting characteristics of the structure of 
foreign capital transfers to developing countries is that countries with 
per capita income of 800 U. S. dollars or less were highly dependent 
on official sources for aid, unlike the relatively advanced'developing 
countries which were more dependent on private sources of capital. ' 
The increasing size of short-term loans from private sources has 
important implications for the question of debt service. About 70 
percent of foreign capital inflow into the 'most seriously affected 
developing countries' (those most affected by the upsurge in the prices 
of oil and manufactured goods) came from bilateral sources. Private 
sources contributed marginally to this group of countries in comparison 
with other sources. 
Official multi-lateral aid fell below that from bilateral and 
private sources both for all developing countries and for any particular 
category. Since IDA is the main contributor to multi-lateral aid and is 
known for the 'softness' of its loans, there has been a general feeling 
that if more resources had been channelled through this Association to 
the developing countries, then indebtedness would not have reached its 
present levels. This, and other Issues will be examined in the 
forthcoming section when we discuss the full implications of foreign 
indebtedness. 
As mentioned before, private sources contributed only marginally 
to the total amount of capital transfer to the least-developed countries 
and the 'most seriously affected developing countries. ' Their lending 
activities were rather concentrated on the high-income developing 
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countries which included oil-exporting nations. With the unanticipated 
rise in oil prices in 1973 and the implications having been felt in 
1974, the net transfer of capital to oil-exporting countries fell sharply 
in 1974 with private sources showing a negative sign which means that 
there was a net outflow of capital. Developing countries experienced 
an increasing net transfer of resources which stood at more than three 
times in 1976 relative to 1970. During the period being analysed, 
1975 was a record year for foreign resources inflow for all categories 
of countries, but the high-income grpup of countries (which includes 
most oil-exporting countries) was an exception. 
On the whole, the net transfer of resources to developing 
countries has been growing in size during the period 1970-76. 
Private lenders provided more resources to the 'better-off' developing 
countries. Among the possible reasons for this preference by private 
sources is the relatively larger size of the latter countries' foreign 
sectors which could, presumably, enable them to service the high cost 
of short-tenn borrowing. If that is so, these countries should not face 
any major debt-service difficulties and can obtain further loans from 
private sources. 
11.3. The Accumulation of Debt 
"Most of foreign funds obtained by less-developed 
countries are in the form of loans and, therefore, 
the growth process is almost inevitably accompanied 
by indebtedness. " 16 
If the size of foreign indebtedness could have been accommodated 
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within the on-going development processes without having an 
appreciable adverse impact on foreign capital transfer (and hence on 
the international economic order), the question of developing countries' 
debt would not have generated the present world-wide concern. The 
'debt debate' is based on an analysis of the present structure of 
capital and technology transfer to developing countries and/or the 
factors that lie behind the economic conditions of certain developing 
countries that exhibit certain characteristics: They could not raise 
domestic resources for developmental purposes to levels sufficient to 
permit a gradually declining dependence on foreign aid over a given 
time horizon. Also, they could not change the structure of their 
economies in a way that would increase foreign exchange earning and 
reduce or eliminate the indebtedness constraint. 
For the purpose of a brief aggregative analysis of developing 
countries' indebtedness, the following indicators will be utilized: - 
(i) the rate of debt accumulation; (ii) debt-service repayments in 
relation to outstanding debt; (iii) the debt-service ratio. 
Table 11. B. shows that the outstanding debt (disbursed only) 
of non-oil producing developing countries has been increasing at an 
annual rate ranging from 14.4 percent to 23.5 percent for the period 
1970 to 1976, with an average annual rate of growth of 19.25 percent. 
The same pattern is depicted when undisbursed balances are added to 
outstanding debt; the range of annual change being from 15.1 percent 
to 29.4 percent with an average for the whole period of 19.7 percent. 
So, the rate of increase of outstanding debt tended to accelerate over 
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time with an even faster rate in the years 1974 onwards as one would 
expect following the oil crisis. The size and the annual rate of 
increase of outstanding debt provide. information on the general trend 
of debt accumulation that accompanies the increase in the size of 
capital inflow, but, by itself, is an inadequate indicator of the debt 
situation. 
Table 11.8. also shows that the total debt-service increased 
by 35 percent in 1973, but this pattern did not persist for long, and 
in 1974 it increased by only 11 -1 percent. As debt-service is composed 
of both principal payments and interest charges, any changes in the 
conditions of existing loans (either by extending maturity periods or 
by any other arrangements that would defer such payments) will affect 
the total amounts to be repaid at the end of each year. The interest 
payments' component of debt-service increased from 30.6 percent in 
1970 to 40 percent in 1976 and the level of 1976 was more than double 
that of 1970. As a result of the changing composition of debt that was 
discussed in reference to table 11.5, the composition of interest 
payments has been affected. Because of the increase in the size of 
debt owed to private creditors and the fact interest charges on these 
loans are higher than onoff icial loans (see table 11.9), the interest 
payments component of total debt-service increased remarkably. Since 
the phenomenal increase in private lending only started in 1974, much 
of this upsurge has yet to be reflected in amortization payments. 
Table 11.10. utilizes the debt-service ratio as an indicator of 
mounting debt problems. It is a comparison between the least-developed 
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and the more advanced developing countries. The foreign aid 
source-mix of these two categories of countries is, of course, quite 
different. While the former primarily depends on official aid, the 
latter borrows significantly from private creditors. Despite the fact 
that the least-developed countries normally obtain loans on more 
favourable terms compared with those for other developing countries, 
there is not much difference in the debt-service ratios between different 
groups of countries as reported in table 11.10. 
The present data on debt-service of the least-developed 
countries must be treated with caution because some of these countries 
- such as Comoros, Bangladesh and the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen became independent very recently and hence no separate data 
was provided for the pre-independence period which is part of the 
period under review. Also, some of these countries have relatively 
high total debt-service which distorts the cumulative position of the 
group. For example, the 1975 increase in total debt-service (31.8 
percent relative to 1974 level) was partly caused by Bangladesh and the 
Sudan when the annual increase for these two countries was 177.8 
percent and 60 percent respectively. However, 1975 witnessed a slow 
rate of increase of exports (2.8 percent) and so the debt-service ratio 
jumped to a record of 11.62 percent. It is evident from table 11.10 
that the least-developed countries were experiencing relative high debt- 
service ratios in the last three years of our time-series. 
The relatively "better-off" developing countries experienced a 
record level of exports in 1974. But the pattern slightly changed in 
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1975 when exports stood at a lower level than that of the previous 
year and that was accompanied by a drastic fall in the annual rate 
of increase of total debt-service. The debt-service ratio showed a 
tendency to decline -over the last three years., contrary to the least- 
developed countries. Among the reasons for the rising level of exports 
of this group of countries is the inclusion of oil-producing countries. 
Although the debt-service ratio is higher when oil-exporting countries 
are excluded, its pattern of change over the years is almost similar. 
The average debt-service ratio for the 'least-developed 
countries' over the entire period is 9.72 percent compared with 8.89 
percent for countries with '801 U. S. dollars per capita income or 
more' and 9.82 percent if oil-exporting countries are excluded from 
the latter group. In relative terms, there may not seem to be striking 
differences between the ratios of the least-developed and the more 
advanced developing countries because the performance of the export 
sector is normally taken into consideration by lenders, particularly 
private sources. Also, the terms of foreign borrowing differ between 
different groups of developing countries. Since borrowing from private 
sources is of a relatively short-term nature, one would expect those 
countries with large proportions of such a type of borrowing to face 
unprecedented increases in their total debt-service. 
An important factor that has an impact on the real value of 
foreign debt of a given country is the unanticipated rate of inflation. 
17 
The anticipated rate of inflation is reflected in the terms of borrowing 
particularly in private financial markets via interest charges. The 
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The. unanticipated rate of inflation causes losses to creditors by 
devaluing the values of annual debt-service receipts and the real 
values of debt outstanding on their accounts with other countries. This 
implies that the grant element of foreign loans should increase in real 
terms. Therefore, the unanticipated rate of inflation will understate 
the real values of debt-servicing to creditors. But recipient countries 
may not be better-off only because this may also affect their terms of 
trade and hence widens their current account deficits. If inflation is 
anticipated and, borrowing carries an inflation premium, then, unless 
export earnings increase as world commodity price level increases, the 
deb - t-service burden may appear more severe than it is likely to be. 
18 
Therefore, the full effects of an unanticipated rate of inflation depends 
on the annual variations in export earnings and import payments in 
individual countries and the level of indebtedness. This means that 
some countries may eventually benefit from the unanticipated rate of 
inflation. 
In conclusion, it is evident that there are convincing reasons 
for the recent concern about foreign indebtedness of developing countries. 
There is an upward movement in their annual total debt-service and 
particularly interest payments. The most important variable in this 
of 
connection, that is, the rate/export growth has been subject to annual 
fluctuations while imports has been steadily rising. Despite the recent 
concern, there is however no conclusive evidence that there is a 'Third 
World debt crisis', but data is only indicative. Certain developing 
countries may be facing debt problems. 
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11.4. What to do about Indebtedness? 
With the growing size of indebtedness partly as a result of 
more short-term borrowing by developing countries, the question of 
how to prevent it from exerting adverse effects on both donor and 
recipient countries has come to the fore. The answer to this question 
is in the long-run relevant to all recipient countries, but is crucial to 
those countries which are at the present time facing debt-service 
difficulties. There are various possible alternative measures that 
could ease and ultimately reduce the level of indebtedness to a 
manageable size. The focus of the inquiry should always be on the 
variables that are directly related to the question of debt-servicing. 
Since debt-service is usually paid in foreign currencies, the burden 
on the foreign sector is greater than on the rest of the economy. 
However, the interaction of the different economic variables means 
that the performance of the foreign sector is a function of the over-all 
state of the economy. The ability to increase the size of domestic 
savings is crucial because unless all means are effectively used to 
raise domestic funds in order to narrow the savings gap, the 
transformation of an increasing proportion of the former into foreign 
exchange may not be possible. This should not be taken to imply that 
governments should cause unnecessary hardship to their citizens by 
squeezing substantial parts of incomes to finance development. Each 
country would be better-off if it seeks ways and means that would suit 
its own economic circumstances. Foreign exchange budgets should be 
carefully drawn in light of individual countries foreign sector 
performance, the need for imported capital and essential consumer 
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goods, the size of foreign aid and the contractual repayments 
obligations and finally the long-term resources requirement of the 
economy. Unless these competing claims on foreign exchange are 
appropriately scrutinized, any country may find itself in a situation 
of severe foreign exchange shortages. Foreign aid should not be 
regarded as a cheap way of financing development, but instead, a 
temporary measure to make up for some unavoidable shortages. Another 
aspect is the provision of basic infra-structure which is generally 
resource demanding: both to establish and maintain. If we take the 
least-developed countries as a group, we find that they are facing the 
ta'sk of restructuring their economies and of providing basic development 
requirements. Since these basic social and economic undertakings 
would pave the way for more productive utilization of resources, but 
are either unproductive - in the strict sense of financial terms - or are 
characterized by long gestation periods, then foreign aid in forms of 
grants and soft loans would be necessary to avoid the emergence of an 
unmanageable debt. 
The above discussion may not seem to be of so much relevance 
to the present 'debt debate' because the question is 'what to do about 
indebtedness nowT. But without considering the whole question of 
development financing and the appropriate remedies, the debt could 
become unmanageable again in the near future if the present situation 
is, after all, contained. At the present time, there is considerable 
concern among lending sources about developing countries' indebtedness 
because that could have damaging effects on the continuity of development 
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assistance inflow into developing countries in general and the 
composition of its supply sources. This problem has been particularly 
evident following the increased participation of private lenders. 
Discussion of debt difficulties in international forums led to general 
agreement on the gravity of the present situation in certain developing 
countries and to agreement on the necessity for lenders to adopt 
specific measures that could reduce the magnitude of indebtedness. 
19 
At the same time, action is expected from the recipient countries who 
face debt difficulties. They need to implement economic policies 
that should help them to avoid falling again into similar debt traps, 
once the present problem is contained. The success of any set of 
remedies would depend, not only on the willingness of all lenders to 
help in accommodating this problem but also on the determination of 
both sides to take positive steps to avoid future escalation of 
indebtedness problems. 
There are a variety of different economic measures that can be 
adopted by lenders in order to ease present debt difficulties . They 
all involve alterations of the terms of past loans. Chief among these 
are: - W rescheduling; (H) refinancing; (iii) postponement, and 
(iv) cancellation. 
20 
The efficacy of any of these measures depends 
on the specific circumstances of the indebted country and the size, 
structure and composition of its outstanding debt. 
(i) Rescheduling means that repayment provisions of an 
existing loan are to be altered so that the annual size of repayment is 
reduced. (ii) Refinancing means that a country would seek more aid 
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in order to be able to pay the annual contractual debt-service. 
Refinancing is a commitment by donors 'to extend more loans than 
before so that part of this capital would be used to service past loans 
from the same sources. In this case, a country may borrow from a 
particular source with the view that some of this capital would be repaid 
back as debt-service on past debts. An example in this connection is 
when a country borrows from the British government to repay some 
British banks the amounts of debt-service that is due during the current 
year. One of the dangers of relying on refinancing is the possibility 
of using short-term borrowing to service long-term loans. This could 
aggravate the debt situation in the near future. 
Rescheduling and refinancing are relief measures that give the 
recipient countries time to re-evaluate the whole situation of foreign 
indebtedness and to undertake the appropriate policies that are intended 
to avoid future repayments difficulties. There are, however, dangers 
if the recipient countries insist on one or both of these measures since 
this may have unfavourable repercussions on the lenders' willingness 
to extend further loans on a significant scale because of fears of 
future debt difficulties. Also, if future requests by a recipient country 
for similar treatment should be turned down, it may act unilaterally to 
reschedule its debt as was threatened by Ghana in 1972.21 Rescheduling 
and refinancing, of course, do not cancel the existing claims on the 
recipient country's resources but only defer them. 
(iii) Postponement of all or part of annual debt-service may be 
possible when loan terms contain provisions for that, or if both the 
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donor and the recipient agree to that in the wake of debt difficulties. 
Such provisions add to the 'softness' of the particular loans and act 
as built-in -measures to defuse any considerable debt accumulation 
problems that may arise because of these types of loans. Postponement 
was practised by Turkey in 1959, Ghana in 1966 and Indonesia in 1966 
with the tacit assent of their cre itors. 
22 
(iv). Cancellation means writing-off past loans by donors. It 
applies, if at all, to official bilateral aid. This alternative, although 
it may -seem appealing to indebted countries, should be examined with 
great care: (1) If one or a few donors should agree to cancel their 
claims on past loans to help in reducing the impact of debt difficulties 
on the recipient's development programme, there are, however, no 
guarantees that this will be the case. Other donors might not respond 
in the same manner and so this capital may be transmitted to service 
their debts. (2) If donors appear to be lenient and can easily cancel 
debts, this may encourage more recipient countries to seek debt 
relief and to avoid some critically important domestic policies in this 
connection by indefinitely depending on foreign aid. In any case, the 
effectiveness of cancellation would depend on the size of repayment 
that is being cancelled and its source of origin. Cancellation can 
partly be applied flatly to all developing countries irrespective of the 
level of each individual country's foreign indebtedness. It may face 
resistance by the public opinion on donors' side. 
Each of the above measures can be undertaken separately or 
in combination with one or more of the others. In certain cases, a 
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mixture of various measures might be appropriate because of the 
diverse structures of loans and their end-use. However, the adoption 
of any of these measures depends on the willingness of donors to do so 
rather than the desires of borrowers. All recommendations other than 
the above-named ones contain, In one way or another, elements of 
one or more of these proposals. An example is the establishment of 
'special funds' to ease the foreign exchange shortages of developing 
countries funded by the industrialized and the oil-exporting countries. 
If it is accepted that there is 'Third World debt crisis', one of 
the most appropriate remedies may then be a 'broad and generalized 
relief. ' However, the analysis of the outstanding debt and the 
related variables showed that although there are sufficient grounds 
for the growing concern about the recent trends of debt accumulation by 
developing countries, there is no evidence to support the thesis that 
there is a global debt problem that is affecting all developing countries 
in the same manner. Therefore, generalized relief might not appeal 
to donors since it would not distinguish between those countries which 
face critical debt problems and those which do not. Arguably, a 
case-by-case approach to ease this problem would best achieve the 
purpose of assisting those most affected developing countries. 
An institutionalized framework by the United Nations' specialized 
agencies to provide information on the size of indebtedness of individual 
countries and to propose policies to ease that problem was in fact 
suggested by the developed countries in UNCTAD's Fourth Session. 
23 
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That Conference passed a resolution calling on bilateral donors to 
convert all past loans into grants to countries designated as 'least- 
developed countries' (those countries most seriously affected by the 
upsurge of manufactured goods, oil prices, the land-locked countries 
and small islands). It also suggested that international multi-lateral 
donors should increase the grant element of their future loans, alter 
the terms of existing loans more favourably and provide more technical 
assistance to these countries. 
There was a general feeling in UNCTAD (IV) that it may be 
difficult in the present circumstances for those countries to meet in 
full their contradtually fixed repayment obligations arising from loans 
from private sources - So, there was need to renegotiate the terms of 
existing loans in order to reduce the size of indebtedness to 
manageable levels. However, the least-developed countries are not, 
anyway, heavy borrowers from foreign private banks and financial 
agencies because there was extreme concentration of this type of 
lending among the few 'better-off' developing countries. 
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With this 
in mind, it seems that the less fortunate developing countries could 
get more benefit from an official bilateral -multilateral approach to 
alter the structure and composition of foreign aid. 
Following UNCTAD (IV), some developed countries announced 
the conversion of their past loans into grants and declared new policies 
towards future assistance to least-developed countries. First among 
developed countries to adopt the former policy was the United Kingdom 
followed by Sweden, Switzerland and Canada. 
25 
The significance of 
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this policy and its ultimate impact on the outstanding debt of the 
concerned developing countries depends on the present contribution 
of bilateral sources to total aid and the percentage of the total annual 
debt-service that arises from loans from this source. Its impact could 
generally be limited unless other sources alter the terms of existing 
loans and provide more concessionary loans in future. 
In Manila (UNCTAD V, 1979), the developing countries proposed 
the establishment of an 'International Debt Commission' to oversee 
international arrangements for debt relief in the broader context of 
development. While no final agreement was reached on this matter, 
it was felt necessary that UNCTAD should continue with its present 
policy of elaborating guidance for debt relief. 
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There were proposals 
for a so-called new international economic order to accommodate the 
recent developments in the economic relations between the developed 
and developing countries but no specific agreement was reached on 
this matter. Alternatively, both have acknowledged 
"the need for a new kind of lending facility that 
falls half-way between the essentially short- 
term conditional lending by the IMF and the long- 
term proJect loans of the World Bank. This 
financing gap is thought to require medium term 
programme finance to support Third World Nations 
with deep structural problems. " 27 
Developing countries' representatives were calling for a 'new 
international economic order' on the understanding that this would imply 
some structural changes rather than a system that would offer more of 
the same. The reasons for the lengthy yet inconclusive negotiations 
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in order to reach an agreement on future economic order is the 
multiplicity of issues that are involved. While developing countries 
may be worried about foreign aid, indebtedness, terms of trade ... etc. 
the developed world is also worried about, say, energy, trade prospects 
and the effectiveness of aid. The problem of indebtedness is just one 
of the symptoms of the malaise of the present international economic 
order. It cannot be eliminated unless interrelated aspects are remedied. 
Progress towards shaping a new forum that could govern the 
relationship between rich and poor countries is encouraging. The 
Conference. on International Economic Co-operation (1975) resulted in 
the establishment of a 'Special Action Programme' in order to provide 
loans on 'highly' concessionary terms to meet the urgent needs of low 
income countries facing problems of transfer resources. 
28 On the 
other hand, OPEC established a. special fund (the number of countries 
contributing to this fund increased since 1973) to assist developing 
countries to overcome foreign exchange'difficulties. All these measures 
have positive effects on the magnitude of indebtedness. 
In addition to that, the existing international multi-lateral 
agencies could play a significant role in assisting low-income developing 
countries. But the ability of the World Bank and its affiliates to extend 
more loans on softer terms is certainly limited. If their role is to be 
extended, more resources are, indeed, needed. These resources would 
presumably come from the advanced countries and OPEC members. 
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11.5. Conclusion 
The foreign indebtedness of developing countries is a cause 
of general concern but the problem of some of these countries appears 
so grave that their development progress might be severely endangered. 
Most developing countries may not be in a position to reduce the present 
levels of their imports beyond certain limits because this will lead to 
lower levels of development investment and also lower levels of income 
which may necessitate further import cuts. The growth rate of the 
developing economies cannot be significantly reduced to overcome debt 
difficulties because of the various political and economic Implications 
of tha t. 
The question of indebtedness has raised, among other things, 
many aspects of capital and technology transfer to developing countries. 
The existing structure of foreign aid needs to be re-examined. The 
bilateral -multilateral-private mix of foreign aid needs to be altered 
in favour of more soft multilateral aid. Also, the programme - project 
composition of aid should be considered so that the demerits of tied aid 
can be avoided. Developing countries should, as far as possible, defer 
from using short-term borrowing either to finance long-term projects or 
repay outstanding debts. 
Most developing countries (non-oil exporters) have been affected 
by the increases in goods and fuel costs during the 1970's. But the 
'least-developed countries' are badly affected by these changes in the 
structure of international economic relations. 
29 
Movements towards 
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restoring a new international economic order to embody the recent 
changes are encouraging. In the meantime, there is need to reconsider 
the outstanding debt-service of the badly-affected developing countries. 
Unless the debt problem is viewed in relation to the over-all 
development progress of Third World countries and the relationship 
between developed and developing there is nothing to stop it repeating 
itself in future perhaps with different dimensions, even if the present 
situation is finally contained. 
333 
Notes and References 
The debt issue came under a wide scrutiny only when it became 
clearly evident that certain developing countries might not be 
capable of meeting all or substantial proportions of their foreign 
debt-servicing obligations and hence default may be inevitable 
and/or their current development programmes may be badly 
affected as a result of thatunless specific measures were 
undertaken to reverse the trend. This matter was discussed in 
the Various UNCTAD meetings which started in 1964. The debate 
on the so-called 'debt problem' of developing countries gathered 
momentum by the 1970's with many experts' discussion papers 
and subsequent recommendations by the Trade and Development 
Board'of UNCTAD. This issue also dominated the growing body 
of literature on economic development where the prime focus, 
among other things, has since been on the causes, implications 
and cures of foreign indebtedness. 
2. United Nations (1970); International Develooment Strategy: Action 
Programme of the General Assembly for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 
New York, Paragraph 48. 
3. The total net flow of resources from DAC member countries to 
developing countries and international multilateral agencies as a 
percentage of the former's GDP was 0.92% on average for the years 
1970-78. ODA was 0.33% on average for the same period of DAC 
GDP which falls short of the 0.7% target advised by the United 
Nations. These calculations are based on data from OECD Reviews 
1976-79, Development Co-operation, Paris. (Revised figures 
appearing in the latest issues are taken into account). 
These characteristics are typical to those of least-developed 
countries. 
334 
Saini, K. and Bates, P. (1978); Statistical Techniques for 
Determining Debt-Servicing Capacity for Developing Countries: 
Analytical Review of the Literature and Further Empirical Results, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper No. 7818, 
New York, p. 2. 
6. World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables: External Public Debt of 
Developing Countries, Vol. 1, Doc. No. EC-167/78, p. 19. 
7. Feder, G. (1978); Economic Growth, Foreign Loans and Debt 
Servicing Capacity of Developing Countries, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper, No. 274, Washington D. C., pp. 1-2. 
8. The analysis in this section draws from the Research Paper by 
Saini, K. and Bates, P. (1978); op. cit. 
9. ibid., P. 19. 
10. In UNCTAD, the developing countries formed 'the Group of 77' to 
press for more foreign assistance and further preferential 
treatments in trade with full regard to the position of their foreign 
indebtedness and its implications. The ultimate aim of these 
discussions is to draw useful conclusions for policy purposes 
in an attempt to assist developing countries by various means 
including the transfer of more resourcesand at the same time get 
the donor countries to implement policies to achieve that 
objective. See, Curry, R. L. Jr. (1979); Africa's External Debt 
Situation, Journalof Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp. 15-28. 
1. World Bank, Annual Report 1968, Washington, D. C. , Extracts 
reprinted in Meier, G. M. (1970); Leading Issues in Economic 
Development, 2nd ed. , Oxford University Press, New York, 
pp. 269-73. Also, in this context see, Aliber, R. Z. (1977); 
Living with Developing Country Debt, Lloyd's Bank Review, 
No. 126, pp. 34-44. 
335 
12. The prime focus on the non-oil exporting developing countries 
as a distinct group was a result of the developments that took 
place in the late 1973 with regard to the upsurge of oil and 
manufactured goods prices and the implications of this on the 
balance of payments of these countries. However, it is not a 
general rule that all these countries are affected in the same 
manner but those which largely depend on exporting primary 
products are indeed the mostly affected. The successive 
years witnessed sudden increases in the aggregate current 
account deficits of these countries. Thereby, most of them 
resorted to financing parts of these deficits by foreign borrowing 
which involved an increasing proportion of commercial loans 
than before. These developments and their subsequent effects 
added to fears of a global debt crisis in the Third World and led 
to several official debates on the so-called 'LDC Debt Problem', 
World Development Special Issue, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 145. 
13. Abbot, G. C. (1979); International Indebtedness and the Developing 
Countries, Croom Helm, London, Chapter 2, pp. 49-98. 
14. Franko, G. L. and Seiber, M. J. eds. (1979); Developing Country 
Debt, Pergamon Policy Studies No. 36, Pergamon Press, Chapter 
3 on 'Debt Escalation: Developing Countries in Euro-Currency 
Markets', Table 3.2, p. 46. The percentage share of country 
groupings in the total Euro-market lending operations was as 
follows in 1970 and 1977* 
Year Industrial Non-oil OPEC Communist Total Countries LDCs LDCs Countries 
1970 89.6 6.3 3.2 0.9 100.0 
1977 41.5 32.4 17.9 8.2 100.0 
Percentages are recalculated by the present author to remove the 
discrepancies in total. 
15. ibid., p. 43. 
336 
16. Feder, G. (1978); Economic Growth, Foreign Loans and Debt 
Servicing Capacity of Developing Countries, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper, No. 274, Washington, D. C., pp. 1-2. 
17. UNCTAD Secretariat (1977); Some Aspects of the Impact of 
Inflation on the Debt Burden of Developing Countries, Doc. No. 
TD/AC. 2/4, Reprinted in World Development (1979), Vol. 7, 
No. 2, pp. 135-43. 
18. Aliber, R. Z. (1977); op. cit., p. 37. 
19. UNCTAD Secretariat (1977); Review of Policy Issues and 
Developments in the Field of External Indebtedness of Developing 
Countries Since the Fourth Session of UNCTAD, Doc. No. 
TD/AC. 2/5,30.6.1977. 
20. Abbott, G. C. (1975); The Case for Cancellation, Inter-Economics, 
Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 217-21. 
21. In 1972, the then Ghana's President announced his country's 
inte*ntions to repudiate parts of its debt and unilaterally to 
reschedule the remaining parts unless the major donor would 
agree to renegotiate the terms of the past loans because, as he 
put it, the country was not in a position to meet all the annual 
debt-servicing obligations. For further details see Krassowski, 
A. (1974); Development and the Debt Trap: Economic Planning 
and External Borrowing in Ghana, Croom Helm/ODI, London, p. 147. 
22. Abbott, G. C. (1975); op. cit., p. 218. 
23. UNCTAD Secretariat (1977); Doc. No. TD/AC. 2/5, op. cit. , 
Annex II and III. 
24. Franko, G. F. and Seiber, M. J. eds. (1979); op. cit. , Table 13.1. 
p. 272. It is shown that the top ten countries accounted for 
71.9% of the gross borrowing from international banks by non-oil 
exporting developing countries and only three of them accounted 
for 5 1.5 % of the grand total. 
337 
25. Midland Bank Review (1978); Official Debt Relief for the Less- 
Developed Countries, Winter Issue, pp. 2-6. 
26. Laishley, R. D. and Laidlaw, K. (1979); Progress Towards a New 
International Economic Order, Standard Chartered Review, 
September Issue, pp. 2-5. 
27. ibid., p. 4. 
28. The Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC) 
held in Paris during the years 1975-77 brought together the 
representatives of eight industrial countries and nineteen 
developing countries to examine the various means of 
co-operation between the more advanced and less-developed 
countries in the framework of what came to be known as 
'North-South Dialogue'. 
29. For the experiences of African Countries where we find the 
majority of least-developed countries in the Third World see, 
Curry, R. L. Jr. (1979); op. cit. 
338 
TA RTY. 11-1 
Total Commitment and Disbursement of Foreign Loans and Grants to 
87 Non-oil Producing Developing Countries: 1970-76 (Million U. S. $) 
Years Commitment 
% Increase over 
revious year 
Disbursement 
% Increase over 
previous year 
1970 12286.9 - 9091. S - 
1971 12422.4 1.1 10143. S 11.6 
1972 16131.2 29.9 12128.2 19.6 
1973 21186.4 31.3 1630S. 1 34.4 
1974 34212.6 61.5 22079.0 3S. 4 
1975 34997.4 2.3 29498.4 33.6 
1976 42337.1 21.0 33133.3 12.3 
1976 % - 244.6 - 264.4 
1970 
Source: World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables: External Public 
Debt of Developing Countries, Doc. No. EC-167/78, 
Vol. I, pp. 42,44. 
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TABLE 11.2. 
Source-Break of Table 11.1. by Percentage Share of Each Category 
and the Annual Percentage Change 
Years 
I Governments* 
% Share 
I% 
Chancre 
International 
OrganiZations* 
% Share % Change 
Total Private 
% Share % Chang 
1. Commitments: 
1970 36.8 - 20.5 - 42.7 - 
1971 35.0 -4.0 22.6 11.7 42.4 0.4 
1972 37.6 39.5 20.8 19.6 41.6 27.4 
1973 30.4 6.1 19.5 23.1 50.1 58.2 
1974 33.7 79.3 17.7 46.1 48.6 56.7 
1975 33.8 2.4 21.1 22.5 45.1 -S. 1 
. 1976 1 30.8 10.4 18.2 4.3 51.0 36.7 
2. Disbursement: 
1970 40.4 - 13.8 - 45.8 - 
1971 40.4 11.5 15.0 20.6 44.7 8.9 
1972 35.6 5.3 14.3 14.7 50.1 34.1 
1973 32.0 21.2 13.8 29.2 54.2 4S. 4 
1974 29.4 24.4 13.8 3S. 1 S6.8 42.0 
197S 33.6 S2.6 13.7 32.7 S2.7 24.0 
1976 27.0 -10.0 13.1 7.6 60.0 27.8 
Source: As for Table 11.1, pp. 74,76,90,92,106 and 108 
(Calculated by the Author). 
Both represent 'Official Lenders'. 
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TABLE 11.4. 
The Indices and the Annual Change of Export Proceeds and Import 
Expenditures of Non-oil Producing Countries*: 19 70-7 6 (Billion U. S. $). 
Years Imports 
(M) 
% Change Exports % Change Resource 
Gan 
Index 
(M /X) % 
1970 46.950 - 37.038 - -9.912 126.8 
1971 52.832 12.5 38.557 4.1 -14.27S 137.0 
1972 58.117 10.0 46.268 20.0 -11.849 125.6 
1973 79.787 37.3 67.370 45.6 -12.417 118.4 
1974 130.986 64.2 97.801 45.2 -33.185 133.9 
1975 138.451 5.7 93.874 -4.2 -44. S77 147.5 
1976 144.846 4.6 115.393 22.9 -29.453 12S. S 
AveragE 130.7 
Index 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1979, pp. 63 and 
67, New York. 
* Data is for 'Other Less-Developed Countries' excluding oil- 
exporting developing countries. 
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TABLE 11. S. 
Comparison of the Percentage Share of Non-oil Producing Developing 
Countries Reserves with other Categories of Countries: 1970-76 
(Million SDR's) 
1 Pprrpntic7p- Sharp* I 
Years World jTotal) % (Total) 
Industrialized 
Countries 
Oil- 
Producing 
Countries 
Other 
LDCs 
% Change 
of 'other 
LDCs' 
1970 93243 100.0 70.6 5.4 14.9 - 
1971 123093 100.0 72.1 6.3 11.7 3.6 
1972 146S58 100.0 66.5 6.9 13.4 36.9 
1973 152073 100.0 63.0 7.9 16.0 23.8 
1974 179527 100.0 54.6 21.4 14.4 6.1 
1975 193785 100.0 53.7 24.9 13.4 0.6 
1976 221553 100.0 51.2 25.3 16.3 38.7 
Source: As for Table 11.4, pp. 44-7. 
* Totals do not add to 100 because some categories of countries 
are not covered by this table. 
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TABLE 11.6. 
Reserve/Import Ratios for Some Categories of Countries: 
1970-76 (Percentages) 
Years 
Industrialized 
Countries 
Oil-Producing 
Countries 
Other 
LDCs 
1970 31.1 51.7 29.6 
1971 40.8 74.5 29.6 
1972 37.5 79.4 36.8 
1973 29.9 72.3 36.9 
1974 22.0 145.0 24.2 
1975 22.3 110.2* 22.0 
1976 20.8 103.3* 29.0 
Average 29.2 90.9 29.7 
Source: As for Table 11.4, pp. 44-7 and 66-9. 
This decline could partly be explained by the process of 
recycling 'Petro -dollars'. 
Note: SDR's were converted into U. S. $ at the rates quoted in 
the IFS. 
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TABLE 11.7. 
Source Breakdown of Net Resource Transfers to Developing Countries 
for the Years 1970,1973-76 (Percentages)* 
Cagegories of Countries 1970 1973 1974 197S 1976 
Developing Countries(94) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OB 
(1) 
60.7 51.1 52.4 50.7 39.1 
Om 
(2) 
15.6 14.6 18.4 17.0 14.4 
PS 
(3) 
23.7 35.3 29.2 22.3 46.5 
801 U. S. $ and Above (27) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OB 31.9 29.6 30.0 28.4 12. S 
Om 13.0 9.0 18. ý 12.2 5.0 
PS 55.1 61.4 51.3 S9.4 82.5 
161-800 U. S. $ (48) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OB 80.4 77.5 58.2 56.7 56.4 
Om 18. S 16.7 14.8 14.7 17.1 
PS 1.1 5.8 27.0 28.6 26.5 
160 U. S. $ and Below (19) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OB 84.4 62.4 67.1 66.8 62.2 
Om 16.0 28.7 25.7 29.7 32.5 
PS -0.4 8.9 7.3 3. S S. 3 
Least-Developed Countries 100.0 (25) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OB 69.3 70.2 67.9 71.5 69.0 
Om 28.1 24.0 - 24.1 26.1 28.4 
PS 2.6 III 5.8 I 8.0 2.4 I- 2.6 II 
P. T. 0. 
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Contd. 
Most Seriously Affected 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
LDCs *** (39) 
OB 78.4 73.8 68.6 74.1 69.4 
om 21.0 26.8 30.0 22.9 25.1 
PS 0.6 -0.6 8.4 3.0 5.6 
Oil-Exporting Countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (11) 
OB 52.1 46.2 104.1 29.1 10.4 
om 4.3 6.6 48.1 13.0 11.6 
PS - 43.6 47.2 -S2.2 S7.9 78.0.1 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat (1978); Debt Problems of Developing 
Countries: External Indebtedness -A Statistical Note, 
Doc. No. - TD/B/C. 3/148,19.9.78, Geneva, pp. 22-6. 
Calculated on the basis of data in Appendix 7. 
Countries with the lowest per capita income in the world. 
Named in the above source p. 21. 
Developing countries most seriously affected by the upsurge 
of manufactured goods and oil prices. 
(1) OB = Official Bilateral 
(2) OM = Official Multi-lateral 
(3) PS = Private Sources 
N 
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TABLE 11.8. 
Annual Percentage Change of the Outstanding Public Debt* of 87 
Non-oil Producing Developing Countries from All Lenders. 1970-76. 
(LL7 0 Average 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
I 
1975 1976 ,,,, 1976r 
Annual 
Change 
1. Debt Outstanding (Disbursed Only 
-1 15.4 
1 14.4 1 18.4 1 23.5 1 21.3 1 22.5 1 186.8 19.25 
2. Debt Outstanding (Including Undisbursed Balances): 
-1 15.1 1 15.6 
1 18.7 29.4 17.9 21.6 192.6 19.7 
3. Total Debt Service: 
-1 10.7 1 16.5 
1 35.0 11.1 18.5 14.9 163.5 17.8 
3.1 Principal Payments: 
-- 
1 10.1 1 16.0 1 36.0 4.4 11.8 12.6 128.2 1S. 2 
3.2 Interest Payments: 
12.2 1 17.9 1 32.7 26.2 30.8 18.7 243.6 23.1 
Average 20.9 Average 25.2 
4.3 as Percentage of 1: 
11.71 11.3 1 11.5 1 13.1 11.8 11.5 10.8 
5.3 as Percentage of 2: 
8.61 8.3 1 8.4 8.2 8.2 7.8 
6.3.2 as Percentage of 3 
30.61 31 .01 31.3 
.1 
30.8 
1 
35.0 
1 
38.6 
1 
40.0 
Source: As for Table 11 .1, pp. 3 8,4 6,5 0 and S 2. 
* Arising for loans bearing an original or extended maturity of one 
year or more. 
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TABLE 11.9. 
A Comparison Between the Average Interest Charges on Loans from 
'Official' and 'Private' Lenders to 96 Developing Countries: 1970-76 
(Percentages) 
Years Total 'Official' Total 'Private' 
1970 4.0 7.2 
1971 4.5 7.2 
1972 . 4.3 7.4 
1973 4.3 8.2 
1974 4.3 8.4 
1975 4.9 8.3 
1976 5.6 7. '9 
Source: World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables, op. cit. , p. 217. 
348 
TABLE 11.10. 
Debt-Service Ratio and Annual Changes in its Components 
for 1970-76 (Million U. S. $) 
1. Least Developed Countries: 
Years Total Debt Service 
% increase 
over previous 
year 
Exports 
% increase 
over previous 
year 
Debt-Service 
Ratio M 
1970 139.0 - 1618 - 8.59 
1971 170.8 22.9 1654 2.2 10.33 
1972 191.8 12.3 2145 29.7 8.94 
1973 229.8 19.8 2582 20.4 8.90 
1974 261.3 13.7 2883 -11.7 9.06 
1975 344.5 31.8 2964 2.8 11.62 
1976 1 . 393.4 14.2 3716 25.4 10.59 
Average Debt-Service Ratio 9.72 
2. '801 U. S. $ Per Capita GNP and Above' Countries: 
1970 3078.8 32840 9.38 
1971 3463.2 12.5 35609 8.4 9.73 
1972 4571.4 32.0 41366 16.2 11.05 
1973 5868.1 28.4 6057S 46.4 9.69 
1974 8109.4 38.2 113554 87. S 7.14 
1975 8385.0 3.4 110114 -3.0 7.62 
1976 9686.4 15.5 126961 15.3 7.63 
Average Debt-Service Ratio 8.89 
P. T. 0. 
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Contd. 
3.1801 U. S. $ and Above' (Excluding oil-exporting Countries)*: 
1970 2584.6 24721 10.46 
1971 2707.8 4.8 25516 3.2 10.61 
1972 3234.3 19.4 30415 19.2 10.63 
1973 4120.3 27.4 43739 43.8 9.42 
1974 5093.8 23.6 64648 47.8 7.88 
1975 6201.2 21.7 63055 -2.5 9.84 
1976 1 7224.3 16.5 73126 16.0 9.88 
Average Debt-Service Ra tio 9.82 
Source: Total debt service figures were gathered by the Author 
from World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables ..., op. cit. , 
pp. 5 2-3. Exports figures were taken from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Year Book, September 1979. 
* Eight countries are excluded. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Foreign Indebtedness and Economic Development in the Sudan 
More than 50 percent of the projected development expenditure 
during the Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) was expected to come from 
external sources including official loans, commercial borrowing and ' 
private capital. It was pointed out that "as debt servicing is likely 
to pose a difficult problem in the coming years, future loans and 
credits must be negotiated with a close watch on the debt-servicing. 
profile aimed at containment of the liability within manageable limits". 
The Plan estimated that about one-quarter of the total foreign aid to 
the Sudan during the six year period would be used to finance 
contractual debt-service obligations. Present debt difficulties are 
mainly the result of the size and form of borrowing particularly over 
the past few years. Faced with a mounting debt problem, the authorities 
focused on revising the development programme for the second half of 
the Plan to give priorities to the unfinished, the export-oriented and 
the infra -structural projects. 
2 
The present chapter is an attempt to evaluate the debt position 
of the Sudan by examining its structure from both the donor side and the 
receiving activities. It utilizes the financial ratio indicators examined 
in the previous chapter and also the various factors that have 
simultaneously affected the economy during the same period to assess 
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the origins and extent of the present debt difficulties. Finally, it 
discusses the Implications of the indebtedness problem on future 
development progress and also makes suggestions that could be useful 
in reducing the extent of future debt difficulties. 
12.1. The Outstanding Debt: A Source and a Sectoral Analysis 
The Sudan had amassed, by the end of 1977, an outstanding 
debt that was almost five and a half times the low 1966 level. Table 
12.1.. shpws that the rate of debt accumulation during the years 1974-77 
was substantially higher than before. In this connection, the level of 
outstanding debt had nearly doubled by the end of 1973 in relation to 
the 1966 level. In contrast, it was 230 percent at the end of 1977 in 
relation to the 1973 level but only 58 percent more than that at the end 
of 1974. The 1974 level was exceptionally high being more than 
double that of the preceding year. The average annual rate of debt 
accumulation during the period 1966-77 was 21.3 percent. Debt 
outstanding on the account of all donors had significantly increased 
but more particularly from the developed market economies and the 
Arab countries. For the first time, the Sudan secured a 200 million 
Euro-dollar loan guaranteed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
which was directed to the Sudan Development Corporation. Borrowing 
from the Arab countries included an increasing proportion of cash loans 
primarily to finance the growing balance of payments deficits. 
Three-quarters of the outstanding debt at the end of 1977 was 
owed to bilateral donors. International and regional multi-lateral 
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agencies together accounted for less than one-fifth of total outstanding 
debt. International multi-lateral agencies (excluding the IMF) alone 
accounted for only 11.5 percent of that. Although the above data may 
under-estimate the magnitude of the outstanding debt, it is clearly 
evident that a substantial proportion of the Sudan's indebtedness arises 
from bilateral loans. This suggests that a consortium approach by the 
maJor bilateral donors is vital in the attempts to overcome the present 
debt difficulties, as will be revealed later. 
The share distribution of the outstanding debt can be further 
explained by examining the position of cumulative repayments and the 
size of undisbursed balances. Table 12.2 reveals that the percentage 
of undisbursed balances to the outstanding debt was 56.5 percent for 
international agencies compared with 13.5 and 3.7 percent with respect 
to the developed market economies and the Arab Funds respectively. 
The wide variation in undisbursed balances ratios as between different 
donors may be particularly attributed to the diversity of loans terms and 
their ultimate end-uses. The World Bank provided the Sudan with 
various long-term loans largely for investment in the agricultural and 
the transport sectors. The time period required to complete a large- 
scale project, as in agriculture, quite often proves to be longer than 
the original estimates due to difficulties incurred in project implementation, 
including the appearance of unanticipated bottlenecks. Since a large 
proportion of the loans from the World Bank and its affiliates is provided 
for such long-term projects, not surprisingly the percentage of 
unutilized funds is higher for this group of donors relative to others 
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(see table 12.3). 
In contrast, the developed market economies and the Arab 
countries provided the Sudan with a variety of loans ranging from long- 
term interest-free loans to short-term credit facilities and cash loans. 
The latter are normally sought to overcome foreign exchange crises and 
to - support the development budget and are, therefore, likely to be 
drawn on schedule. Almost 80 percent of the outstanding debt arising 
from loans provided by the developed market economies resulted from 
credit facilities extended to enable the country to import necessary 
capital goods, and in some cases consumer goods as well. A 
substantial proportion of this aid is tied to purchases from the given 
donor's markets, so undisbursed balances are unlikely to be sizable 
unless project implementation is subject to delays. The lack of 
effective co-ordination between different donors which finance a certain 
project, or the shortage of domestic counterparts funds, may also lead 
to the build-up of unutilized funds. In addition, group-financed 
projects may be subject to considerable delays caused by a failure of 
one or more of the main donors to fulfil all their commitments. In 
addition to the build-up of undisbursed balances, these factors also 
led to the tying of domestic resources. 
A variable that is directly related to the size of the outstanding 
debt is the total amount of cumulative repayments to a particular donor 
in respect of a given loan at the end of each year. Of course, the level 
of such repayments is not necessarily related to the efficient utilization 
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of the loan or the rate of return on the project. Where repayment 
instalments are associated with the direct returns of the aid-financed 
project, cumulative repayments with respect to a given loan may be a 
useful economic indicator for the effective use of the borrowed capital. 
This inevitably is not a general practice because foreign loans are also 
used for activities such as road construction, education, health ... etc. . 
which do not yield direct returns, although they are essential 
pre-requisites for prospective development. The pace of cumulative 
repayments to a certain donor is usually governed by the original terms 
of the loan, any agreement to alter such terms, and above all, the 
capacity of the recipient country to service its foreign indebtedness. 
The availability of foreign exchange is certainly an important factor in 
determining the latter. 
It can be seen from table 12.4. that the cumulative repayments 
to the international multi-lateral agencies amounted to 61.1 percent of 
the total outstanding debt on their account with the Sudan by the end of 
19 77 compared with 38.4 and 22.7 percent for the developed market 
economies and the Arab bi-lateral loans respectively. The World Bank 
group is among the long-standing donors to the Sudan. Therefore, by 
1977 most of the 1960's loans' grace periods had expired, and so the 
size of annual repayments obligations was giowing at a faster rate than 
that for other donors. In contrast, the Arab countries significantly 
increased their lending activities to the Sudan only by the early 1970's. 
Hence the percentage ratio of cumulative repayments to the outstanding 
debt with regard to these countries is expected to remain on the low side 
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until most of the grace periods expire. It is however, notable that 
cash loans constituted about one-third of the total outstanding debt 
on the account of Arab countries with the Sudan and hence the likely 
method to meet the arising repayment obligations is refinancing. 
Table 12. S. shows that the trans port/communica tion sector was 
the largest single contributor to the total outstanding debt at the end 
of 1977 being an almost one-quarter of that total. This certainly 
under-estimates this sector's contribution since some of the debt 
obligations arising from the item 'purchase of machinery and equipment' 
may also be attributed to this sector. Loans for agriculture added 
14.2 percent to the total outstanding debt, and those used for industrial 
development were below 2 percent. Cash loans and oil facilities 
together comprised over 30 percent of that total, however this percentage 
can be expected to increase during the forthcoming years since the 
short-term difficulties that present themselves in liquidity and foreign 
exchange crises are likely to persist. 
The over-all structure of the outstanding debt shows that infra- 
structure development including transport, accounts for a significant 
proportion of the present debt, but further basic investment in that 
sector still appears to be necessary which will inevitably involve a 
high foreign exchange component. On the whole, the current economic 
difficulties; namely, the shortage of foreign exchange which had led to 
the depletion of the country's international reserves in the past are 
likely to persist for a while in the light of the difficulties that constrain 
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the expansion of exports compared with a growing size of imports. 
Table 12.6. reveals that the percentage share of private 
lenders in total outstanding debt increased from 15.6 percent in 1970, 
to nearly 40 percent at the end of 1976. Therefore, about 60 percent 
of debt was owed to official lenders; of this, more than 70 percent 
was in respect of foreign governments' bi-lateral aid to the Sudan. 
Suppliers' credits lending had also been increasing in size over the 
period under consideration, to represent about one-quarter of total 
private lending contribution to the outstanding debt at the end of 1976.3 
The total of outstanding debts on account of bi-rlateral donors were 
recently influenced by the acts of cancellations that were pledged by 
some countries in Western Europe. 
4 It is likely that the future 
composition of the outstanding debt would be altered towards more 
private debts as the trend during the 1970-76 period clearly indicates. 
A comparison between loan terms from official and private lenders 
brings out the particular implications of borrowing from each of these 
sources. Table 12.7. throws light on two phenomena: - the diversity 
of loan terms as between private and official donors and the overall 
changing pattern of loan terms over time. 
(i) There are great differences between the terms of private and 
official loans which can be seen by examining the elements that 
constitute the terms of a certain loan. These elements are: interest 
charges; the maturity, and the grace periods; all of which are combined 
in a single indicator known as the grant element of the loans. Loans 
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from private creditors normally bear higher interest rates, allow 
shorter maturity and grace periods and hence contain lower grant 
elements than official loans. The cited table shows that official loans 
had a grant element of 62.6 and 53.1 percent on average for 1971-73 and 
1974-76 respectively in contrast to 12.0 and 0.9 percent for private 
loans. Figures for 96 developing countries reveal that official loans 
have contained a grant equivalent of 45.0 and 31.0 percent for the years 
1970 and 1976 respectively while that in respect of private loans is only 
12.0 and 7.0 percent. 
5 Coupled with an increasing reliance on loans 
from private lenders, this differential implies a sharply rising trend in 
the -effective burden of indebtedness. The above figures indicate that 
private loans to the Sudan became much harder on average compared 
with the average of such loans to developing countries as a whole, 
whereas the opposite was the case for official loans. This highlights 
an important source of the growing debt difficulties which the country 
started to face during these years. 
(ii) A second feature revealed in the table 12.7 is the general 
tendency towards the hardening of loans over time. The average grant 
element from both sources decreased between the two periods, with 
private loans hardening at a faster pace compared to official loans. 
The rising cost of borrowing can be seen in the context of the prevailing 
charges on commercial lending. The hardening of loan terms may 
however indicate that lenders are incurring some risks by extending 
credits to developing countries with low potential capacities to meet 
their future debt obligations. Although there seems to be a general 
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tendency for private loans to harden over time, the pace at which 
this is taking place differs from one country to another. 
6 
Heavy 
reliance on such loans would lead to high debt-service in a short 
period partly because of maturities bunching. This is particularly 
worrying for countries whose prospects of increasing their export 
proceeds are not, at the moment, encouraging. 
Finally, the structure of the Sudan's indebtedness shows that 
by 1977 only about one-third had a maturity period of more than IS years. 
A large proportion of outstanding debt (63.1 percent) therefore arose 
from loans with. maturity periods between 5 and 15 years. Figures 
clearly indicated that the proportion of long-term loans was decreasing 
over the years while that of short-term loans (with less than 5 year 
maturity) was increasing. 
The evidence presented so far indicates that the Sudan's foreign 
indebtedness is largely to bi-lateral donors. However, the country is 
increasingly resorting to the international capital market which has 
shown itself more willing to lend to developing countries and this has 
increased the share of private loans in the total foreign capital inflow. 
Borrowing from private sources normally takes the form of short-term 
facilities to enable the country to maintain a target level of imports. 
Problems would certainly arise if short-term borrowing were used to 
finance long-term projects. The result could be that debt would 
accumulate well before the given projects yield adequate returns or have 
the desirable impact on the economy. However, the most common 
factor behind short-term borrowing is to offset the impact of a rising 
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debt-service primarily caused by maturities bunching which itself 
arises from heavy reliance on short-term loans in the past. These 
issues will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
12.2. Some Indicators of the Extent of Sudan's foreign 
Indebtedness 
Like its predecessor, this section seeks to explain the debt 
position of the Sudan by utilizing some of the commonly used aggregate 
ratio indicators that are directly related to the capacity to service 
debts, namely: - (i) debt-service ratio; (ii) debt-service/import ratio 
and (iii) reserve/import ratio. Debt-service rerpayments are viewed in 
this connection as the direct cost of foreign loans. A recipient . 
country faces competing claims on its available foreign exchange from 
both imports and debt-service obligations. Ceteris paribus, a country 
with an inadequate amount of foreign exchange to pay for both of them, 
might find it necessary to decide whether to default on debts and hence 
to maintain its desired level of imports, or alternatively to follow a 
tied import policy that would only ensure some minimum levels of 
imports which enables it to achieve a set of minimum levels of economic 
and social objectives that it reckons desirable, and at the same time 
could meet its contractual debt obligations. Such an approach implies 
that the debted country's import capacity ought to be tested against the 
need to satisfy essential consumption needs and to sustain normal 
economic activities. The minimum import requirement could be 
determined on the basis of the amounts of imported capital goods needed 
for an effective utilization of the existing productive capacity and the 
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capacities that are in the process of being established. Items that 
should be considered include the required amounts of fertilizers, spare- 
parts, industrial raw-material and construction equipment. In accordance 
with this, a country can be said to have a debt problem if two conditions 
prevail: First, if the prospective import-capacity falls short of what is 
needed for the attainment of its minimum economic and social objectives. 
Second, if debt-service repayments are likely to absorb an annually . 
increasing proportion of the available foreign exchange. The second 
condition has to be interpreted differently in varying circumstances 
particularly in the short- and the long-run. In the short-run, when a 
country finds it difficult to meet its committed foreign exchange outlays, 
the exchange problem will dominate no matter whether debt-service is 
large or small. Things look different in the long-run when a country 
finds that its prospective import-capacity falls short of the adequate 
level that is desirable to maintain minimum economic and social 
objectives. The ratio of the debt-service payments to total external 
outlays then assumes greater significance. There is, therefore, little 
sense in saying that such a country has an immediate debt problem if 
the debt-service repayments are relatively small and only make a minor 
difference to the total import-capacity. 
8 
A quantitative analysis of the debt position of a given country 
necessarily rests on the assumption that there is economic efficiency 
in the allocation and use of foreign resources. Such an evaluation 
should, therefore, be substantiated by qualitative judgements on the 
performance of the economy that is receiving foreign aid. This approach 
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will be adopted in assessing the debt position of the Sudan. 
Table 12.8. shows that the debt-service ratio of the Sudan 
had been on the increase during the 1970-79 period. It was however 
subject to sharp fluctuations resulting primarily from changes in the 
size of the total debt-service more than from fluctuations in export 
proceeds. In fact, the average percentage rate of increase of exports 
for that period was 10.5 percent compared with 18.7 percent in respect 
of total debt-service. This shows that the latter was increasing at a 
faster rate than the former. It goes without saying that the total 
export revenue fell below previous levels during both 1974 and 1978 
mainly due to the decline in the proportionate contribution of cotton as 
was noted earlier. The average debt-service ratio for the whole period 
exceeds one-fifth of the total export proceeds. A comment on the high 
ratio reported in 1975 is in order. It was the result of the record aid 
inflow that took place in 1974 of which a large proportion was of a 
short-term nature. The obvious effects of short-term borrowing is a 
fast increase in the annual debt-service obligations than should be the 
case in respect of long-term borrowing. Table 12.9. illustrates this 
phenomenon by disaggregating the total debt-service into principal 
repayments and interest charges. It is shown that while interest 
charges more than doubled in 1974, principal payments increased by 
less than one-fifth. In my opinion, this situation is open to two 
interpretations: (1) Since the Sudan had been borrowing from both 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral sources for quite a long time on long-term 
conditions and since the size of short-term borrowing had only been 
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significant very recently, the size and growth rate of the principal 
component of the debt-service reflects acts of rescheduling, cancellation 
or deferment of payments during this period as will be seen in the 
following section. This is true in the light of the fact that as grace 
periods elapse, the size of annual principal instalments is expected to 
increase by a rate determined by the length of the maturity periods. 
In contrast, total principal payments had experienced sharp fluctuations 
during certain years which lends support to the above interpretation and 
casts doubt on the usefulness of the debt-service, ratio as an analytical 
tool in determining the debt-servicing capacity of the country. (2) The 
second interpretation relates to the increase in the size of annual 
interest charges. The prime cause of that is the increase in the 
proportionate size of short-term borrowing as is evident from 1974 
figures. Generally speaking, any borrowing of short-term nature would 
have an immediate effect on the size of the interest-charges component 
of the total debt service, but the impact on principal payments takes 
time to be seen because of the grace periods that are normally allowed 
however short the maturity of such loans may be. Added to this, there 
is a possibility that some long-term loans particularly those financing 
large-scale agricultural projects such as El Rahad project may have been 
re-negotiated to soften their terms and to defer the interest payments on 
the outstanding balances of these loans. The impact of altering loan 
terms depends on the size of such an operation in relation to the total 
annual debt-service. 
Diagram 12 shows the trend line of the two components of the 
total debt-service for 1970-77. It is clearly evident that the annual 
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average rate of change of the total interest-charges is higher than that 
of principal- repayments. 
The average debt-service ratio for 1970-73 is 18.9 percent 
(table 12.8) in respect of the Sudan compared with an average of 16.1 
percent for eight mo. st seriously affected developing countries (as 
classified by UNCTAD) for the same period, ranging from 27.9 and 
24.6 percent in relation to Egypt and India to 4.4 and 1.3 for Ghana 
and Malt respectively. 
9 This indicates that the Sudan is among the 
developing countries with relatively high debt-service ratios. The 
Economist quoted an OECD report showtng that among the 29 least- 
developed countries, the Sudan assumed the highest debt-service ratio ' 
in 1975 and thereafter argued in favour of total debt-relief for such 
countries. 
10 One reason for this comparably high debt-service ratio 
Principal 
Repayments 
Interest 
Charges 
eqaloevýýs 
Years 
Diagram 12 : The Trend Line for the Components of the Total Debt- 
Service (1970-77). 
Based on data in table 12.9. 
364 
may be that the Sudan had access to lending facilities from the oil- 
exporting countries in the Middle East more easily than most countries 
in this group. However, this should not in any sense be taken as an 
indication that the Sudan received more foreign loans compared with 
other countries but necessarily reflects the forms and the terms of 
those loans. 
(ii) Another indicator that helps to explain the debt position of 
a country is the debt-s ervice/im port ratio. Unlike the debt-service 
ratio which relates foreign exchange repayments to proceeds, the latter 
relates two variables that compete for available foreign exchange. A 
high ratio in that connection indicates that large proportions of the 
available foreign exchange are being spent on debt-service repayments 
relative to the size of imports - It also indicates either a slow down 
on the growth rate of imports or a higher debt-service level than before. 
Table 12.10. shows that the average debt- service/im port ratio for the 
whole period (i. e. 1970-79) was 18.7 percent. The 1976 ratio was 
significantly higher than the preceding year due to the fact that that 
level of imports was 15.8 percent less during that year while the total 
debt-service increased so marginally. Similarly, since 1977 and 79 
witnessed a drastic fall in the total debt-service repayments (because 
of foreign exchange crisis), a lower debt service/import ratio than the 
preceding years was therefore reported. The average percentage rate 
of increase of imports for the period, 1970-79 was 17.5 compared with 
18.7 percent in respect of total debt-service. 
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(iii) A further indicator of debt-service capacity is the reserve/ 
import ratio. Table 12.11 shows that ratio for the period 196S-76. 
The importance of sizable foreign reserves to any economy is beyond 
doubt. They are an obvious buffer to protect the economy against an 
unpredicted decline in its foreign exchange earnings. Developing 
countries which depend on a few primary products for a substantial 
part of their foreign exchange revenue are likely to face such a situation 
more than countries with diversified exports. Therefore, it is necessary 
for such developing countries to build up sizable foreign reserves that 
can be used if a critical need arises. However, the size of foreign 
reserves itself is a function of the availability of foreign exchange, 
that is, the capacity of the country to increase its foreign exchange 
proceeds through international trade. 
The size of foreign reserves of the Sudan has been deteriorating 
since the early sixties. The relatively high levels of reserve/import 
ratios that was maintained during the first few years of the period'under 
review (table 12.11) did not indicate an increasing ability of the country 
to add to its reserves, but only that foreign loans were used to maintain 
that position. Although the total reserves were steadily moving in a 
downward trend, the level of imports was considerably higher in the 
1970's than was in the 1960's. The growing deficit on the current 
account caused by higher levels of imports relative to export earnings 
was the main factor for the rapid depletion of foreign reserves during the 
I 970's. 
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As was mentioned before, 1974 witnessed a record foreign 
capital inflow which resulted in more than doubling of foreign reserves, 
a trend that was short-lived. 
partly used to finance imports - 
Heavy borrowing during that year was 
Although that high level of foreign 
capital inflow was not maintained during the successive years, the 
level of imports remained relatively high which eventually caused debt 
difficulties. However, the composition of the Sudanese imports shows 
that the percentage value of imported machiner, spare-parts and 
transport equipments was 25.8 percent in 1974 increasing to 45 percent 
in 1976. This shows that any substantial reduction in imports in the 
face of debt difficulties would have a significant adverse effect on the 
development programme. This particular issue will be examined in the 
next section in connection with the over-all implications of foreign 
exchange crises. 
Finally, table 12.12 compares the reserve/import ratio of the 
Sudan with some relevant *groupings of developing countries. It is 
clear that the Sudan had maintained a ratio that was more or less 
similar to the average of comparable groupings during 1965. But this 
parity was not maintained during the 1970's when Sudan's ratios lagged 
far behind these averages for the reasons mentioned before. 
This section has produced evidence on two broad issues: - 
(i) The size of debt-service repayments had been growing at an increasing 
rate in recent years with the impact of harder loan terms on Sudan's 
indebtedness clearly evident from the relative increase of the interest 
charges in the total debt-service. 
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This means that the country may find 
itself in the middle of a deep foreign exchange crisis before its 
development process finally matures. In that case, there are important 
implications for the target growth rate of the economy. This may also 
lead ýo the distortion of the existing economic priorities in the sense 
that the available foreign exchange would then have to be used to 
achieve short-term objectives rather than the fulfilment of the long- 
term development strategy. 
(ii) There is an overwhelming importance for a flexible foreign 
sector so that short-term measures designed to reduce the size of the 
trade gap can be effective. This would also enable the country to 
re-allocate the available foreign exchange whenever it falls below the 
projected levels to ensure the least adverse impact on the development 
programme. Such an ability should help in keeping foreign indebtedness 
at manageable levels. 
The analysis of the financial ratio indicators with respect to 
the foreign debt of the Sudan suggests that if the present trend of import 
increase, of export stagnation and of high levels of foreign borrowing 
(largely on short terms) continue, the country would certainly face 
critical debt difficulties far more than at the present time. The 
implications of that would be further cuts in the development programme 
and a rapid accumulation of unpaid debt-service. 
12.3. The Impact of the Growing Size of Foreign Indebtedness 
on the Prospects of Development. and Alternative 
Policy 02tions 
The debt problem cannot be separated from the character of 
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Sudan's development strategy. This is because the development path 
chosen has a high foreign exchange component, as was revealed 
earlier. The reasons for that are; partly the insignificance or total 
lack of indigenous capital goods, plus the fact that the total 
contribution of the industrial sector to GDP is relatively quite small 
(less than 10 percent). However, the present industrial development 
strategy itself is also the most evil in that connection, being highly 
capital -intensive. Present levels of industrial production fall short 
of basic domestic needs in a rapidly growing market. Therefore, an 
increasing pressure on the balance of payments is expected to prevail 
up to the point where domestic industrial production could be sufficient 
to meet a larger proportion of the required consumer goods. 
The issue of foreign indebtedness has come into focus because 
the available foreign exchange cannot meet both the import bill and the 
debt-service repayments. As long as the country can neither increase 
its exports substantially -a possibility that seems limited in the 
present circumstances - nor significantly reduce its import bill by 
partly holding down the growth rate of the economy, debt-service will 
constitute a major challenge to the budgeting of foreign exchange 
available. If all repayments commitments are honoured, the level of 
imports would have to be reduced drastically or otherwise the inflow of 
foreign capital be increased considerably. Taking for granted that 
basic consumer necessities can hardly stand any meaningful reductions 
due to human, social and political reasons, the axe must fall mainly on 
imported raw-materials, spare-parts and capital goods. However, 
i 
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taking into considerations that most of the manufacturing industries, 
such as chemicals which constitute 10 percent of the'total value of 
imports of the Sudan, depend to a large extent on imported raw-materials, 
any significant reduction of imports in this direction would lead to an 
excessive unutilized capacity in this sector and eventually to 
considerable pressures to import finished goods. Such restriction on 
imports would certainly create unemployment and also have adverse 
effects on the future prospects of the industrial development strategy 
. as. a whole. 
The size of imported capital goods is crucial in achieving the 
stated development goals. The demand for capital goods is a function 
of investment projects in agriculture, industry, infra-structure ... e tc. 
The present strategy for agricultural development rests on the 
establishment of large-scale projects to exploit wide areas of land 
and to avoid the obvious disadvantages of small-scale production In 
terms of cost and, most importantly, the ultimate impact on the 
population. In addition, it is designed to augment exports. This 
strategy, however, requires heavy capital investment to succeed. The 
state is taking the lead in agricultural development - as in most 
developmental activities --- by either financing whole projects or joint- 
ventures involving one or more foreign donors such as the Kenana sugar 
project. 
11 But progress in the agricultural sector cannot be isolated 
from the growth of other activities in the economy. For example, the 
improvement of the transport and the communication systems has a 
direct impact on the growth of agricultural production in terms of 
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exports, domestic distribution and the availability of seasonal 
labourers. Another example relates to the suggested industrial 
development programme: being basically agriculture-orientated, it 
cannot at all develop in the absence of a successful agricultural 
programme to supply the necessary material inputs. Therefore, there 
are direct links between the prospective development programme in each 
of these sectors. On the question of imported capital goods, it means 
that any effective reduction in the required amounts of these goods (to 
maintain existing activities, complete the unfinished projects) would, 
lead to a low growth rate of the economy hence delaying the attainment 
of a self-sustained growth phase. 
So far we have examined the possibility and the implications of 
reducing the level of each category of imports if the situation arises 
where debt-service payments represent a relatively large proportion of 
the attainable foreign exchange and poses difficulties. Conclusions 
I are based on the assumption that the export sector is incapable of 
growing at a rate sufficient to meet the growing demand for foreign 
exchange generated by both imports and debt service obligations. 
12 
The present development strategy could not be expected to contribute 
a great deal to exports for quite a while. To put it differently, if we 
assume that the present level of imports is to be compressed to the 
minimum, but still foreign exchange proceeds fall short of the desired 
level, then the country would face two alternative policy options and 
the choice between them would depend on the specific circumstances 
at the given time. - 
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(i) The first option would then be to undergo further cuts in 
imports whose impact would be a reduction in the size of both the 
ordinary budget and the public sector development budget. This means 
that less capital would be invested on the developmental activities in 
which the state is undertaking a large stake and to which the future 
prosperity of the country hinges. It may also affect the indigenous 
entrepreneurs by the provision of less infra-structure and also less 
credit facilities from both the central government and the specialized 
banks. The development of the rural areas which is crucial in the 
attempts to reduce regional disparities would have to slow down in 
favour of the established parts of the modern productive sector. In 
addition to its economic consequences, such a policy option may prove 
politically undesirable in the face of the previous commitments to a 
speedy economic and social development process. 
Faced with severe balance of payments difficulties, the Sudanese 
authorities recently decided to revise the development programme for 
the period 1979/80-1981/82, in an approach similar to the Interim 
Programme of Action adopted in 197S/76-1976/77.13 The three-year 
programme focuses on completing projects in progress, on improving 
the performance of the export sector, and in particular on capital 
investment to ease the bottlenecks arising from the limited capacity of 
the transport sector. This became necessary in the light of increasing 
debt difficulties which had adverse effects on the inflow of foreign 
resources into the country. The prime factor behind this concern, 
however, is to raise the effective use of capital resources including 
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foreign loans and eventually to overcome the present debt difficulties 
by export promotion. The over-all implication of these measures is 
a slower growth rate of the economy in relation to the targets set in 
the Six-year Plan. Other measures taken to overcome the present 
debt difficulties include rescheduling, refinancing ... etc. 
(ii) The second alternative policy option is to default on debt. 
A unilateral approach to overcome the present debt difficulties by 
default is ruled out in this context because of its adverse implications 
on the future borrowing. It is, therefore, necessary to overcome the 
. present debt crisis and at the same time to ensure that future foreign ý 
. capital 
inflow should not be greatly hampered since that is crucial 
for the fulfilment of Sudan's development targets. The following 
paragraphs will consider the possible impact of theý different debt- 
relief methods such as cancellation, rescheduling, refinancing ... etc. 
on Sudan's indebtedness. 
(1) The size of the outstanding debt is partly reduced by the 
cancellation approach initiated by some advanced countries to relieve 
the least developed countries from all the liabilities arising from past 
bi-lateral loans and then to extend aid in the form of grants rather than 
loans in the future. For example, the Swedish government decided in 
1977 to write-off the total of ES. 3.4 m. representing its outstanding 
debt arising from loans to the Sudan. 
14 The impact of such an 
initiative depends on the annual share of such bi-lateral loans in the 
total debt-service and the prospects of increasing the participation of 
these countries in future development finance. The available evidence 
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indicates that only the developed market economies have adopted 
such an approach to foreign aid. However, unless more bi-lateral 
donors are willing to follow this approach to relieve the debt of the 
least-developed countries, it would have a minor impact on the present 
debt difficulties of the Sudan. This is because a large proportion of 
Sudan's indebtedness is owed to bi-lateral donors. 
(2) Another approach to ease debt difficulties is to seek 
refinancing of the existing loans. This has to be carefully considered 
because a refinancing method means an increase in the magnitude of 
the outstanding debt not for development purposes, but for the 
settlement of past claims on the available foreign exchange. The 
most obvious danger comes from an acquisition of short-term loans to 
finance long-term outstanding claims because such borrowing would add 
to the annual repayments obligations in the near future. A reasonable 
approach for the Sudan in that connection would be to assess the 
situation of the beneficiary activities or projects from each individual 
loan in order to establish whether such projects will soon be completed 
and then to what exterit will they add to the debt servicing-capacity of 
the country. If a given project has not been completed and is expected 
to have a long gestation period before it effectively contributes to the 
economy, the donors may be willing either to waive present repayments 
or to provide loans on more favourable terms to finance the arising debt. 
Such an approach would also help in the re-evaluation of projects 
currently under construction and thereafter could enable the authorities 
to avoid the snags that may have happened during a hasty search for 
financial support in the past. 
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The Sudan has so far practised two forms of debt refinancing. 
The first form is to borrow from a bi-lateral donor to repay debts due 
to agencies in that country, such as the borrowing from the Dutch 
government in 1977 to meet debt obligations to the Netherland Investment 
Bank for Developing Countries. In this particular case, the loan from 
the Dutch government was offered according to the terms normally 
applied by IDA which meant that they are softer compared with the 
terms of the loan they were intended to refinance. 
IS The second form 
of refinancing is to acquire a loan from arlotiXer source specifically to 
refinance a given debt obligation. For example, the Saudi Monetary 
Authorities which guaranteed the 200 million Euro-dollar loan agreed 
to extend a loan to help in meeting the repayments of that loan. 
16 
Another possible alternative to the above forms of debt 
refinancing is to seek long-term loans for the over-all support of the 
debt-service programme although that might prove hard to find since no 
single donor may be prepared to provide such loans. In fact, the 
Saudi government granted the Sudan a 300 million dollar loan in 1979 
for a general balance of payments support including debt-service 
repayments. 
17 
(3) The above attempts represent scattered efforts to ease the 
debt position of the Sudan. In contrast, rescheduling of past loans 
is apparently an effective way of overcoming immediate debt difficulties. 
A request in that connection may, however, throw doubts on the 
country's ability to manage its foreign debt and hence to maintain firm 
economic policies and must, therefore, be embarked on with caution, 
and only as a last resort. 
375 
An agreement between the Sudanese government and the member 
countries of the Paris Club was signed in 1979 to provide significant 
official debt relief to the former. An agreement was also reached on 
the orderly settlement of overdue obligations amounting to approximately 
300 million US dollars. 
18 During the course of the same year, the 
Sudanese government entered into negotiations with foreign commercial 
banks to reschedule commercial debts. These attempts only help to 
overcome the present debt difficulties and to ease the pressures on the 
balance of payments. Debt difficulties will again arise unless the 
whole approach to foreign borrowing is extensively revised, resources 
are used more effectively and the envisaged expansion of'the export 
sector is achieved. 
The above analysis focuses on the increasing debt difficulties 
which the Sudan faces at the present time, and examines the implications 
of the successive measures adopted by the authorities to ease these 
difficulties. The present debt problem emerges at a time when the 
country requires still large amounts of foreign resources to fulfil its 
development targets and to overcome immediate economic problems. 
It therefore became necessary to scrutinize the present development 
programme focusing on the completion of the unfinished projects and 
those which directly contribute to exports as well as the development 
Of infra-structural facilities. This could add substantially to the debt- 
servicing capacity of the country if it is ensured that such priorities 
are strictly followed and also projects are efficiently implemented. 
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On the other hand, the authorities are aware of the adverse 
effects of debt difficulties on future borrowing and subsequently on 
the development programme and are determined to avoid future debt crises. 
The trend to relieve the least-developed countries from past debt 
obligations has helped in reaching an agreement on debt relief with 
the major donors in Western Europe. However, it remains to be seen 
whether these countries will increase their lending to the Sudan on 
softer terms than before. In the meantime, it is hoped that the Sudan 
might not face an indebtedness on a larger scale before its economy 
passes the transitional phases of establishing itself on sound bases. 
12.4. Conclusion 
The analysis of the indebtedness of the Sudan - using financial 
ratio indicators and an assessment of the various aspects of the present 
development programme - reveals that it is facing considerable debt 
difficulties. This is clearly evident from the sharp rise of the debt- 
service ratio which almost doubled since 1970, and the marked increase 
in debt- s ervice/im port ratio. In addition, the reserve/import ratio 
decreased considerably over the past decade. Furthermore, there is 
a widening gap between export proceeds and import payments, and a 
slow progress - or lack of it - towards reducing such a gap. Evidence 
of the increasing indebtedness problem is also found in the persistent 
foreign exchange crises which forced the authorities to seek cash and 
budget support loans and this contributed a great deal to the present 
debt difficulties. Balance of payments support has mainly come from 
the IMF in the form of various stabilization programmes. Also there has 
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been an increasing dependence on oil facilities particularly from OPEC 
members to offset the impact of the rising oil prices on the balance of 
payments. Although the effect of the latter was global, it had a 
particularly severe adverse impact on the least-developed countries 
such as the Sudan where crude oil represented IS percent of the total 
value of imports in 1979 compared with only 11 percent in 1978. 
The above assessment of the origins and magnitude of the debt 
Problem of the Sudan must be seen against the background of a wide 
and a Justified concern among policy-makers about the progress of 
development and the ability of the economy to overcome the various 
obstacles which frustrate that. The performance of the development 
programme has considerable implications on the capacity of the country 
to service its foreign debt. The crux of the present development 
strategy is, of course, to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food-stuffs 
with an excess for exportation. Until it yields its returns, there will 
continue to be a growing pressure on the demand side particularly for 
basic consumption goods which are, at the moment, mostly imported. 
The inability to satisfy the present demand for certain imported consumer 
goods reflects an increasing foreign exchange shortage. Unless self- 
sufficiency in basic consumer needs is achieved in a few years time 
and exports are diversified, the country will certainly face severe debt 
difficulties. 
Faced with mounting debt difficulties, the Sudanese authorities 
aPproached the Paris Club seeking significant debt relief and an agreement 
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in that connection was signed in 1979. The country has also been 
financing parts of its debt obligations by special loans particularly 
from Saudi Arabia. These measures and others should ease the 
present debt difficulties. However, if the achievement of the 
development programme remarkably falls below targets, it may be 
necessary to seek further debt relief from the major donors. 
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380 
10. The Economist (1978); Relief for the Poorest: The rich countries 
should indeed cancel the official debts of the poorest poor ones, 
Vol. 266, No. 7018 (March 4-10). 
The Kenana sugar project is financed by a number of foreign donors, 
including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - The construction work is 
undertaken by European companies For further details see, 
New Africa (1979); Sudan Survey, January Issue, p. 58. 
12. This assumption is particularly valid for developing countries which 
export a few primary products such as cotton in the case of the 
Sudan. 
13. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1979, pp. 88-91. 
14. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1977, p. 41. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1979, p. 54. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid. 
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TABLE 12.2. 
Undisbursed Balances for the Three Main Donors as Percentage of 
the Total Outstanding Debt* as at end- 1977. 
MaJor Donors % 
International Multi- 56.5 lateral Agencies 
Developed Market 13.5 Economies 
Arab Funds 3.7 
All Donors 18.7 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Annual Report 1977, pp. 43-8. 
* Outstanding debt on account of each donor. 
TABLE 12.3. 
The Distribution of Undisbursed Balances According to 
Donors as at end- 1977 (Percentages) 
Groups of Donors % 
International Multi-lateral Agencies 34.8 
Centrally Planned Economies 28.0 
Developed Market Economies 22.5 
Arab Funds 8.4 
Regional Multi-lateral Agencies 6.3 
Total 100.0 
Source: As for table 12.2. 
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TABLE 12.4. 
Cumulative Repayments to the Three Main Donors as Percentage 
of Total Outstanding Debt* as at end- 1977. 
MaJor Donors % 
International Multi-lateral 61.1 
Agencies 
Developed Market Economies 38.4 
Arab Funds 22.7 
All Donors 36.7 
Source: As for table 12.2. 
* Outstanding debt on account of each donor. 
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TABLE 12. S. 
The Distribution of Public Outstanding Debt at end-1977 by 
Beneficiary Activities* (Percentages) 
Activities % Share 
Agriculture 14.2 
Transport 23.7 
Industry 1.8 
Services 0.3 
Electricity & Water Supplies 3.4 
Sub-Total 43.4 
Purchases of Equipment 25.7 
Cash 14.7 
Oil Facilities 16.2 
Sub-Total 56.6 
Grand-Total 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1977. 
* Excluding Centrally Planned Economies and Dealings with the IMF. 
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TABLE 12.6. 
Percentage Distribution of Sudan's Public Outstanding Debt* by 
Cagegory of Lenders: 1970-76 (Disbursed Only) (Percentages) 
Category of 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 197S 1976 
Lenders 
Total Official (1) 84.4 86.6 85.6 79.3 63.7 S7.5 60.9 
Total Private (2) 15.6 13.4 14.4 20.7 36.3 42. S 39.1 
Total All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Governments 58.2 60.8 62.8 6S. 2 69.0 70.6 72.7 
Inter. Organiz. 41.8 39.2 37.2 34.8 31.0 29.4 27.3 
Total Official 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Suppliers' 
7.1 6. S 4.7 6.0 1S. 8 20.3 24.8 Credits 
Total Financial 92.9 93.5 9S. 3 94.0 84.2 79.7 7S. 2 
Total Private 
1 
100. 
fl 
100.01 100.0 
1 
100.0 
1 
100.0 
1 
100.0 
1 
100.01 
Source: World Bank (1978); World Debt Tables: External Public 
Debt of Developing Countries, Doc. No. E C--1 67/78, 
Vol. II, pp. 159-60. 
* Includes public and publicly-guaranteed private loans. 
(1) Loans from governments and their agencies as well as International 
organization (including regional agencies). 
(2) Includes all forms of suppliers' credits and all types of credits from 
international financial markets. 
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TABLE 12.7. 
Average Terms of Loans Committed to the Sudan for the Periods 
1971-73 and 1974-76 
Particulars Official Creditors 1971-73 1974-76 
Private Creditors 
1971-73 1974-76 
Average Interest Rates 1.7 2.9 6.9 9. S 
Average Maturity 32.6 27.9 8.6 9.6 Periods 
Average Grant 62.6 S3.1 12.0 0.9 Element 
Source: World Baný, (1978); World Debt Tables. *., op. cit., 
219. 
TABLE 12.8. 
Debt-Service Ratio of the Sudan for the Period 1970-79 
Years Debt-Service Ratio Average 
1970 16.2 1970-73 (18.9) 
1971 20.2 1974-77 (24.0) 
1972 23.7 
1973 15.4 1970-77 (21.4) 
1974 19.0 
1975 35.1 
1970-79 (22.6) 
1976 25.1 
1977 16.6 
1978 '29.8 
1979 24.5 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1970-1979, Khartoum. 
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TABLE 12.9. 
The Components of the, Total Debt-Service: 1970-79 (ES. m. ) 
Years Principal Interest Total Debt-Service 
1970 11.1 5.4 16. S 
1971 18.2 4.1 22.4 
1972 22.2 5.3 27. S 
1973 18.6 5.7 24.3 
1974 27.2 9.2 36.4 
1975 32.1 19.3 51.4 
1976 29.4 23.1 52. S 
1977 21.7 16.5 38.2 
1978 - - 64.8 
__1979 
21.5 34.2 55.7 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1970-79, Khartoum. 
¼ 
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TABLE 12.10. 
De bt-Servi ce/Im port Ratios for the Sudan: 1970-79 
Years Ratio (91. ) Average 
1970 15.8 
1971 19.6 
1972 22.5 
1973 18.7 18.7 
1974 17.6 
1975 18.1 
1976 22.0 
1977 15.5 
1978 22.3 
1979 14.4 
Source: Imports from table 6.11 and Bank of Sudan Annual 
Report 1979; Debt-Service from table 12.9. 
389 
TABLE 12.11. 
Reserve/Import Ratios for the Sudan: 1965-76 
Years Ratios* M Average 
1965 27.8 1965-67 (25.4) 
1966 2S. 1 1965-69 (21.5) 
1967 23.4 
1970-72 (8.2) 1968 17.2 
1969 13.9 1973-'74 (14.3) 
1970 7.4 
1971 8.6 1975-76 (3. S) 
1972 8.6 
19 65 -76 (14.0) 1973 12.1 
1974 16.5 
1975 3.5 
1976 3.5 
Source: Imports from table 6.11. 
Reserves from table 6.12. 
* Figures are to the nearest decimal point. 
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TABLE 12.12. 
* 
A Comparison of Re serve/Im port" Ratios for the Sudan and the 
Relevant Developing Countries' Groupings for 196S, 70 and 1973 
(Percentages) 
Years 1965 1970 1973 
Developing Countries 31.8 31.4 47.5 
Lower-Income Developing 
Countries 23.3 27.9 27.1 
African Countries 22.7 32.0 30.4 
Sudan*** 22.3 6.2 10.1 
Source: World Bank, World Tables 1976, New York, pp. 472-4. 
Not comparable with table 11.6 because of different 
country groupings. 
Imports of goods and non-factor services. 
Slight discrepancies with table 12.11 due to diverse 
data sources. 
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PART IV 
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CONCLUSION 
Sustained economic progress of Third World countries Is normally 
hindered by a multitude of economic, political and social constraints. 
Their removal is vital to expanded economic growth. One group of 
development theories focus on the limits to economic growth arising 
from the inability to mobilize sufficient domestic resources to meet 
investment requirement of target growth rates. The critical problems 
which. arise in thiý connection can be elucidated by the two-gap 
analysis, which suggests the use of external resources to overcome 
the different sequential constraints, thereby enabling the recipient 
economy to achieve its target growth rates. 
The role of external resources in economic development has come 
under wide scrutiny, in part using econometric methods where the focus 
has been to test the relationship between domestic savings and foreign 
capital inflow and in particular aid. A sustained rate of increase of 
domestic savings is widely seen as an essential ingredient to economic 
progress. The most significant conclusion of these studies is that for 
most of recipient countries foreign capital has resulted in lower rates of 
increase in domestic savings than would otherwise be obtained. The 
implications of that are mainly related to the significance of the existing 
foreign aid programmes in adding to the growth potential of recipient 
countries. This led to suggestions that aid is detrimental to developing 
countries' efforts to mobilize domestic resources and to further progress. 
These conclusions are not however convincing to many economists, but 
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they raise some important issues in relation to the effective use of 
foreign resources to promote the development of Third World countries. 
In the light of the above discussion, this dissertation has 
attempted to test the Weisskopf hypothesis in that connection with 
respect to the Sudan. The econometric test on the Sudan for 1966-77 
has produced negative but statistically insignificant correlation 
coefficient between foreign aid and domestic savings. The negative 
causal relationship between these two variables examined earlier is 
not supported in the case of the Sudan. Moreover, our study emphasizes 
the overwhelming importance of considering the various factors that 
shaped the economic scene during the above period in interpreting the 
results of that econometric test. 
Most important in that connection was that foreign aid received 
during the above-mentioned period was predominantly in the form of 
quick-disbursing support loans for the budget and the balance of payments. 
The effective disbursement for development projects (which were mostly 
in infra-structure or in long-term yielding investment) fell well below 
targets. At the same time, the political instability that characterized 
that period also contributed to low levels of domestic savings. The 
pattern of current public expenditure had also been detrimental to 
development efforts, being largely on those activities least directly 
related to development. Coupled with low ordinary budget surpluses and 
poor performance of autonomous enterprises, the latter contributed to low 
levels of public savings which were the major source of national savings 
in'the Sudan. Foreign aid was, therefore'# in response to low savings 
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and was largely spent to maintain internal and external balances. 
The main policy implication of our study is 'that there is an immediate 
need for the implementation of economic policies designed to raise 
the level of domestic savings in the Sudan. These policies should 
involve tax reform, reduction of government spending on non-developmental 
activities, re-organization of autonomous enterprises and the establishment 
of financial agencies to mobilize private savings. These measures 
should add to the saving potential of the country. 
The present dissertation also brings out the scale and character 
of foreign resource transfers into developing countries in an attempt to 
identify the main causes of debt difficulties. There has been an 
increasing nominal transfer of resources from advanced to less-developed 
countries over the past decades, but it has fallen below the targets 
accepted in international forums. The. process has inevitably been 
accompanied by debt difficulties whose origins and dimensions vary 
between different countries; which reduces the ultimate usefulness of 
inter-country comparisons in that respect., - However, an assessment 
of the structure of outstanding debt for a-large group of countries has 
revealed a similarity in virtually all theýprime factors that underlie the 
present debt difficulties; namely, the composition of foreign borrowing, 
the loan terms, the performance of the export sector and the structure 
of imports. 
The study has utilized various financial ratio indicators, - despite 
their shortcomings,. to depict the extent of the debt problem of developin 
countries and to identify its causes and effects. It emerged that the 
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magnitudes of the financial indicators such as debt-service and debt- 
service/import ratios during the period 1970-76 were not sharply 
different as between the 'better-off' and the least-developed countries, 
primarily because the ability of individual countries to acquire more 
foreign resources is normally related to their debt-servicing capacity 
broadly determined in relation to the performance of the export sector. 
In contrast, the level of. such ratios differed significantly among 
particular countries, especially among those designated as least- 
developed ones. It is clear, therefore, that debt difficulties are at 
the moment critical for only a few developing countries,. mainly those 
whose ability to increase their foreign exchange earnings is extremely 
limited. 
By contrast, striking differences between groups 'of countries 
emerged from an examination of the composition of outstanding debts. 
Whereas 'better-off' developing countries owed an increasing 
proportion of their debts to private sources, official donors remained 
the largest and the most significant contributors to that of the least- 
developed ones. However, the latter countries had increased their 
reliance on capital borrowing from private sources, but to a far lesser 
extent than the fomer. 
The present study arrives at the conclusion that a major cause 
of debt difficulties of developing countries (which are critical in certain 
cases) is the sharp increase in the size of borrowing on commercial 
terms. The implications of such a trend in the magnitude of foreign 
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indebtedness is self-evident; including an excessive use of short- 
term credits leading to sharp increases in total debt-service over a 
relatively short period of time partly due to bunching of maturities, 
i but most importantly, leading to significant rises, in-the interest-charge 
component of debt-service; all of which aggravate debt difficulties. 
In addition, an evaluation of loan terms has revealed that borrowing 
from private sources has contained harder terms relative to that from 
official donors. Finally, there is a general tendency for loan terms 
from both sources to harden over time. S" 
Resort to more borrowing from private creditors should bý seen 
against the growing need by developing countries-for more foreign resources 
than that normally provided through official chann-els. That'stems from 
the desire of these countries both to grow rapidly and to alleviate 
poverty which are inextricably linked; causing-maýy critical economic 
-problems, highlighted by frequent liquidity and foreign exchange crises. 
Most relevant in this connection is, that excessive, borrowing on commercial 
terms has, in certain cases, been the main factor behind'rapid accumulation 
of debts and eventually led to grave debt-servicing difficulties. 
The apparent fact that insufficient volumes of external resources 
on appropriate terms were extended to developing countries, judging by 
estimates of their need for the support of such resources, caused great 
concern among academics and policy-makers alike', `ý 'It also resulted in 
critical assessments -of the present international economic'order from the 
standpoint of less-developed countries. ' As a result of these assessments, 
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it is now widely believed that the establishment of a new system to 
regulate international economic relations should result in immediate 
benefits to developing countries; notwithstanding its considerable 
long-term advantages to both sides. Although no conclusive agreement 
has been reached to restructure the system as a whole, various 
palliatives have already been adopted by most official donors in the 
field of aid which should reduce the adverse effects of debt difficulties 
of affected countries. 
The above measures include the establishment of special funds 
designed to defuse the economic crises of those countries badlY 
affected by the sharp rise in the cost of their imports. In addition, 
certain industrialized countries have agreed to provide a generalized 
debt-relief for the least-developed countries by cancellation of past 
debts and have also pledged themselves to extend their future bi-lateral 
aid to these countries in grant rather than loan form so as to avoid debt 
problems. Particularly significant in the attempts to avert debt crises 
and to promote development in indebted countries is that most of the 
latter have reached bi-lateral agreements with their major donors to 
ease the growing pressure on their economies aIr. ising from unmanageable 
foreign indebtedness; including debt re 
I 
scheduling, refinancing and 
partial cancellation. 
The above measures should ease immediate debt difficulties, 
but do not necessarily prevent the emergence of similar crises in the 
*, future -A central element in avoiding future debt difficulties is the 
ability of affected countries to improve, their inade. quate economic 
performance to which, in my opinion, a larger part of the present 
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problem is owed. They should activate their economies by 
implementing effective measures designed to promote exports, to 
overcome development constraints and to eliminate resource waste. 
Such policies should add to their debt-servicing capacity potential. 
The above arguments are presented in the broader perspective 
of developing countries as a whole in connection with the origins and 
implications of growing international indebtedness. The study then 
turns to a detailed examination of the situation in the Sudan, making 
use for this purpose of published and unpublished data. 
Our analysis makes it clear that the success of the present 
development programme of the Sudan largely depends on the ability of 
the government to mobilize foreign financial and technical support. 
With the pattern of the present development strategy prevailing since 
the early sixties, debt difficulties has become more critical during the 
late seventies. It has been shown that the country's outstanding debt 
includes a high and an increasing proportion of cash loans and 
oil-facilities to mitigate the adverse effects of the mounting deficits 
on the current account of the balance of payments caused by the 
widening trade gap and the increasing debt-service burden. The period 
1974-77 witnessed the highest-ever rate of debt accumulation in the 
Sudan; including an increasing proportion of loans from private 
creditors with obvious implications on the magnitude of debt-service 
obligations. However, the bulk of Sudan's public debt is owed to 
official donors. On the other hand, about two-thirds of the present 
level of outstanding debt has resulted from short-and medium-term 
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loans, with the size of the former sharply rising over the years. 
In view of the above characteristics of its foreign indebtedness, 
the Sudan is particularly prone to debt difficulties, which are 
aggravated by the inadequate growth performance of the economy. 
The progress of the development programme is severely limited 
by the inability of the government to provide essential investment 
requirements such as adequate facilities and sufficient construction 
materials. In addition, the performance of the export sector has fallen 
well below estimates because of the limited success of the attempts to 
increase the volume and to alter the structure of exports. Apart from 
that, the size of the import bill has considerably increased, primarily 
to satisfy the growing need for capital goods, construction equipment 
and spare-parts. 
In an attempt to overcome the above difficulties, large 
proportions of the public sector investment programme are directed to 
develop the necessary infra-structural base of the economy, and more 
than one-quarter of outstanding debt derives from loans directed to 
achieve that objective. The development programme also involves 
large-scale agricultural schemes linked with agro-based industries. 
Although such projects are important in the attempts to alleviate the 
various constraints to progress, to diversify exports and to reduce 
dome stically-subs titutable imports, they have little direct or immediate 
impact on the ability of the Sudan to improve its present debt-servicing 
capacity. 
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That the composition of foreign borrowing and its ultimate 
use have led to mounting debt difficulties in the Sudan is evident 
from the sharp rise in the magnitude of the various financial ratio 
indicators in this context; such as debt-service and debt -s ervice/im port 
ratios. Furthermore, the country's foreign reserves stand at very low 
levels. The upshot is that the Sudan has emerged as one of the few 
developing countries facing critical debt difficulties, which result in 
considerable frustration of its development programme. 
Faced with mounting economic problems and debt difficulties, 
the Sudanese authorities have acted in two directions: - (i) They 
sought considerable debt-relief from the major donors; including the 
developed market economies, the Arab countries and the private donors. 
(ii) They acted to revise the development targets in an attempt to 
vitalize the economy and more importantly to avoid similar debt crises 
in the future. 
(i) The culmination of debt difficulties during 1978-79 led to 
a major debt-relief operation by the Paris Club members which involved 
rescheduling and cancellation of parts of debt arrears. This was to be 
followed by a similar approach with respect to debts arising from loans 
owed to private creditors. Before that, there had been various attempts 
to reduce the severity of the country's debt problem, primarily by 
refinancing methods. Though it provides immediate debt-relief, the 
latter method can aggravate future debt difficulties. In addition to the 
above measures, Sudan's debt position was partly eased by the 
willingness of certain industrial countries to write off debts owed to 
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least-developed countries as a group, in which of course the Sudan 
is included. Most important in connection to these measures is that 
they should not affect the inflow of foreign resources into the country. 
(ii) The debt problem, highlighted by critical foreign exchange 
shortages, has had an adverse impact on the development programme, 
leading to intensive revision of the targets set in the Six-Year Plan 
for the period 1977/78 to 1982/83. The development programme has 
been slimmed down considerably, with great emphasis on completing 
unfinished projects, and on investment which make a direct contribution 
to exports, as well as on more capital investment to be channelled into 
infra -structural facilities including the transport sector. Such measures 
should help to break the present stagnation of the export sector, and in 
providing more development opportunities. They should also reduce 
expenditure on imported capital goods, further easing balance of 
payments difficulties. But their ultimate impact on the economy could 
be less significant than is hoped, unless they are accompanied by 
other economic measures such as reductions of public expenditure, 
re-assessment of present policies in relation to foreign borrowing and 
ensuring the effective use of resources - 
The above measures should ease the present debt problem and 
the government hopes that more foreign resources on favourable terms 
will be available to the Sudan to finance development. But the ultimate 
impact on the country's debt-servicing capacity largely depends on the 
success of the present attempts to diversify and to increase exports and 
to industrialize on a viable basis. Unless that takes place, the Sudan 
will face more critical debt difficulties in the near future than ever before. 
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APPENDIX I 
Land Use in the Sudan ('000 Hectares) 
Particulars 1961-65 1966 1970 1975 
Total Area 250581* 
Land Area 237600* 
Arable & 
Permanent Crops 
6180 6250 6365 7495 
Arable Land 
Permanent Crops 
6154 
26 
6220 
30 
6330 
35 
7450 
45 
Permanent Pasture 24000* 
Forest & Wood 91500* 
Other Land 115920 1 115850 1 115735 1 114605 
Source: FAO Production Year Book 1976, Vol. 30, p. 47. 
* Fixed areas 
N. B. 
1 Hectare = 2.4 7106 Acres 
I Feddan = 1.0 38 Acres 
(Feddan is often used in the Sudan). 
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APPENDIX 2 
The following method is used for fitting a straight line trend 
line by the method of least squares: 
. We calculate the values of the parameters 
'a' and V from the 
following relationship: 
y 
a- n 
b 
Yc =a+ bx 
Where: a is the intercept 
b is the estimated annual change of the given variable 
y is the given value of the variable 
x is the length of time-series 
YC is the computed trend line 
n is the number of observations 
In table 5.13, there are 8 observations and hence x values will be 
-7, -5 ...... 5,7. For expenditures, 
a= 216.2 
b= 15.4 
so Yc = 216.2 + 15.4 (x) 
To fit the trend line, we take any two values of x. In this case: 
yc 1970/71 ý 
216.2 + 15.4 (-S) = 139.2 
yc 1975/76 "'-- 
216.2 + 15.4 (5) = 293.3 
The same applies for revenue: - 
a= 234.0 
b= 17.4 
Yc = 234.0 + 17.4 
yc 1970/71 "- 
234.0 + 17.4 (-5) = 147.0 
404 
yc 1975/76 = 
234.0 + 17.4 (5) = 321 
Then the trend line is fitted as follows: 
The Trend Line of Public Revenue and Expenditures in the 
Sudan, 1969/70-1976/77* 
Revenue, 
Expendi- 
ture 
(Es. M. ) 
Years 
* Data from table 5.13. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Disbursement of Development Funds by Source, 1966-77 (ES. m. ) 
Years International Multilateral 
Developed 
Market 
Economies 
Arab 
Funds 
Centrally 
Planned 
Economies 
Regional 
Banks Total 
1966 4.1 2.4 5.8 0.9 13.2 
1967 3.3 4.8 1.3 0.3 9.7 
1968 1.8 4.9 1.0 0.4 - 8.1 
1969 2.8 0.1 1.7 0.4 - 5.0 
1970 4.1 1.0 1.0 3.1 - 9.2 
1971 2.7 0.2 0.8 1.5 - 5.2 
1972 1.6 6.2 4.4 1.2 - 13.4 
1973 1.4 2.9 5.8 1.2 - 11.3 
1974 1.0 13.4 13.4 1.2 0.2 29.2 
1975 3.4 12.8 7.9 1.1 4.5 34.7 
1976 3.3 2.3 20.0 0.5 1.0 27.1 
1977 3.0 - 6.1 - 0.4 9.5 
Total 37.5 51.0 69.2 11.8 6.1 175.6 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1966-77. 
407 
1:: ý 
zi 
W 
C14 
tz 
10 
(0 
M 
m 
Q) 
E 
4-1 
0 
E 
CID 
10 
(a ý-4 
(0 
r*ý C14 (D Lo Lr) co 
cý 4 cý cý c4 a; C4 0 -4 -4 04 CY) 04 (D E-4 1-4 
0 
41 
m r. 0) (1) Lo - 1ý 4ý 1 1ý Ci Ci 
tn e I 
: % 
Q M ýo cli qw (D cq 
U) 
-4 CY) -4 
C; C; 
C13 
4-J 
-4 cv) 
ý ; ; ; C c (= C 1-4 
0 -4 N CV) 1-4 (M V) 04 -4 IT 1-0 
CL 
w C.,; c; c; c; C.: C4 
4 
0; 
E-4 
cn Z N 1ý Cý 1ý C"! 
10 z C) C) " -4 -4 rý- 
-4 
:3 If) U') 
M ý4 CC) qw Lo rýý. ko qw CO rýý v 
2 
L. 
rp rý CC) (n C) 14 C14 (Y) lc: r Ul) (. 0 r%% - 
CY) m al (M (7) cn a) c) cn 0 
1-4 _4 r-4 -4 
- 
o. 4 -4 E- 
N. 
N- 
'. 0 
C, 
-4 
I a 0 0 
C13 
408 
APPENDIX 6 
The Estimated Values of the Coefficient 'c' in the Behavioural 
Equation S=a+ bY + cF + dE for the 17 Developing Countries 
Countries Periods 
Ica 
Values t-Raiio R2 
Burma 1953-62 -0.484 -2.5 0.964 
Columbia 1953-66 -0.069 -0.18 0.972 
Costa Rica 1957-65 -0.584 -1.25 0.943 
Ghana 1955-65 -0.765 -2.52 0.798 
Guiana 1954-65 -0.355 -2.83 0.970 
Honduras 1953-66 -0.880 -2.40 0.974 
India 1950-65 -0.270 -5.91 0.999 
Israel 1953-64 -0.886 -10.40 0.999 
Jordan 1959-66 -0.955 -2.63 0.965 
Malta 1955-66 -0.274 -4.41 0.949 
Mexico 1953-66 -0.055 -0.25 0.994 
Philippines 1953-62 -0.209 -1.37 0.994 
Portugal 1954-64 -0.758 -3.20 0.995 
Puerto Rico 1953-66 -0.537 -12.51 0.999 
South Korea 1953-66 -0.817 -2.13 0.904 
Taiwan 1953-65 -0.371 -2.95 0.997 
Uruguay 1955-64 -0.043 -0.2S 0.917 
Source: Weisskopf, T. E. (1972); The Impact of Foreign Capital 
Inflow on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries, 
TIE, Vol. 2, No. 1, table 2, p. 36. 
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APPENDIX 7 
A Source-Break of Net Resource Transfers to Developing Countries 
for the Years: 19 7 0,19 73-76 (Mill ion U. S. 
Categories of Countries 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Developing Countries(94)* 7125 14224 16594 26245 29118 
OB(l) 4327 7134 8700 13309 11411 
Om 
(2) 1113 2072 3047 4464 4217 
PS 
(3) 1685 5018 4847 8472 13S60 
801 U. S. $ and Above(27) 3013 6601 4628 7437 12099 
OB 960 1952 390 2110 1510 
Om 391 597 864 911 607 
PS 1662 4052 2374 4416 9982 
161-800 U. S. $ (4 8) 2584 4790 8102 13525 12597 
OB 2077 3717 4718 7673 7107 
Om 479 800 1189 1986 2149 
PS 28 277 2195 3866 3341 
160 U. S. $ and Below(l 9) 1528 2354 3866 5279 4494 
OB 1289 1470 2593 3524 2793 
Om 245 676 992 1S67 1462 
PS -6 208 281 188 239 1 
Least Developed 606 1608 2S68 3494 3088 
Countries (2S) 
OB 420 1129 1744 2495 2131 
Om 170 386 620 912 878 
PS 16 93 204 87 79 
T. 0. 
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Contd. 
Most Seriously 
Affected LDCs(39) 2040 3686 6234 10259 8648 
OB 1600 2720 4276 7602 5998 
om 429 989 1431 2350 2166 
PS 11 -23 527 307 484 I 
Oil-Exporting Countries 38 5 17 3349 84 3109 4071 (11) 
OB 906 1546 608 904 422 
om 75 223 281 405 474 
PS 757 1 1580 1 -305 1 1800 3175 
Source: See table 11.7. 
(1) OB = Official Bilateral 
(2) OM = Official Multilateral 
(3) PS = Private Sources 
Figures between brackets refer to the number of countries 
included. 
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